Dissenting Opinion
concurring. Appellant, Douglas Retterer, allegedly encountered unwelcome sexual remarks and touching from supervisors and coworkers while he was an employee of Whirlpool Corporation at its Marion plant. Retterer also allegedly was the subject of continuous ridicule because of his sexual orientation. Retterer filed a complaint against Whirlpool and his coworkers on April 20, 1994, alleging, among other things, sexual harassment. The trial court granted a motion for summary judgment in favor of the defendants on November 7, 1995. On appeal, the Third District Court of Appeals reinstated most of Retterer’s causes of action but upheld the dismissal of the sexual-harassment claim. The court found that Retterer’s claims sounded in sexual-orientation discrimination, which was not actionable in Ohio. Retterer v. Whirlpool Corp. (1996),
Importantly, Retterer failed to appeal that decision. The court of appeals’ judgment thus became the law of the case, foreclosing Retterer from reasserting
I write to make clear that this case was improvidently allowed based primarily on procedure. Retterer had an opportunity to appeal the decision of the appellate court, but did not. He is therefore forced to live with that decision.
Retterer’s sexual-harassment claim should have survived summary judgment. On this day, this court held that “R.C. 4112.02(A) protects men as well as women from all forms of sex discrimination in the workplace, including discrimination consisting of same-sex sexual harassment.” Hampel v. Food Ingredients Specialties, Inc. (2000),
Lead Opinion
The cause is dismissed, sua sponte, as having been improvidently allowed.
The court orders that the court of appeals’ opinion not be published in the Ohio Official Reports and that it may not be cited as authority except by the parties inter se.
