104 Wash. App. 147 | Wash. Ct. App. | 2001
The Retired Public Employees Council of Washington (RPEC) is a non-profit organization that advocates for retirees receiving benefits under the Public Employees Retirement System of Washington (PERS).
From 1947 to 1976, a “Retirement Board” controlled the benefits of PERS I members. Starting in 1973, this Board was empowered to grant cost of living adjustments (COLAs) if, in its sole discretion, certain conditions were met. Former RCW 41.40.195(5) (1994) provided in part:
(5) Each service retirement allowance payable from July 1st of any year after 1973 until any subsequent adjustment pursuant to this subsection shall be adjusted so as to equal the product of the cost-of-living factor for such year and the amount of said retirement allowance on the initial date of payment: PROVIDED, That the board finds, at its sole discretion, that the cost of such adjustments shall have been met by the excess*149 of the growth in the assets of the system over that required for meeting the actuarial liabilities of the system at that time.[2 ]
In 1976, the Department of Retirement Systems (DRS) succeeded to the Board’s responsibilities.
Effective May 12, 1995, the Legislature repealed former RCW 41.40.195.
RPEC now appeals. It argues (1) that the statute of limitations is six years, not three years; (2) that even if the statute of limitations is three years, it was never triggered; (3) that DRS failed to carry its burden of eliminating all issues of material fact; and (4) that the trial court should have allowed discovery.
I
The statute of limitations for a written contract is six years.
Noah v. State
II
Former RCW 41.40.195(5) necessarily obligated DRS to decide on COLAs no later than July 1 of each year, for it also obligated DRS to make any appropriate adjustment as of that date. At first glance then, it would seem that the three-year statute of limitations was triggered no later than each July 1 with respect to COLAs for the previous year. RPEC contends, however, that the statute of limitations was not so triggered because (A) PERS I is a trust and (B) the discovery rule applies.
A
RPEC argues that PERS I is a trust; that DRS as trustee of that trust “had the duty to disclose”
The premise underlying these arguments is that PERS I is a trust. In Bowles, the Supreme Court expressly “rejected a characterization of the PERS I fund as a trust.”
B
RPEC seems to rely on that aspect of the discovery rule which holds that “a cause of action does not accrue . . . until the plaintiff knows, or has reason to know, the factual basis for the cause of action.”
RPEC may be claiming that the discovery rule applies because its members were ignorant of the law—in other words, because its members were ignorant of former RCW 41.40.195(5)’s provision regarding COLAs. If that is the claim, we reject it. The discovery rule tolls the statute of limitations if a reasonable person would have been ignorant
RPEC cites Samuelson v. Community College District No. 2,
Ill
RPEC claims that the trial court should have allowed discovery before taking up DRS’s motion for summary judgment. Like the trial court, however, we disagree. The facts needed to determine whether this suit for COLAs is time barred are whether the plaintiffs are members of PERS I, and whether COLAs were granted or denied once each year. Those facts are not controverted, and discovery would have been fruitless.
RPEC’s remaining arguments are meritless or subsumed in the arguments already discussed.
Affirmed.
Bridgewater, J., and Wang, J. Pro Tern., concur.
Review denied at 143 Wn.2d 1023 (2001).
The plaintiffs include RPEC and two individuals, Gloria M. Champeaux and John E. O’Brien. For convenience, we refer primarily to RPEC.
Laws of 1973, 2d Ex. Sess., ch. 14, § 1.
Laws of 1975-76, 2d Ex. Sess., ch. 105, §§ 4, 5, 10, 11, 12.
Laws of 1995, ch. 345, § 11.
RCW 4.16.040(1); see also Barnes v. McLendon, 128 Wn.2d 563, 570, 910 P.2d 469 (1996); Cahn v. Foster & Marshall, Inc., 33 Wn. App. 838, 840-41, 658 P.2d 42, review denied, 99 Wn.2d 1012 (1983).
See RCW 4.16.080(3).
Noah v. State, 112 Wn.2d 841, 774 P.2d 516 (1989).
Bowles v. Dep’t of Ret. Sys., 121 Wn.2d 52, 847 P.2d 440 (1993).
Bowles, 121 Wn.2d at 79; Noah, 112 Wn.2d at 844.
See Bakenhus v. City of Seattle, 48 Wn.2d 695, 698, 296 P.2d 536 (1956).
Br. of Appellant at 36.
Br. of Appellant at 37.
Bowles, 121 Wn.2d at 79.
Br. of Appellant at 33 (quoting Bowles, 121 Wn.2d at 79-80).
Samuelson v. Cmty. Coll. Dist. No. 2, 75 Wn. App. 340, 877 P.2d 734 (1994), review denied, 125 Wn.2d 1023 (1995).