185 P. 535 | Utah | 1919
This is an original action in this court, asking for a review of certain proceedings before the Industrial Commission of this state in an action entitled Barto Reteuna as Guardian of the Person and Estate of Domineck Borda, an Injured Employé, Plaintiff, v. Independent Coal & Coke Co.
The' facts out of which this controversy arose are as follows: On'or about April 1, 1918, one Dominech Borda was employed by the Independent Coal & Coke Company in Carbon county. On said date he was injured during the course of his employment, and the accident causing the injury arose out of such employment. These facts are not in dispute, but are admitted by both parties. As a result of such injury the mind of said Borda became deranged to such an extent that he is mentally incompetent. On or about April 12, 1919, the district court of Carbon county appointed plaintiff, Reteuna, guardian of the person and estate of Borda, and thereafter such guardian filed an application with the Industrial Commission, defendant here, asking for an award for said injury under the Workmen’s Compensation Act of Utah. Comp. St. 1917, tit. 49. A hearing was regularly had on said petition on or about April 30th of that year. On May 26, 1919, an order was made, awarding to the petitioner therein twelve dollars per week, and directing the Independent Coal & Coke Company to pay the applicant as such guardian that amount from and including April 12, 1918, that being ten days after the injury, “until such date as the commission shall by proper order change, modify, or discontinue such compensation, less the sum of $648, theretofore received by the applicant.” It further appears that on or about August 23, 1919, said guardian presented his verified petition to the district court of Carbon county, in which it was set out that the Independent Coal & Coke-Company had in writing offered to pay the petitioner, as guardian aforesaid, a lump sum of $2,500 as full compensation for the injuries received by his ward while in the employ of the coal and coke company. It was likewise represented to the court that in the guardian’s judgment it
The Industrial Commission by its answer admitted the proceedings had before it as herein stated; admits that by its order it refused to approve or authorize a settlement by the payment of a lump sum of $2,500, but denies the authority of
The answer having admitted all of the allegations of the petition respecting the proceedings and orders made by the commission left no material issue of fact in dispute. To the affirmative allegations of the answer, which really stated conclusions of law only, a demurrer was filed by the plaintiff, and the matter was argued and submitted upon the issues presented by the pleadings.
The application for review filed in this court is under the provisions of Comp. Laws Utah 1917, section 3148, as amended by chapter 63, Laws Utah 1919. That section as amended provides that within thirty days after the final decision of the commission on an award any one affected by the order of the commission may apply to the Supreme Court for a weft of certiorari or review. It is also therein provided that the review shall extend no further than “to determine whether or not: (1) The commission acted without or in excess of its power; (2) if findings of fact are made, whether 'or not such findings of fact support the award under review.” It is further provided in that section as amended that the findings and conclusions of the commission on questions of fact “shall be conclusive and final and shall not be subject to review; such question of fact shall include ultimate facts and the findings and conclusions of the commission.” The other
No question is presented respecting the right of the injured employe to receive compensation, nor or the liability of the Independent Coal & Coke Company to pay such compensation.
The constitutional right of the Legislature to enact a workmen’s compensation law is no longer open to question. Many of the provisions and sections of this statute have
“The theory of workmen’s compensation is based largely upon the doctrine that society itself is vitally concerned in the prompt*264 payment of compensation to injured and the dependents of killed employes. It is a matter relating to the promotion of the general welfare. * * * The Industrial Commission is the instrumentality through which the state acts, and it is its duty, not only to ascertain all of the facts and determine the amount of compensation to which a claimant is entitled, hut to pursue the matter to final judgment in the event the .employer refuses to pay. In other words, the state, as the representative of society at large, steps in and takes charge. Such being the case, it follows that the individual claimants, not being solely interested, cannot enter into a release which will be binding without the consent of the state through the action of the Industrial Commission.”
To the same effect is the decision of the Supreme Court of Michigan in the case of Estate of Beckwith v. Spooner, 183 Mich. 323, 149 N. W. 971, Ann. Cas. 1916E, 886.
Section 3138 of the act provides when compensation shall be received by an employé for partial disability, and that such compensation shall be a weekly allowance. Section 3144 defines the powers and jurisdiction of the commission as follows:
“The powers and jurisdiction of the commission over each case shall be continuing, and it may from time to time make such modification or change with respect to former findings or orders with respéct thereto as in its opinion may be justified.”
Section 3146, relating to -the authority of the commission to commute payments, is as follows:
“The commission, under special circumstances, and when the same is deemed advisable, may commute periodical benefits to one or more lump sum payments.”
It will thus be seen that the commission is charged with the duty of fixing the compensation to be received by an injured employé. Also, that, after having made such award, the commission, under section 3144, supra, has continuing power and authority to modify or change such order of award as in its opinion may be justified. By the provisions of section 3145, under special circumstances, when deemed advisable, it may commute the periodical payments to one or more lump sum payments. Considering the objects sought to be accomplished by the enactment, that it is not damages as ordinarily understood to be paid by the negligent employer for an injury to an employé, but that it is compensation to
In addition, under the particular facts as presented by the record, even if we considered it a matter that the court should review, we are not prepared to say that the acts of the commission were arbitrary and unlawful. It appears from the record that the injured employe is an Italian, that he is mentally incapacitated by the accident, and that it is wholly uncertain as to how long the incompetency will last, or what form or degree such incompetence or insanity may take. While it is true that the duty of the commission
It is contended by counsel for plaintiff that' the order of the district court of Carbon county authorizing and empowering the guardian to make the settlement and to execute a re-leasé, if not binding upon the commission, was at least prima facie evidence of the reasonableness of the settlement, and that in the absence of any evidence to the contrary it was incumbent upon the commission to-authorize the settlement as directed by the district court. In that we think the petitioner is in error. The fund to be paid for the injury is in no sense an estate to be administered by a guardian as usually understood in the handling of estates belonging to incompetents and minors. Section 3146 of the act in question provides:
“Compensation before payment shall be exempt from all claims of creditors and from any attachment or execution, and shall be paid only to such employes or their dependents.”
It follows from that section that the only jurisdiction the district court had, or could have, .over the fund in question is to see that it is applied by the guardian for
Considering the entire record, there is ample testimony to support the conclusion of the commission to refuse to approve the settlement, considered purely as a question
*267 “When those questions do not arise — and they necessarily can arise only in a few and exceptional instances — the findings and orders of the commission respecting the amount, terms, time, and condition of payment and the nature and extent of the injuries are necessarily final, and not subject to review by the courts.”
If it be contended tbat tbe conclusions herein reached of necessity abridge the freedom of contract, it is sufficient answer that the authority of the Legislature to enact a workmen’s compensation law is no longer open to question; that the provisions of such law, if constitutional, enter into and become a binding part of all contracts made between employers and employés. By the provisions of section 3151 of the act any agreement made in advance between an employer and ah employe, releasing or limiting the liability of the employer in the event of injury, is not binding. The interests of society in the working of the act in question that will not permit a waiver of the right for compensation is also sufficient to prevent the settlement or payment of such compensation in any other manner except as provided by the act, and as may be lawfully determined by the commission under its provisions.
It follows that the writ should be denied, and the petition dismissed. Such is the order.