OPINION
Opinion by:
This is an appeal from the trial court’s summary judgment rendered in favor of appellees. In an opinion and judgment dated July 9, 2008, we reversed and remanded after a determination that appel-lees did not establish their entitlement to summary judgment as a matter of law. Appellees filed a motion for rehearing. To clarify our discussion on the issue of necessity, we vacate our earlier judgment, withdraw our earlier opinion, and issue this opinion and judgment in their place. Concluding our original decision was correct, we overrule appellees’ motion for rehearing.
BACKGROUND
Appellants, Xavier Reyes and Maria del Rosario T. Reyes own sixty acres of land, which they acquired in 1978 from Francisca Thrash. Appellees, Eligió E. Saenz, Jr. and Martha Saenz own approximately eighty-seven acres of land, which they acquired in 1970 from the previous owners, who in turn had acquired the land from Francisca Thrash in 1965. There is no dispute that the land owned by the Saenzes is surrounded by land owned by others, and that the Saenzes’ land does not abut a public road. The underlying dispute involves the use of a road that leads from the Saenzes’ land across Mrs. Thrasher’s land and across the Reyeses’ land to a public road. In October 2006, the Saenzes sued the Reyeses asking for a declaratory judgment on their right of way across the Reyeses’ property for the purpose of accessing the Saenzes’ property. The Saenzes also asked that the Reyeses be permanently enjoined from interfering with their use and enjoyment of the roadway across the Reyeses’ property. In their petition, the Saenzes based their request for relief on five theories: implied easement appurtenant, easement by implication, easement by necessity, easement by estoppel, and easement by prescription. The Saenzes later moved for summary judgment on three of their five theories: implied easement appurtenant, easement by implication, and easement by necessity. The trial court rendered summary judgment in favor of the Saenzes “under the various legal theories pled by them.” This appeal by the Reyeses ensued.
NO-EYIDENCE SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The Saenzes moved for both a no-evidence summary judgment and a traditional summary judgment. The basis of the Saenzes’ no-evidence motion was that the Reyeses had “failed to produce any evidence to negate or disprove the essential elements of [the Saenzes’] claims.” Although the trial court did not state whether it was granting the no-evidence motion or the traditional motion or both, we construe the court’s statement that the Saenzes were entitled to summary judgment “under the various legal theories pled by them” as granting a traditional summary judgment. We also note that the Saenzes, as plaintiffs, were not entitled to a no-evidence summary judgment on their own claims. The Texas Rules of Civil Procedure allow a party to move for summary judgment “on the ground that there is no evidence of one or more essential elements of a claim ... on which an adverse party would have the burden of proof at trial.” Tex.R. Civ. P. 166a(i) (emphasis added). The Saenzes had the burden of proof on their easement claim; *677 therefore, they were not entitled to a no-evidence summary judgment on that claim.
TRADITIONAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The Saenzes’ petition asserted five theories as the basis for their requested relief; however, they moved for a traditional summary judgment on only three of those grounds: implied easement appurtenant, easement by implication, and easement by necessity. Accordingly, to the extent the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the Saenzes on the two grounds not raised in their motion, the Saenzes were not entitled to summary judgment on the theories of easement by estoppel and easement by prescription. We thus narrow our review to whether the Saenzes established their entitlement to summary judgment as a matter of law under the remaining three grounds.
A plaintiff, as movant, must conclusively prove all essential elements of his or her claim to be entitled to summary judgment.
MMP, Ltd. v. Jones,
An essential element common to all three theories under which the Saenzes sought relief is the element of necessity.
See Drye v. Eagle Rock Ranch, Inc.,
There is no dispute the Saenzes must cross property owned by another in order to access their acreage. “[A]n easement by necessity is not defeated by proof that the party seeking the easement has ‘a mere license to use a way across the land’ of another.”
Crone v. Brumley,
Also, in their response to the Saenzes’ motion, the Reyeses point to the testimony of Xavier Reyes, which the Saenzes attached to their motion for summary judgment, in which Xavier is questioned as follows:
Q. All right. And are you aware of whether or not Eligió [Saenz] has any other method of getting to a public roadway, other than through Mrs. Thrash’s property and through your property?
A. He’s even going through my, my easement that I bought outright several times, and also through the ranch, through other places. [Emphasis added]
Q. Through what other places sir?
A. Through mine and Bazans and Manuel Reyes too. He’s been using it, not right now because he locked the gates. [Emphasis added]
Xavier Reyes’ testimony raises a genuine issue of material fact on whether the Saenzes have other possible legal means of access to their property and on whether access across the Reyeses’ property is a necessity, as opposed to a mere convenience.
See Mitchell v. Castellaw,
CONCLUSION
We conclude the Saenzes failed to conclusively prove an essential element common to all three of the theories on which they moved for summary judgment. Accordingly, the trial court erred in rendering summary judgment in favor of the Saenzes. We reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings. 1
Notes
. We decline to address the Reyeses’ first and third issues as they are not dispositive to this appeal. Tex.R.App. P. 47.1.