2 Conn. App. 196 | Conn. App. Ct. | 1984
The plaintiff appeals1 from a judgment of the trial court dismissing his two count complaint on the grounds of lack of subject matter jurisdiction and improper service of process.
The plaintiff, a professor at Southern Connecticut State College (SCSC)2 since 1961, reached the mandatory retirement age of seventy on August 29, 1982. See General Statutes
The complaint alleged as follows. On September 18, 1981, the plaintiff, by letter to an SCSC administrator, requested that his employment be continued beyond his seventieth birthday as provided by General Statutes
On September 27, 1982, after the plaintiff's retirement, he commenced this mandamus action to compel the defendants to provide him with the reasons for the denial of his request and to hold a hearing to consider whether he should be allowed to continue his employment on a year-to-year basis. The first count of his complaint claimed that the failure to hold a hearing and to provide him with the reasons for the denial of his request deprived him of his rights to procedural due process under article
The trial court found that because the plaintiff lacked standing to bring the action, it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Although the issue of standing was dispositive, the court also found the claim of improper service to be valid.
"Standing is not a technical rule intended to keep aggrieved parties out of court; nor is it a test of substantive rights. Rather it is a practical concept designed to ensure that courts and parties are not vexed by suits brought to vindicate nonjusticiable interests and that judicial decisions which may affect the rights of others are forged in hot controversy, with each view fairly and vigorously represented. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr,
The trial court found that although the challenged action has caused injury to the plaintiff because of loss of employment, the interest sought to be protected did not come within the "zone of interests" protected by General Statutes
Standing goes to the court's subject matter jurisdiction. Housing Authority v. Local 1161,
It is by now axiomatic that administrative appeals under the UAPA must be from contested cases, which are proceedings in which either the opportunity for a *202
hearing is "required by statute" or in which a hearing was in fact held. General Statutes
The plaintiff claims that the constitution is a "statute" within the purview of General Statutes
The defendant's argument requires us to confront a question left unanswered by our Supreme Court: whether the "opportunity for hearing" which is referred to as being "required by statute" under General Statutes
Prior to 1973, the phrase "required by statute" read as "required by law." Public Acts 1973, No. 73-620, 2 amended it to read as "required by statute." Certainly the earlier phrase is broader than the later and is more susceptible of the broad reading urged by the plaintiff. "Statute" in common legal parlance refers to an act of the legislature. Ballentine's Law Dictionary. This use of the word runs throughout General Statutes
Thus, the administrative proceedings of which the plaintiff complains did not constitute a contested case. The plaintiff could not, therefore, assert standing under the UAPA.10 Ardmare Construction Co. v. Freedman,
The court found, as an alternative basis for dismissing the entire action, that service was improper because the defendants were not served individually. This was error. It is undisputed that the defendants were served only in their official capacities through the attorney general's office. Pursuant to General Statutes
There is error in part, the judgment, insofar as it dismissed the first count of the complaint, is set aside, and the case is remanded for further proceedings.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.