BLAS REYES et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF SAN DIEGO COUNTY et al., Defendants and Respondents.
No. D005383
Fourth Dist., Div. One.
Nov. 19, 1987.
196 Cal. App. 3d 1263
Peter M. Liss, Anson B. Levitan, Colleen Fahey Fearn, Carol L. Bracy and Charles Wolfinger for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
OPINION
WORK, J.—Blas Reyes and the Welfare Rights Organization of San Diego, Inc. (Plaintiffs), brought this class action for declaratory and injunctive relief against the San Diego County Board of Supervisors and Department of Social Services (County) to stop the practice of depriving general relief recipients of benefits for failing to comply with work project rules without distinguishing between willful and nonwillful violators and to recover past benefits lost from such illegal terminations. They appeal that portion of the trial court‘s order denying its motion for class certification as to retroactive relief. They contend the class for retroactive benefits is ascertainable and meets all proper community of interest requirements necessary for certification, asserting the trial court improperly relied on the County‘s potential administrative burdens at the remedy stage of determining class identity and individual claimant entitlements. For the reasons which follow, we conclude the trial court abused its discretion in denying Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification as to retroactive relief. Accordingly, we reverse its order in part.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 17000, requires every county to provide general relief to all incompetent, poor, indigent and incapacitated individuals who are not supported by relatives, friends or state or private relief. [REDACTED] Financed entirely out of County general funds, this program was designed to be the residual financial “safety net” for indigents who cannot obtain relief from any private sources and cannot qualify for aid under any specialized state or private program. (Mooney v. Pickett (1971) 4 Cal.3d 669, 681 [94 Cal.Rptr. 279, 483 P.2d 1231].)2
Relying on Jennings v. Jones, supra, 165 Cal.App.3d at pages 1092-1093, Plaintiffs’ lawsuit essentially contends the sanctioning process of the County‘s program fails to distinguish between the competent healthy recipients who willfully fail to comply with the underlying requirements of the program and those whose failure is the result of mere negligence, inadvertence, or mental or physical disability. The class action complaint seeks injunctive and declaratory relief, claiming the County‘s practice of terminating general relief benefits without distinguishing between willful and nonwillful violations of its work project rules violates substantive due process. The action further asks the court to require the County to provide advance notice of terminations for alleged work project violations so recipients can request continued benefits pending an administrative hearing consistent with the constitutional guarantee of procedural due process. Petitioners also seek a peremptory writ of mandate ordering the County to provide timely and adequate notice of actions to sanction individuals, to provide full discovery of evidence for and during hearings, to cease enforcement of its sanctioning process, to implement regulations requiring County to sanction only
Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification was granted insofar as it sought to certify a class of аll individuals who will be sanctioned by the County and deprived of general relief benefits on or after the date of entry of final judgment.5 However, with regard to retroactive relief to all individuals who have been sanctioned by the County‘s relief program since April 10, 1983, to the date of entry of the final judgment, certification was denied. The trial court rationalized its denial of retroactive benefits to a class estimated to be comprised of 15,000 individuals, because determination of class identity and entitlement to relief at the remedy stage rendered the class unascertainable and unmanageable. The court explained: “I think that in this instance the class does not fit into the traditional class where it is a mechanical calculation... to determine the entitlements of the class, but merely requires individual hearings as to the willful nature of the violations and the determination of liability on a case-by-case basis.
“That really does not suit class certification as far as retroactive benefits are concerned. It seems to me that those parties who still have rights may pursue them, if they wish, certainly, individually. But this is all we‘re doing, if we order the class certification, would be to just renotice people that they had a right to assert their individual actions and have administrative hearings on each one. I don‘t think that suits the standard of the class litigation. It certainly becomes unmanageable from the county view and I think the Metcalf vs. Edelman case is on point in this matter, which would prohibit the determination of the class.
“Certainly, the county has indicated their willingness to have this order made without prejudice to renewal of a more determinable, manageable class that didn‘t require the individual determinations of, really, a mini trial
GOVERNING LAW
Class actions serve an important role by establishing a judicial process within which claims of many individuals can be resolved simultaneously, eliminating repetitive litigation and providing claimants with a practical method of securing redress for claims which because of their size do not warrant individual litigation. Consequently, courts and legislatures have developed and transformed this former, limited equity device to a contemporary tool designed to meet the needs of modern society. (Richmond v. Dart Industries, Inc. (1981) 29 Cal.3d 462, 469 [174 Cal.Rptr. 515, 629 P.2d 23].) [REDACTED] The class action has now become “a ‘peculiarly appropriate’ vehicle for providing effective relief when, as here, a large number of applicants or recipients have been improperly denied gоvernmental benefits on the basis of an invalid regulation, statute or administrative practice. [Citations.]” (Employment Development Dept. v. Superior Court (1981) 30 Cal.3d 256, 265 [178 Cal.Rptr. 612, 636 P.2d 575].)6
In California,
Whether a class is ascertainable is determined by examining (1) the class definition, (2) the size of the class, and (3) the means available for identifying class members. (Vasquez v. Superior Court, supra, 4 Cal.3d at pp. 821-822; Miller v. Woods, supra, 148 Cal.App.3d at p. 873.) [REDACTED] As to the community of interest requirement, it consists of three factors: “(1) predominant common questions of law or fact; (2) class representatives with claims or defenses typical of the class; and (3) class representatives who can adequately represent the class. [Citation.]” (Richmond v. Dart Industries, Inc., supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 470; Miller v. Woods, supra, 148 Cal.App.3d at p. 874.)
[REDACTED] The decision whether to certify a class rests within the sound discretion of the trial court (Richmond v. Dart Industries, Inc., supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 470; Schneider v. Vennard, supra, 183 Cal.App.3d at p. 1345) and will not be disturbed on appeal if supported by substantial evidence, unless either improper criteria were employed or erroneous legal assumptions were made. (Richmond v. Dart Industries, Inc., supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 470; Schneider v. Vennard, supra, 183 Cal.App.3d at p. 1345; Miller v. Woods, supra, 148 Cal.App.3d at p. 872.) Trial courts have been admonished to carefully weigh the respective benefits and burdens and to allow maintenance of the class action only where substantial benefits accrue both to the litigants as well as the courts. (Blue Chip Stamps v. Superior Court (1976) 18 Cal.3d 381, 385 [134 Cal.Rptr. 393, 556 P.2d 755]; Occidental Land, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 360; City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 447, 460 [115 Cal.Rptr. 797, 525 P.2d 701, 76 A.L.R.3d 1223]; Vasquez v. Superior Court, supra, 4 Cal.3d at p. 810; Collins v. Safeway Stores, Inc. (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 62, 67-68 [231 Cal.Rptr. 683].) The party seeking class certification beаrs the burden of not only showing that substantial benefits, both to the litigants and to the court, will result from class certification (City of San Jose v. Superior Court, supra, 12 Cal.3d at p. 460; Collins v. Safeway Stores, Inc., supra, 187 Cal.App.3d at p. 68), but also proving the adequacy of its representation (Richmond v. Dart Industries, Inc., supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 470). At the certification stage, just as the trial court is not to examine the merits of the case, our inquiry on
PLAINTIFFS’ CONTENTIONS AND THE COUNTY‘S RESPONSE
Plaintiffs contend they have met their burden of establishing not only an ascertainable class, but also a well-defined community of interests among their class members. They assert the trial court erroneously relied on the County‘s potential administrative burdens at the postjudgment remedy stage of determining class identity and individual claimant entitlement to relief, when it denied сlass certification for retroactive benefits. They argue the determination of class certification in government benefits cases involves the primary concern of the court‘s role in trying the case, not the administrative agency‘s duties in providing legally required relief to those who prove they are members of the class. Consequently, because the issues of class member identity and relief entitlement are not determined by the court, they are irrelevant to the class certification decision. Moreover, they contend the County‘s remedial concerns here were based upon unsupported assumptions that determinations regarding past benefits would be unduly administratively burdensome.
The County responds certification was properly denied because the validity of its actions as to any specific recipient must be individually factually determined and thus it is possible the challengеd sanctioning process may have been invalidly applied to only a few members of the broadly defined class. (Dale v. Hahn (2d Cir. 1971) 440 F.2d 633, 640; Burchette v. Dumpson (E.D.N.Y. 1974) 387 F.Supp 812, 820; Mays v. Scranton City Police Dept. (M.D.Pa. 1979) 87 F.R.D. 310, 315.) Consequently, because each recipient‘s right to recover depends on the facts peculiar to his/her case, the County asserts the trial court properly exercised its discretion since even if the plaintiffs prevail in their action, each member of the class in order to recover must establish through the administrative process his/her violation was in fact “nonwillful,” general eligibility for relief, the nature of the violation and the existence of any defenses. (See, e.g., Fischer v. Dallas Federal Sav. and Loan Ass‘n (N.D.Tex. 1985) 106 F.R.D. 465, 470-471; Rice v. City of Philadelphia (E.D.Pa. 1974) 66 F.R.D. 17, 20.) In short, the County asserts the right to monetary relief depends entirely on factual issues peculiar to each case, emphasizing liability and proof of damages cannot be determined here in an easily calculable, mechаnical manner. Accordingly, the County argues there is no sufficiently ascertainable class
The County also argues manageability is a proper factor for the court to consider in determining class certification, citing the total administrative cost here of processing approximately 7,600 claims (approximately one-half of the 15,200 sanctions imposed during the time involved) would be approximately $257,000 and exhaust six and one-half yeаrs of staff time. It claims retroactive relief here would be without substantial benefit to the class members in comparison to the administrative burden imposed. [REDACTED] Citing
AN ASCERTAINABLE CLASS
[REDACTED] Mindful in determining whether a class is ascertainable wе examine the class definition, the size of the class and the means of identifying class members (Vasquez v. Superior Court, supra, 4 Cal.3d at pp. 821-822; Miller v. Woods, supra, 148 Cal.App.3d at p. 873), we conclude Plaintiffs’ proffered class of “all individuals sanctioned from the County‘s general relief program since April 10, 1983,” is sufficiently defined to meet the “ascertainable” standard.
The County concedes the proposed class as defined is not “unduly complex.” It clearly includes all individuals potentially affected by the challenged administrative sanctioning process. (Compare Employment Development Dept. v. Superior Court, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 260, where the class was defined as “all other women ‘subjected’ to the provisions of [
[REDACTED] Preliminarily, it is firmly established a plaintiff is not required at this stage of the proceedings to establish the existence and identity of class members. (Stephens v. Montgomery Ward & Co., supra, 193 Cal.App.3d at p. 419; Collins v. Safeway Stores, Inc., supra, 187 Cal.App.3d at p. 71; Lazar v. Hertz Corp. (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 128, 138 [191 Cal.Rptr. 849].) In fact, prejudgment notice is not required in welfare class actions where declaratory and injunctive relief are the primary objectives. “California decisions follow the analysis of the federal courts; prejudgment notice ‘serves no apparent purposes’ in welfare class actions where there are no factual disputes and the class is adequately represented by counsel.” (Miller v. Woods, supra, 148 Cal.App.3d at p. 875; see also Gonzales v. Jones (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 978, 985-987 [171 Cal.Rptr. 567].) [REDACTED] However, within the context of manageability, the issue is whether there exist sufficient means
However, the County essentially argues the class is unmanageable because of the cited administrative cost in identification at the remedial stage. (See, e.g., Simer v. Rios (7th Cir. 1981) 661 F.2d 655, 671.) Manageability within this context is intertwined not only with the question of ascertainability, but also the underlying admonishment the Supreme Court has given the trial courts to carefully weigh the respective benefits and burdens of a class action and to permit its maintenance only where substantial benefits will be accrued by both litigants and the courts alike. (Blue Chip Stamps v. Superior Court, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 385; City of San Jose v. Superior Court, supra, 12 Cal.3d at p. 459.) [REDACTED] Consequently, where the administrative cost in identification and processing of past general relief recipients’ claims is so substantial to render the likely appreciable benefits to the class de minimis in comparison, the class action should not be certified. (See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Superior Court, supra, 18 Cal.3d at pp. 385-386; Bacom v. County of Merced (1977) 66 Cal.App.3d 45, 48-52 [136 Cal.Rptr. 14]; see also Lawson v. Brown, supra, 349 F.Supp at p. 209, and compare Hypolite v. Carleson (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 566, 578-579 [125 Cal.Rptr. 221], where the trial court and the court of appeal acknowledged that identification from government records was readily available, presenting a “relatively uncomplicated problem” involving “neither unreasonable time nor expense.“) However, a court should not decline to certify a class simply because it is afraid that insurmountable problems may later appear at the remedy stage. “But where the court finds, on the basis of substantial evidence... that there are serious problems now appearing, it should not certify the class merely on the assurance of counsel that some solution will be found.” (Windham v. American Brands, Inc. (4th Cir. 1977) 565 F.2d 59, 70.) Consequently, unless the unmanageability of the class action is essentially without dispute or clearly established, it should not foreclose class certification.
[REDACTED] Here, the County has not shown the administrative cost of retroactive relief outweighs appreciable benefits to the class. Preliminarily, we are unpersuaded the County‘s selected method of identification and notice is the most practicable and cost-efficient; for, in comparison, how effective and costly would simple notice to all general relief recipients during that period of time be? Moreover, the size of the class in regards to the starting date for payment of retroactive benefits to class members is not established and binding until the trial court grants final relief. Indeed, in order for the County to show the administrative costs are disproportionate to the
In summary, the trial court has considerable flexibility in the management of a class action at the remedial stage. Under these circumstances, the County‘s assertion the certification order here if the class should prevail, will require them to incur undue administrative costs both in identifying and notifying class members should be presented to the trial court postjudgment at the remedial stage. (Employment Development Dept. v. Superior Court, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 266.)
THE CLASS SHARES A WELL-DEFINED COMMUNITY OF INTEREST IN QUESTIONS OF LAW AND FACT
In determining whether the class satisfies the community of interest requirement, we look to whethеr common questions of law or fact dominate, the claims of the class representative are typical of the class and the class representative can adequately represent the class in its entirety. (Richmond v. Dart Industries, Inc., supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 470.) [REDACTED] We conclude
This second statutory requirement of a “community of interest” revolves on “whether the common questions are sufficiently pervasive to permit adjudication in a class action rather than in a multiplicity of suits.” (Vasquez v. Superior Court, supra, 4 Cal.3d at p. 810; Miller v. Woods, supra, 148 Cal.App.3d at pp. 873-874.) This common question requirement is patently satisfied here by the class claim the County has violated state law by failing to distinguish between willful violations of work rules by competent healthy adults who may be sanctioned and nonwillful violations caused by negligence, inadvertence or mental or physical disability which may not serve as a basis for sanctioning. In other words, the common goal of the entire class is to invalidate this sanctioning process and require the implementation of regulations requiring the County to sanction only healthy, competent individuals who willfully fail to comply with program requirements.
The County challenges this assessment, contending classwide liability cannot be established by the declaratory/injunctive relief phase of this case, because each class member‘s right to recover depends on facts peculiar to his/her case. The County explains that in order for a class member to recover, that individual must establish at the remedy phase not only damages, but liability—that he/she was a victim of unlawful conduct, to wit sanctioned for nonwillful conduct. Finally, the County stresses that as to each class member, the separate factual issues of eligibility, nature and willfulness of the violation, and the existence of any defenses must be determined.9
[REDACTED] Moreover, this community of interest requirement is especially satisfied here, because the trial court would have to redetermine the legality of the County‘s sanctioning process in each сase individually pursued. For, “[t]he courts will not apply... [the principle of res judicata] to foreclose the relitigation of an issue of law covering a public agency‘s ongoing
nonwillful conduct because it never evaluated a recipient‘s conduct in those terms. Indeed, all terminated past recipients had the right to have legally proper standards apply.
Finally, we find unpersuasive the County‘s assertion that the “common issue” cannot be decided without examining the facts of each individual case. In other words, the County contends that even if all class members share a common interest in whether it had a duty to distinguish between willful and nonwillful violations of the work program, proof of whether it did in fact improperly administer their work project program in its sanctioning process depends entirely on the facts peculiar to each individual case. Rather, whether the County applied an unlawful sanctioning process can be proved by reviewing the County‘s regulations, the testimony of the County‘s welfare employees as to the standard practices followed in making sanctioning decisions, as well as a sampling of representative cases probative of the County‘s practice of sanctioning for nonwillful noncompliance with work program requirements.
THE GENERAL APPROPRIATENESS OF CLASS CERTIFICATION
As already noted, it is especially appropriate to proceed with a class action to provide effective relief when, as here, a large number of welfare recipients have been allegedly, improperly denied governmental benefits on the basis of an invalid administrative practice. (Employment Development Dept. v. Superior Court, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 265, and cases there cited.) [REDACTED] The true appropriateness of proceeding with a class action here rests solely not in the ascertainability of a class of past welfare recipients under
DISPOSITION
That portion of the order denying class certification as to all individuals who have been sanctioned from the County‘s general relief program from April 10, 1983, to the date of entry of final judgment is reversed. In all other respects, the order is affirmed.
Wiener, Acting P. J., concurred.
BENKE, J.—I concur.
The court below concluded Metcalf v. Edelman (N.D.Ill. 1974) 64 F.R.D. 407, precludes the class action herein. I do not believe it does so. Moreover, I would read Metcalf not as a confusing expression of law but as being consistent with that federal authority which defines when class certification is proper.
Existing California authority provides a class action is not inappropriate merely because each class member must, at some point, make an individual
Moreover, where there is but one essential issue to be pursued and each claimant‘s entitlement to benefits depends upon the existence of this single issue rather than a separate set of issues or facts applicable to him, the class action may go forward. (Hypolite v. Carleson (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 566, 579-580 [125 Cal.Rptr. 221] [class defined as those denied benefits because their parents maintained a home together elsewhere]; also see Clothesrigger, Inc. v. GTE Corp. (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 605, 617 [236 Cal.Rptr. 605] [class composed of those who were charged for one or more unanswered long distance calls; damage amount may vary; class action permitted]; Lazar v. Hertz Corp. (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 128, 140 [191 Cal.Rptr. 849] [misrepresentation is inferred as to entire clаss, hence individual “minitrials” not necessary; class action permitted].)
However, where, after the common questions have been determined, each class claimant would still have to litigate a number of substantial questions peculiar to himself in order to recover, there does not exist a necessary community of interest and there is no assurance the class representative would indeed be representative. A class action is therefore improper. (See D‘Amico v. Sitmar Cruises, Inc. (1980) 109 Cal.App.3d 323, 326 [167 Cal.Rptr. 254].)
The preceding rules are easy to articulate. However, the difficulty and danger in examining the number of issues at the class certification stage lies in determining at what point the number of substantial issues passes from the permissible number into the impermissible and whether the multiple issues problem will present itself at the liability or remedial stage of the proceedings. While it is certainly possible, and the court is duty bound to detect an unascertainable class at the certification stage, incorrect focusing at that time on the number of substantial issues potentially involved or when they will arise may in doubtful cases serve to prematurely foreclose a legitimate class action which might more properly be limited or eliminated by decertification in later proceedings on the merits.
Unfortunately, existing California authority does not clearly set forth how the lower court is to go about deciding whether existing issues are appropriately considered at the litigation‘s merits stage or its remedial stage. As has been observed, the various rules and classifications contained in our case law respecting class actions are not easily reconcilable. (4 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Pleading, § 202, р. 238.)
Whether the multiple issues will arise at the liability or remedial stages depends in large part upon the theory of liability to be advanced by the proposed class. For purposes of the case herein, it is instructive that there is federal authority where, despite potential differences amongst members’ claims, certification has been ordered because the legal theory of liability was “as broad as the class claimed.” (See Donaldson v. Pillsbury Co. (8th Cir. 1977) 554 F.2d 825, 832, fn. 6; Gibson v. Local 40, Supercargoes & Checkers, Etc. (9th Cir. 1976) 543 F.2d 1259, 1264-1265; Tonya K. v. Chicago Bd. of Educ. (N.D.Ill. 1982) 551 F.Supp. 1107, 1111.) Metcalf v. Edelman, supra, 64 F.R.D. 407, 409, upon which the trial court here relied, is consistent with these federal cases. Indeed, it appeаrs to me that certification was denied in Metcalf not simply because of the number of issues involved, but because plaintiff‘s counsel were unable to offer the court an objective definition of the class which was consistent with and as broad as their theory of liability, i.e., denial of a livelihood compatible with health and well-being. (Ibid.) In this case, the plaintiff‘s theory of liability is that the county illegally sanctioned individuals without first drawing a distinction between those acting willfully and those acting nonwillfully. The proposed class—everyone “sanctioned“—is objectively discernible and coextensive with the theory of liability.
Although the county‘s ultimate liability to each class member may well depend upon individual factual circumstances, the county‘s existing administrative forums do provide a suitable means of protecting individual interests without sacrificing the efficacy of a сlass proceeding. Thus, contrary to the court‘s ruling below, the holding in Metcalf is not an impediment to certification of the proposed class.
A petition for a rehearing was denied December 4, 1987, and appellants’ petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied March 3, 1988.