Thе Hempstead County Circuit Court, sitting as a jury, found that the appellant destroyed trees on property owned by appellees. The court held the appellant’s acts violated Ark. Code Ann. § 18-60-102 (1987), and under the authority of that statute, it awarded appelleеs treble damages in the amount of $5,220.00. Appellant appeals the lower court’s decision, contending the court erred in awarding replacement costs of the trees as damages and in trebling the damages awarded.
At trial, the parties offered damage evidence regarding the appellant’s removal of some large pine and oak trees growing on the apрellees’ property. Appellees’ expert, over appellant’s objection, was allowed to testify to the replacement costs of those trees (as shade trees), saying that the oaks were worth $200.00 to $700.00 and the pines bore a valuе of $300.00 to $600.00. Appellant’s expert gave a value of $25.00 per tree based upon the trees’ commercial or area sawmill prices. The parties’ witnesses generally agreed that three to four oaks and three to four pines had been destroyed and removed. The trial court awarded appellees $ 1,500.00 in damages before trebling the amount under § 18-60-102. The court added $720.00 fоr costs the appellees apparently incurred for removing brush left from the appellant’s bulldozer work in removing the trees. The $720.00 amount is not questioned in this appeal.
In the recent case of Worthington v. Roberts,
The Worthington case did not involve § 18-60-102 — the statute relied on by appellees — but that distinction requires no different result. Section 18-60-102(a) provides that if any person injures or destroys any tree growing оr placed for the use of shade or timber on the land of another in which such person has no right or interest, the person so trespassing shall be liable to the injured party for treble the value of the “thing so damaged” with costs. While appellant argues that thе only proper damages in this case should be the diminution in value to the property resulting from the damage, we have not reаd § 18-60-102 so narrowly.
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In Stoner v. Houston,
Appellant next questions the treble damages awarded by the trial court. Although § 18-60-102(а) provides for treble damages, appellant directs our attention to § 18-60-102(c) which, in essence, provides that if the defendаnt (appellant here) had probable cause to believe the land on which the trespass occurred was his own, then thе plaintiff (appellees) shall recover single damages only. In construing this statutory language, we have said that our cases mаke clear that a necessary element to justify treble damages is intent of wrongdoing, though such intent may be inferred from the carеlessness, recklessness, or negligence of the offending party. Calloway v. Perdue,
In considering appellant’s intent as it bears upon appellees’ entitlement to treble damages, we review the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the appellees and reverse only if the trial judge’s decision is clearly erroneous. Sipes v. Munro,
In sum, appellees and McDowell had informed appellant that, if MсDowell continued to clear the brush and trees as appellant directed, McDowell would be working on appelleеs’ property. Confronted with this information and warnings, appellant still had McDowell complete the work as instructed. On these faсts, the trial court, in trebling damages, found the appellant had been fully apprised of the property line claim of appellees before the damages were incurred, yet he proceeded to have his bulldozer operator cross the line to clear property anyway. We are unable to say the trial court was clearly erroneous.
We affirm.
Notes
There was some evidence that the appellees purchased the property with the trees for $150.00 and the property after the trees’ removal was worth $600.00. In other words, appellant claims the appellees’ market value of the property has actually increased and appellees bore no loss from the appellant’s actions.