Rexnord, a manufacturer of roller chain, hired DeWolff Boberg & Associates (DBA), a management-consulting firm, to help improve its productivity. The parties had a falling out and Rexnord brought this diversity suit for breach of contract, obtaining a jury verdict of some $1.6 million, exactly one-half of what it had sought. To that amount the judge added an award of attorneys’ fees of almost $600,000 pursuant to a term of the contract. Indiana law is agreed to govern all the substantive issues in the litigation.
The consulting agreement was drafted by DBA and provides that DBA “shall provide, on a timely basis, and to the best of its ability, the professional services as generally outlined in the Proposal from the Analysis Report.” Going to the Proposal section of DBA’s precontractual analysis of Rexnord’s needs (the “Analysis Report”), one discovers a whole series of ‘We wills”: “We will design and install management systems to give your supervisors and managers the information they need to effectively control all of the functions within their departments.” We will train your supervisors and managers ‘on the floor,’ so they truly understand how to apply and use the systems and management concepts in their operations.” We will conduct a series of opening meetings during the first two weeks, to set the stage for the process that is starting.” We will develop a performance improvement evaluation method to measure the attainment of our savings commitment on a weekly basis.” “We will design the supervisory training program based on the weaknesses we observed.”
The consulting agreement also states that
we [DBA] estimate the annual savings available to you through implementation of our program will be Four Million Dollars ($4,000,000). These savings will come about from increased labor productivity, increased throughput, and reduced rework and scrap.... Please note that we are not attempting to put a financial value on the many collateral benefits that will come about as a result of this program, such as improved customer service, improved employee morale and ongoing improvements made by your people using this process,
and adds that DBA’s fee is $1.32 million, payable weekly over the course of the project; but if DBA is not “able to achieve our guaranteed annual savings rate [the $4 million] by the planned completion date of our program [the program was to run for 33 weeks], we would either continue working on your premises at our expense, or we would reimburse a portion of our fees, to provide you with the original estimated return on investment.”
The 33 weeks ended in August of 1997, but (we are now summarizing the evidence developed at trial, construed as favorably to Rexnord as the record permits) the promised $4 million savings had not yet been achieved and DBA chose to continue working. Why had the savings not materialized? Well, DBA had recommended that Rexnord reduce the number of its workers in certain departments, and Rexnord had complied. But the recommendation had proved to be a bad one, so DBA had changed course and recommended that workers be moved into those departments from other departments. When this failed too, DBA had changed course once again and urged Rexnord to hire a number of new employees, which Rexnord did. These about-faces in personnel policy caused the morale of Rexnord’s employees to plummet, and in August more than half the employees could be seen wearing T-shirts emblazoned “DON’T MISMANAGE OUR JOBS AWAY,” with the letters D, B, and A emphasized. Turnover among both supervisors and workers had soared, causing impaired productivity and additional severance and recruitment expenses. The company lost business and market share, customers were permanently lost, profits fell, rework and scrap increased, overtime increased, delivery reliability deteriorated. All these were consequences of the disruptive effects of DBA’s inept recommendations regarding staffing; and the poor quality and defective implementation of the recommendations could be traced in turn to breaches by DBA of specific promises in the Proposal, such as the promise to install a management operating system that would determine optimal staffing requirements and the promise to train supervisors and employees in the new systems. (DBA objected to a number of Rexnord’s damages exhibits on the ground that Rex-nord had failed to prove a causal relation between breach and damages; but this just is not so.)
DBA gave up the project in October, still having achieved nowhere near the $4 million in promised savings; but it refused to refund any part of its fee, on the ground that the failure of the project had been due to lack of cooperation by Rexnord. DBA complains that the judge failed to instruct the jury adequately on this defense (that the promisee made it impossible for the promisor to carry out its promise); but he did, if less amply than would have been desirable, by stating that Rexnord could
Contract law distinguishes between direct and consequential damages, the difference lying in the degree to which the damages are a foreseeable (that is, a highly probable) consequence of a breach. See
Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp.,
Contract law takes two approaches to consequential damages in cases in which the contract itself fails to make provision concerning them (this is such a case). One, which the great Holmes favored (see
Globe Refining Co. v. Landa Cotton Oil Co.,
Were the consequential damages foreseeable here? The famous case of
Hadley v. Baxendale,
9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854), held that a mill could not recover lost profits as a result of a carrier’s delay (in breach of the contract of carriage) in delivering a part essential to the mill’s operation; and there is a superficial resemblance, supportive of DBA’s position, to this case. But the cases are different in two important respects. First, unlike the carrier in
Hadley,
DBA knew a great deal about the promisee’s business and should have been able to estimate the likelihood and magnitude of the losses that it would impose on a client if it failed to honor its undertaking. Second, the result in
Hadley
may have depended on the mill’s failure to have protected itself against the consequences of a delay by the carrier by having a spare part on hand.
Rodi Yachts, Inc. v. National Marine, Inc.,
What is slightly offputting about the consequential damages sought and awarded in this case is that they seem rather more like tort damages than like contract damages. Suppose that in the course of performing the contract, which required DBA personnel to spend a lot of time in Rexnord’s factory, an employee of DBA had through carelessness dropped his cell phone into the assembly line, causing damage. Unless the contract expressly or implicitly required the exercise of due care by DBA personnel when at Rexnord’s plant, Rexnord’s remedy would he in tort rather than in contract even though the injury had arisen in the course of the performance of a contract.
Raquet v. Thompson,
So far, so good. But unfortunately the appeal, and indeed the entire litigation, have been muddied by the misplaced preoccupation of both parties with the “collateral benefits” provision of the consulting agreement, in which, the reader will recall, DBA stated that it was “not attempting to put a financial value on the many collateral benefits that will come about as a result of this program, such as improved customer service, improved employee morale and ongoing improvements made by your people using this process.” DBA argues that this provision did not create a legally enforceable duty but that the damages the jury awarded are based in part on the erroneous belief that it did. Rexnord insisted at trial and continues to insist that the provision indeed imposed a legally enforceable duty that DBA violated.
The provision is a red herring. Rexnord to the contrary notwithstanding, the provision does not contain a binding promise, does not justify any award of damages, and indeed has nothing to do with this case. The very term “collateral,” the placement of the provision after the express promise of $4 million in savings, and DBA’s disclaimer of being able to put a
Then too, DBA would be unlikely to make a binding promise to achieve a result so dependent on the conduct of the promis-ee as “ongoing improvements
made by your people
using this process.” Such a promise would place DBA at Rexnord’s mercy, cf.
Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co. v. Color Converting Industries Co.,
The clincher is the sheer impossibility of quantifying the damages that Rexnord incurred from DBA’s failure to achieve “improved customer service, improved employee morale and ongoing improvements.” Suppose customer service did not improve, but did not worsen either. How would a judge or jury determine how much customer service should have improved — and how much DBA had promised it would improve — if DBA had performed all its promises, and what value Rexnord would have derived from such an incremental improvement? The second step would merely be difficult, but the first would be impossible because the provision does not specify the amount of improvement that DBA is obligated to bring about.
The difference between a prediction and a promise is that only the latter is a commitment.
Medtech Corp. v. Indiana Ins. Co.,
Other issues are raised but do not warrant discussion. The judgment in favor of Rexnord is
Affirmed.
