Retha WEEMS, Appellee, v. TYSON FOODS, INC., Appellant.
No. 10-2975
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit
December 28, 2011
665 F.3d 958
Id. at 968.
In the present case, the district court might reasonably have decided this was not an isolated incident because Smith participated in a series of telephone and text-message communications with Special Agent Moore between September 1, 2010, and October 25, 2010. Furthermore, Smith consistently has denied he intended to obstruct justice or took a substantial step toward accomplishing that objective. And finally, Smith did not voluntarily abandon his plans or try to dissuade Special Agent Moore from harming the informant. The district court did not clearly err in denying the sentencing reduction based on acceptance of responsibility.
In Honken, we cautioned that the “extraordinary case” should not be construed so broadly as to swallow the “ordinary” case where the defendant who has not attempted to obstruct justice is granted a reduction for his acceptance of responsibility. Honken, 184 F.3d at 970. Nothing in this record suggests Smith did “anything that is more than ordinary, or [went] beyond what is usual, regular, common, or customary to earn an acceptance of responsibility downward departure.” Id. (internal quоtations omitted). Because Smith attempted to obstruct justice, yet did nothing “extraordinary” to demonstrate he accepted responsibility, the district court‘s denial of the sentencing reduction was entirely proper.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.3
Patrick Scott Casey, argued, Chicago, IL, James S. Whitehead, Jason J. Englund, Chicago, IL, Susan Keller Kendall, Rogers, AR, Scotty Shively, Little Rock, AR, on the brief, for appellant.
Stephen Lee Wood, argued, Rogers, AR, for appellee.
Before RILEY, Chief Judge, COLLOTON and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.
RILEY, Chief Judge.
Retha Weems brought suit against Tyson Foods, Inc., claiming workplace gender discrimination under
I. BACKGROUND
A. Facts1
In 1988, Weems began working at the Hudson Foods poultry processing plant in Noel, Missouri (Noel plant or Noel).
Weems was employed as a Hudson superintendent at Noel when Tyson purchased the plant in 1998. Weems continued to work at Noel for Tyson, and received a number of promotions.
In 2005, Rusty Bowsher, the complex manager at Tyson‘s poultry processing plant in Monett, Missouri, hired Weems to be the Monett plant manager. At Monett, Weems reported directly to Bowsher, and he consistently gave her strong performance ratings.
While Weems was at the Monett plant, the Noel plant was plagued by production and quality control problems. Tyson removed two successive plant managers betwеen 2004 and 2006 because of the Noel plant‘s poor performance. The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) issued two Notices of Intended Enforcement (NOIE) against the Noel plant in 2004 and 2006 because the plant was not complying with federal food safety regulations. These NOIEs indicated the government would suspend operations at the Noel plant if Tyson failed to correct the identified violations.
Tyson believed Weems was needed to address the problems at the Noel plant and offered her thе position of plant manager. Tyson vice presidents Bernie Adcock and Donnie King encouraged her to accept the position. Because of the Noel plant‘s troubled history, Weems asked King and Adcock whether accepting the position would be a “career ending move.” They reassured her she would be given the time and support she needed to turn the plant around. In spite of her misgivings, Weems eventually agreed to accept the position, provided Tyson would change the managеment structure at the Noel plant, give her two years to implement the neces-
2. Noel Plant Manager
Conditions at the Noel plant were atrocious when Weems took over. The equipment and facilities were in disrepair, resulting in wasted and contaminated product. The plant‘s other managers were encouraging inappropriate recordkeeping to obscure the extent of employee absenteeism, contaminated and condemned poultry, and productivity problems. Weems immediately began addressing these issues.
Tyson continued to make personnel changes at Noel after Weems became plant manager. In February 2007, Tyson fired Patrick Johnston, the Noel complex manager and Weems’ supervisor, and replaced him with Bowsher, Weems’ former supervisor at Monett. In April 2007, Tyson created a new position at Noel—division operations manager—and appointed Tim Singleton, who had been a plant manager at a Tyson facility in Mexico. Around this same time, Adcock, who was then the division vice president responsible for the Noel plant and five other poultry processing facilities, was promoted. Chip Miller replaced Adcock as division vice president. Weems was the only female plant manager within Miller‘s division.
After Miller became division vice president, Weems fell out of favor with her supervisors. Tyson argued Weems’ performance as plant manager did not meet its expectations. Tyson presented evidence of significant health and safety issues at the plant, the plant‘s continued poor performance and high operating costs, and the perception of Weems’ supervisors that she would be unable to implement the necessary changes to turn the plant around.
Weems claimed her firing was the result of gender discrimination. To refute Tyson‘s claim she was underperforming, Weems presented evidence showing she successfully accomplished her primary responsibility as plant manager by overcoming the NOIEs and bringing the plant nearer to regulatory compliance. Weems also contends many of the changes she made at the Noel plant were only beginning to produce results when she was removed.
To show disparate treatment based on her gender, Weems offered evidence she was treated differently than Singleton and similarly situated male managers at another facility. Weems presented evidence Miller harbored a discriminatory, sexist attitude toward her. Weems testified (1) Miller would ignore Weems and speak directly to Singleton when Miller toured the plant; (2) Miller harshly accused Weems of staring at him, remarking to her “What the hell are you looking at?“; and (3) she overheard Miller tell Bowsher, “women had no business being plant managers; they couldn‘t handle the heat.”2
3. Removal as Plant Manager
In October 2007, Bowsher, Miller, and Adcock discussed removing Weems from her pоsition as plant manager. They “vett[ed]” the decision with a Tyson human resources director, and with Tyson‘s vice president of employment compliance.
On October 24, 2007, Weems heard a rumor from an outside contractor that she may be losing her job. She approached
In November 2007, Bowsher told Weems that Greg Nelson, Tyson‘s human resources division manager, would be her human resources contact during the transition. Weems was in frequent contact with Nelson as she searched for a new position. According to Weems’ testimony, she told Nelson about Miller‘s comment to Bowsher and said she “felt like [she] was discriminated against because [she] was female.” According to Weems, Nelson responded that Miller‘s comment did not reflect company policy and promised to look into it and get back to her.3
Nelson never followed up with Weems about her concerns. Nelson did, however, arrange to send Weems a “Separation Agreement and General Release” (separation agreement), which she received around November 28, 2007. Had Weems accepted the agreement, her employment would have terminated effective November 30, 2007, and Tyson would hаve paid her base salary and a portion of her medical benefits through January 4, 2008. Weems did not sign the agreement. In December, 2007, Weems accepted a position as general production manager at a Tyson facility in Springdale, Arkansas, where she remained employed through the trial.
B. Procedural History
Weems brought suit against Tyson for employment discrimination under the
To prove her allegations with respect to Nelson, Weems offered and testified about the separation agreement. Tyson objected, asserting the agreement was a compromise offer and therefore inadmissible under
During closing argument, Weems’ counsel emphasized the importance of the separation agreement for Weems’ claims, stating
The fifth reason [for finding in Weems’ favor] is this separation agreement. [Weems] met with Greg Nelson, or talked with him on November the 6th, 2007. At that time, according to his notes, she told him that she felt that she had nоt been treated right. Of course, as HR manager, apparently those words didn‘t trigger anything in his thinking process. He was waiting for those magic word—or that magic word “discrimi-
nation.” Yet, after that discussion he presents [Weems] with this separation agreement. Now, the important part here, the significant part, is that in exchange for receiving some money from Tyson, [Weems is] going to give up her right to sue the company for sex discrimination. Why would Mr. Nelson give this to [Weems], someone who had been removed from her job for poor performance, if she hadn‘t said something to him to the effect that she felt like she‘d been discriminated against because she was a woman?
. . . .
Greg Nelson, the fellow from HR, I don‘t think it was his job to see that the [equal employment opportunity] policies were enforced. I‘m thinking it‘s his job to make sure that the company didn‘t get sued, to protect the company. That‘s why that separation agreement was offered to [Weems].
During deliberations, the jury submitted a written question to the district court regarding the separation agreement. The jury inquired whether “all demoted/fired employees get a separation agreement and general release.” The district court informed the jury it could not comment and directed the jury to rely on the evidence as presented by the parties.
The jury found for Weems, awarding her $108,994 for lost wages and benefits and $650,001 in compensatory and punitive damages. The district court reduced the latter sum to $600,000 to comply with statutory damage limitations.4 Tyson moved for judgment as a matter of law or for a new trial, which were denied.
II. DISCUSSION
Tyson argues the district court abused its discretion under
A. Standard of Review
“We review de novo the district court‘s interpretation and application of the rules of evidence, and review for an abuse of discretion the factual findings supporting its evidentiary ruling.” United States v. Allen, 540 F.3d 821, 824 (8th Cir.2008). We will reverse only if an evidentiary ruling constituted “a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion . . . affect[ing] a substantial right of the objeсting party.” Vasquez v. Colores, 648 F.3d 648, 652 (8th Cir.2011) (internal quotations omitted).
B. Federal Rule of Evidence 408
At the time of trial,
We analyze this issue in three parts. First, we must address whether the separation agreement related to a claim that was in dispute as to validity or amount at the time the agreement was proffered. Second, assuming there was such a claim, we must assess whether Weems offered the separation agreement to prove Tyson‘s liability for or the validity of the claim, rather than for another acceptable purpose. And finally, upon determining the district court abused its discretion in admitting the separation agreement, we must address whether this was a material error for which Tyson is entitled to relief.
1. Disputed Claim
The separation agreement was clearly an offer of compromise within the meaning of
We have not substantially analyzed the “in dispute” requirement. See, e.g., id. (applying “in dispute” analysis with limited discussion). We agree with our sister circuits in recognizing a dispute need not “crystallize to the point of threatened litigation” for the
On the facts of this case, Weems’ claim clearly was “in dispute” when Tyson offered the separation agreement. Thе undisputed evidence shows, at the time Weems contacted Nelson, Weems had been removed from her position as plant manager and placed on administrative leave. Weems knew she had only thirty days to find another position within the company to avoid termination. Weems claims she informed Nelson of her gender discrimination concerns, and Nelson‘s notes from that conversation confirm he understood Weems felt “she was not treated right” with respect to the circumstances of her removal.
While Nelson testified he did not recall Weems raising any concerns about gender discrimination, and Weems maintains she was not contemplating legal action at the time, neither contention undermines our conclusion the claim was in dispute at the time of the offer. Tyson sent the separation agreement to Weems after Tyson re-
To the extent the district court concluded the separation agreement was not “caught by [Rule] 408” because Weems was placed on temporary administrative leave rather than tеrminated, the district court‘s finding was an abuse of discretion. Weems was placed on a thirty-day administrative leave to allow her to locate another position within Tyson and, if unsuccessful, Tyson would terminate her. If Weems accepted the separation agreement,5 she would release her claims and be terminated.
Not every employment separation agreement is an offer to settle a disputed claim under
2. Admissibility
We now address whether evidence relating to the separation agreement was admissible for a permissible purpose under
In certain circumstances, evidence of a compromise offer may be admitted to show a party‘s lack of good faith. In Athey v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 234 F.3d 357, 361-62 (8th Cir.2000), we upheld the trial court‘s admission of evidence from a settlement conference between an insurance company and the insured regarding a claim arising under an automobile insurance policy. The insurer refused to settle the claim unless the insured abandoned a pending claim of bad faith against the company. Id. at 361. Applying the substantive law of South Dakota, we held “an insurer‘s attempt to condition the settlement of a breach of contract claim on the release of a bad faith claim [could] be used as evidence of bad faith.” Id. at 362. Weems has not alerted us to any authority indicating employment separation agreements are admissible under applicable substantive law, and we have found none. Athey, therefore, does not control this case.
The policy concerns underlying
The settlement evidence was inadmissible to show Tyson‘s bad faith, and Weems has suggested no other purpose for which the evidence is relevant and admissible. In furthering the public policy of
C. Materiality
Evidentiary errors are grounds for reversal only if the error affected a substantial right of the aggrieved party. See Nichols v. Am. Nat. Ins. Co., 154 F.3d 875, 889-90 (8th Cir.1998). It is an “unusual case where a new trial is needed because a full and fair presentation of the claims was impeded at trial, and substantial prejudice resulted.” Id. at 890. On the other hand, “[t]he parties have a right to untainted jury deliberations and a verdict which is based upon admissible evidence.” Qualley v. Clo-Tex Int‘l., Inc., 212 F.3d 1123, 1131 (8th Cir.2000).
In this case, we are confronted with unusually clear and objective proof the improperly admitted evidence substantially influenced the jury‘s verdict. First, Weems’ counsel emphasized the separation agreement in his closing remarks, arguing Tyson offered the agreement because Weems “felt like she‘d been discriminated against because she was a woman,” and the agreement proves Tyson was more concerned with protecting itself against liability than with ensuring Weems had been treated fairly. Weems’ reliance on the evidence at closing suggests it materially influenced the jury verdict. See Nichols, 154 F.3d at 890 (explaining the party‘s “closing argument at trial demonstrate[d] that the [improperly admitted] evidence was intended to influence the jury‘s determination of liability,” which indicates admission of the evidence was not harmless); Gulbranson v. Duluth, Missabe and Iron Range Ry., 921 F.2d 139, 142-43 (8th Cir. 1990) (similar).
During its deliberations, the jury submitted a written question to the district court, inquiring whether “all demoted/fired employees get a separation agreement and general release.” This shows the jury was focused on the separation agreement during deliberations, and strongly supports the inference the jury materially relied on this evidence in reaching their verdict. See White v. Honeywell, 141 F.3d 1270, 1280 (8th Cir.1998).
Weems argues the error was not material beсause the separation agreement was a “general release” and did not contain an admission of liability, and therefore had minimal probative value. See Haun v. Ideal Indus., 81 F.3d 541, 547-48 (5th Cir.1996) (deciding the introduction of a similar employment separation agreement
Weems argues the error was harmless because there was ample evidence apart from the separation agreement supporting the jury‘s verdict. Assuming properly admitted evidence was sufficient to support the verdict, we must reverse if the improperly admitted evidence had “a substantial influence on the jury verdict,” Nichols, 154 F.3d at 889. In this case it is “very likely that the [imprоperly admitted evidence] affected the jury‘s deliberations and the jury verdicts.” White, 141 F.3d at 1280. Admission of the separation agreement deprived Tyson of a fair trial; thus, we reverse.
III. CONCLUSION
Under the facts of this case, we conclude the district court violated the policy and exclusionary provision of
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Sterling McKOY, Appellant.
No. 11-1749
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit
December 30, 2011