Petitioner seeks review of LUBA’s decision reversing Washington County’s approval of a lot line adjustment affecting two lots in adjacent rural planned developments (RPDs). We reverse.
LUBA held that the county’s interpretation and application of its ordinance was “clearly wrong,” within the meaning of
Goose Hollow Foothills League v. City of Portland,
The parties express somewhat differing views about how we should review LUBA’s decision. We turn initially to that question.
LUBA reviews the county’s interpretation to determine whether it “[improperly construed the applicable law. ” ORS 197.835(7)(a)(D). We, in turn, review to determine whether LUBA’s decision is “unlawful in substance or procedure.” ORS 197.850(9)(a). However, to ascertain whether LUBA’s application of the standard in
Clark
and our later decisions explaining it was unlawful in substance, we must independently examine the local government’s interpretation and assess the consistency of the interpretation with the legislation, rather than “deferring” to LUBA’s resolution of those matters. That is the methodology that the Supreme Court appears to have used in
Clark,
We turn to the merits. The disagreement between LUBA and the county, and between the parties appearing here, turns as much on which local provisions are applicable as on what particular provisions mean. It suffices to say that petitioner and the county emphasize certain provisions relating to lot line adjustments, while LUBA and respondents consider certain RPD provisions in the county’s legislation to be more relevant. In some respects, the provisions that the parties cite are consistent- and interrelated; however, they also contain ambiguities and arguable conflicts. 1
LUBA’s and respondents’ interpretation of the local legislation is cogent. In our view, however, it is their interpretation, rather than an evaluation of the county’s interpretation under the Clark criteria, and LUBA therefore exceeded the authority that Clark leaves it by substituting its own interpretation of the local legislation for the county’s.
We said in
West v. Clackamas County,
“We emphasize that this is not a situation where other provisions of the local legislation are clearly relevant to and demonstrative of the linguistic meaning, policy, purpose or context of the provision that the local decision-maker is interpreting. Rather, the ordinance contains a grab bag of provisions that, arguably, are equally relevant and that equally support the various meanings for which the parties contend and that the decision-maker found. Where that state of absolute or near equipoise exists, the selection from the grab bag is for the local deciding entity to make. We also note that the more distant from equipoise the interpretive options *37 or the linguistic support for the local government’s interpretation becomes, the greater the burden on the local government to support its interpretation in its findings and conclusions becomes, with corresponding effects on what the appealing party must show to demonstrate error.”
The situation here is comparable. The argument to be made against the county’s interpretation is somewhat stronger than was the one in West. However, it is not strong enough to show that the county’s interpretation is “clearly wrong.” We are constrained to accept the local interpretation and LUBA erred by not doing so.
Reversed.
Notes
This case differs from Goose Hollow Foothills League v. City of Portland, supra, where we concluded as a matter of law that there was no ambiguity in the city legislation that permitted any interpretation, let alone the one that the city gave it. We cannot say that no ambiguity exists here.