Reyes v. StateReyes v. State
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Per Curiam
Maria Reyes appeals from an order dismissing her application for post-conviction relief. The application was dismissed because it was filed beyond the time period permitted by
Reyes was convicted of felony injury to a child. The judgment of conviction was upheld in
State v. Reyes,
121 Idaho 570, 826 P.2d 919 (Ct.App.1992). The remittitur in that appeal was issued on March 13, 1992. At the time,
Reyes filed her application for post-conviction relief on October 27, 1994, within five years after the remittitur from her earlier appeal, but more than one year after the effective date of the amendment to
On appeal, Reyes presents four arguments why the district court erred by concluding that her application was time-barred.
None of these arguments are persuasive. The sole ground for relief stated by Reyes in her application is a claim that her trial counsel was ineffective because the attorney “did not fully research facts and evidence, including evidence not presented at trial in order to find reasonable doubt as to [Reyes’] innocence.” Reyes’ application does not assert, nor does she argue on appeal, that this allegation concerned facts discovered after the time had expired for filing her application. Her argument on appeal focuses solely upon her alleged unawareness that the statute had been amended, while she was incarcerated, to shorten the time for filing her application. If a “discovery” exception should apply to the filing of an application for post-conviction relief, the exception must relate to
facts
learned by the applicant after expiration of the time limit established by
The key consideration under the discovery rule is the factual, not the legal, basis for the cause of action. The action accrues when the plaintiff knows or should know the relevant facts, whether or not the plaintiff also knows that these facts are enough to establish a legal cause of action. Were the rule otherwise, the discovery rule would postpone accrual in every case until the plaintiff consults an attorney.
Allen v. State,
118 Wash.2d 753, 826 P.2d 200, 203 (1992). Likewise, if a statute of limitation did not begin to run until the plaintiff became aware of the limitation, there would not be a discrete period applicable to all actions subject to the same limitation. Such a situation would be clearly contrary to the terms established by the legislature in
It is also well settled that the amendment to
In this regard, ... there is almost universal agreement that when a statutory period of limitation is amended to reduce the limitation period, the party whose right accrues before the effective date of the amendment cannot be heard to complain if he is given the full time allowed [to commence the] action according to the terms of the amended statute from and after the effective date of the amended statute.
University of Utah Hospital v. Pence,
104 Idaho at 175, 657 P.2d at 472. Because Reyes was accorded the entire one-year period following the amendment to
We also reject her argument that she has been deprived of access to the courts. Again, it is well settled that the adoption or modification by the legislature of a period of limitation for commencing an action does not violate art. I, section 18 of the Idaho Constitution.
Olsen v. J.A. Freeman Co.,
117 Idaho 706, 791 P.2d 1285 (1990);
Hawley v. Green,
117 Idaho 498, 788 P.2d 1321 (1990). Nevertheless, Reyes suggests that because she was incarcerated in an institution which
The order dismissing Reyes’ application for post-conviction relief because it was untimely filed is affirmed.