Opinion
Mandate. Petitioner Reyes was charged in municipal court under Penal Code section 647, subdivision (b) with soliciting an act of prostitution from Patti May, an undercover police officer. After his first trial ended in a hung jury, he filed two motions for “pretrial” discovery of information his counsel asserted was necessary to adequately prepare an entrapment defense on retrial. His first motion sought, among other items, disclosure of the names and addresses of 14 other persons arrested by the Los Angeles Police Department’s “trick” team on the same corner and on the same night petitioner was arrested. His second motion sought, among other items, the names, addresses, and telephоne numbers of persons who had filed complaints with the police department alleging that Officer May acted in the manner of a prostitute, solicited acts of prostitution, conducted herself in a manner unbecoming an officer, made false arrests, and fabricated charges. It also sought the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of persons interviewed by the police department during its investigations of complaints against May; copies of all investigative reports made as a result of such complaints; copies of records, reports, and writings in Officer May’s personnel file or in the possession of the police department pertaining to her sоlicitation of prostitution and to conduct unbecoming an officer, including findings, letters, formal reports, and oral conversations by psychiatrists, psychologists, superiors, and fellow officers; and “all findings, reports, opinions, and transcripts of disciplinary actions, or proceedings commenced or taken against Officer May by the [police department] relating to her solicitation for acts of prostitution or conduct unbecoming an officer.” In support of these motions petitioner’s counsel declared the information would show the trick team’s character trait or habit of engaging in entrapment and would enable him to impeach May’s testimony.
The municipal court refused to order disclosure of the names of others arrested on the night of petitioner’s arrest and refused to order disclosure of complaints against Officer May. It did order production of *775 statements and tape rеcordings of petitioner, identities of officers present when the statements and recordings were made, identities of members of the trick team, identities and whereabouts of all percipient witnesses to events leading to рetitioner’s arrest, and the number of other arrests made by the trick team on the night of petitioner’s arrest. Both the superior court and this court denied petitions to require disclosure of further information, but on order of the Supreme Court this court subsequently issued an alternative writ.
I
To generalize on the law of criminal discovery, an accused’s motion for discovery must be timely, must describe the information sought with reasonable specificity, and must present a plausible justification for production of the items requested.
(Hill
v.
Superior Court
(1974)
II
On the specific showing in this cause, we believe the trial court acted well within its discretion in limiting petitioner’s requests for discovery. The court’s order gave petitioner all information pеrtinent to his arrest, including recordings of his own statements, identities of the officers who overheard the statements, incidence of trick-team arrests on the night of his arrest, identities of members of the trick team, and identities and whereabоuts of all percipient witnesses to events leading to his arrest. Declarations by counsel in support of petitioner’s first motion, discovery of the identities of others arrested the same night, merely speculate that this additionаl information might help show that
*776
petitioner was entrapped, but they fail to aver what, if any, additional facts relevant to his own arrest petitioner could ascertain if he had the names, addresses, and telephone numbers оf other arrestees. Furthermore, the benefit petitioner might derive from disclosure of the identities of other arrestees is at best remote and speculative, and its dubious value to petitioner is outweighed by the legitimate interеst in privacy of the third party arrestees, some of whom may never have been charged or convicted. (See
Craig
v.
Municipal Court
(1979)
Ill
But going beyond procedural deficiencies and considering the substance of the motions, we find little merit in petitioner’s assumption that the additional information sought could corroborate his entrapment defense and produce something of potential probativе value. The encounter between petitioner and Officer May involved its own unique set of facts and circumstances, one essentially involving words and gestures exchanged between the two on a street corner. The key issue is who solicited whom. No trait of character is involved (Evid. Code, § 1103); no habit or custom is at issue (Evid. Code, § 1105, and Law Revision Commission com. thereto); no propensity for violence is present. Cases which hold the facts and circumstances of other arrests discoverable because they might support an inference that the arresting officers were emotionally inclined to and had a propensity to resort to excessive force in effecting arrеsts, and therefore might have done so in the particular
*777
case, an inference which could substantiate the claim of self defense, (see Evid. Code, § 1103;
Pitchess
v.
Superior Court
(1974)
Petitioner complains he was deceived, and therefore entrapped. Obviously he was deceived, for if he had known May under her true colors as a police officer he would never have offered her $30 to prostitute herself. But ruses, stings, and decoys are permissible strategems in the enforcement of criminаl law, and they become invalid only when badgering or importuning takes place to an extent and degree that is likely to induce an otherwise law-abiding person to commit a crime. As the court said in
People
v.
Barraza
(1979)
*778 Petitioner also complains the police had a plan to maximize arrests for solicitation of acts of prostitution, and from this he concludes that evidence of acts and conduct of the police at other times is discoverable (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (b)). Patently, the police had a plan to arrest all law violators they сould catch, and their eight-member trick team undertook to put their plan into operation. But the mere existence of a plan to make lawful arrests, which every properly conceived police drive to suрpress crime must possess, does not amount to a showing of possible illegal entrapment sufficient to justify discovery of other arrests and other conduct. At bench, petitioner uses “plan,” “scheme,” and “conspiracy” as рejorative terms for concerted police action taken in the public interest to reduce the incidence of solicitation for prostitution in a specific area by arresting and charging those who violatе the law. Yet patently, police may act in concert, and their action is not required to be haphazard to remain legal.
In final analysis, petitioner’s argument on entrapment is that he solicited May because he wаs deceived by her looks and acts into thinking she was a prostitute. The implication of his argument is that solicitation of a prostitute is not a crime. Acceptance of such an argument would be a long step toward nullification of the law against solicitation for prostitution, in that an accused could always claim he thought the victim looked and acted like a prostitute. We do not believe petitioner’s argument sets out good law. (See
Leffel
v.
Municipal Court
(1976)
Petitioner’s motions for discovery were properly denied. The writ is discharged.
Compton, J., and Beach, J., concurred.
Petitioner’s application for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied June 18, 1981. Bird, C. J., Tobriner, J., and Mosk, J., were of the opinion that the application should be granted.