137 Ky. 637 | Ky. Ct. App. | 1910
Opinion of the Court by
— Affirming.
This appeal involves the' construction of the will of George Reuling, Sr., who died a resident of Jefferson county on May 16, 1909. The will-in question was executed by the testator on September 10, 1894. On October 19, 1895, a codicil was added thereto. The first clause directed the payment of the testator’s debts. The second clause of the will is as follows: “I will and bequeath and devise all of my estate, real and personal and mixed, which may be left after paying any debt I may leave, to my beloved wife, Elizabeth Reuling, during her natural life, -provided that she remains my widow and should she marry again after my death, then she shall have only such interest in my estate as she will then be entitled to (if any) under the laws of Kentucky.” By the third clause of his will the testator provided that one of his farms should be reserved after his wife’s death as a homestead for his children or two stepdaughters so long as any of them remained unmarried. By the fourth clause he provided that the balance of his estate should be sold upon the death of his wife or her remarriage, and converted into cash and divided into eight equal parts. Four of these parts he gave tó four of his children; one of them he gave to a son, then dead, which passed to the latter’s child; one he divided between two of his stepdaughters; one he conveyed in trust for his
In a long line of decisions this court has held that, where an estate is devised to one for life, with remainder to another, with the further provision that, if the remainderman should die witjiout child or issue, then to a third person, the rule is that the words “dying without child or issue” are restricted to the death of the remainderman before the termination
of the particular estate. Bradshaw v. Butler, 110 S. W. 420, 33 Ky. Law Rep. 531; Harvey v. Bell, 118 Ky. 521, 81 S. W. 671, 26 Ky. Law Rep. 381; Rice v. Rice, 118 S. W. 270.
It is insisted, however, that this rule has no application to the case at bar, for the.reason that Mrs. Reuling, the life tenant, was dead at the time the will was probated. From this it is argued that the testator plainly intended that the property in ques
As the trust in question is a dry trust, with a naked legal title in the trustee and the unqualified beneficial interest in the appellee, we conclude that he was entitled to have the trust set aside. Woolley v. Preston, 82 Ky. 415; Pink v. Metcalfe, 83 S. W. 643,
Judgment affirmed.