34 Fla. 181 | Fla. | 1894
The plaintiff in error was indicted under sec. 2020 of the Revised Statutes of Florida against improperly-printing, etc., obscene books, pamphlets, papers, etc. The indictment, after omitting the preliminary part thereof, was in the following words: ‘‘That one James Keyes, late of the county of St. Johns, and State of Florida, on the 23rd day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and ninety-four, in the county and State aforesaid, did then and there print, publish and distribute certain printed and written paper containing obscene language and. an obscene figure or picture, manifestly tending to the corruption of the morals of youth, contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Florida.”
A trial was had at the Spring term, 1894, of the Circuit Court of St. Johns county, at which the defendant was convicted. A number of assignments of error are made, predicated upon various rulings of the Circuit Court. Upon the view we take of the case it is only necessary to pass upon one of them, which is-the ninth, and relates to the refusal of the court below to grant defendant’s motion in arrest of judgment. Among the grounds of this motion we need to pass only upon the 3rd, 4th and 5th. In substance all of these grounds alleged that the indictment is insufficient; that it does not charge any offense under the laws of the State of Florida, and does not apprise the defendant of the true character of the charge in
The words used in the indictment are in the very language of the statute. In this case, however, this is not sufficient. The indictment should state the circumstances which constitute the definition of the offense. Failing to do so no j udgment can be entered upon the verdict. Stevens vs. State, 18 Fla., 903; Hamilton vs. State, 30 Fla., 229.
In arriving at our conclusions herein we have not •overlooked the provisions of our statute (sec. 2892 R. S.), which provide “that every indictment shall be deemed and adj udged good which charges the crime substantially in the language of the statute.” It could not have been the intention of the statute that an indictment-would be sufficient which gave a defendant no information of the charge against him sufficient to ■enable him to prepare his defense. Such a construction put upon it would be in conflict with the eleventh ■section of the Bill of Rights of our Constitution, which provides that every person accused of crime “shall be heard * * to demand the nature and cause of the •accusation against him.” This point was involved in the case of McNair vs. People, 89 Ill., 441. The State •of Illinois has a statutory provision almost identical with our statute just cited, but it was held in that case that the statute did not dispense with the necessity of .giving some specific description of the alleged obscene paper. The statute and the indictment in that case were very similar to the statute and indictment now under consideration. We think the indictment so indefinite in its terms that the defendant might be exposed to danger of a second prosecution for the same offense.
