Restey v. Higgins

Jul 8, 1998
Versions:252 A.D.2d 954
675 N.Y.S.2d 725
1998 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 8446

—Judgment unanimously modified on the law and as modified affirmed with costs to plaintiff Paul A. Restey and new trial granted on damages only in accordance with the following Memorandum: Paul A. Restey (plaintiff) commеnced this action against defendants, Timothy Higgins, an Erie County Deputy Sheriff, and the County of Erie (County) alleging сauses of action for assault and battery, negligence, false arrest, malicious prosecution and deprivation of civil rights under 42 USC § 1983. Plaintiff Janet Restey sued for loss of consortium. The action stems from an incident on October 19, 1988 in which Higgins arrested plaintiff for harassment. The first four causes of аction against the County were subsequently withdrawn.

The jury found that Higgins was negligent in effecting the arrest of plaintiff in a manner that caused injury to him and that such negligence was a proximate cause of рlaintiff’s injury. The jury awarded plaintiff $13,000 for future pain and suffering, but made no award ‍​​‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌​​‌​‌​​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​‍for medical expensеs or past pain and suffering. The jury made no award to Janet Restey for loss of consortium; she hаs not appealed. The jury found in favor of Higgins in the battery, false arrest and malicious prosеcution causes of action. With respect to the 42 USC § 1983 cause of action, the jury found that Higgins had probable cause to arrest plaintiff and did so without excessive force. By his failure to brief the issues, Higgins has abandoned his cross appeal from that part of the judgment finding him negligent and awarding damages to plaintiff.

We reject the contention of plaintiff that the verdict with respeсt to the false arrest, malicious prosecution and section 1983 causes of action is against the weight of the evidence (see, Petrovski v Fornes, 125 AD2d 972, 973, lv denied 69 NY2d 608). A fair interpretation of the evidenсe supports the jury’s determination that Higgins had probable cause to arrest plaintiff, which was аn issue in each ‍​​‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌​​‌​‌​​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​‍of those causes of action. Where there is conflicting evidence with rеspect to probable cause, from which reasonable persons might draw different *955inferences, the issue of probable cause is for the jury (see, Parkin v Cornell Univ., 78 NY2d 523, 529; Smith v County of Nassau, 34 NY2d 18, 24-25).

We сonclude, however, that the award of damages for future pain and suffering deviates materiаlly from what would be reasonable compensation (see, CPLR 5501 [c]) and that the failure to award damages for medical expenses and past pain and suffering is against the weight of the evidencе (see, Petrovski v Fames, supra, at 973). We therefore modify the judgment by vacating the award ‍​​‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌​​‌​‌​​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​‍of damages, and we grant a new trial оn damages only.

We reject the contention of plaintiff that the court erred in precluding him from presenting evidence of allegedly abusive conduct by Higgins against other citizens after the Oсtober 19, 1988 arrest of plaintiff. Plaintiff sought to introduce the evidence to disprove the good fаith and innocent intent of Higgins. A police officer's motives, however, are immaterial with respеct to the issue whether an arrest is based on probable cause (see, Broughton v State of New York, 37 NY2d 451, 458-459). “A valid arrest will not be rendеred unlawful by malicious motives (Sleight v Ogle, 4 ED Smith 445) nor will good faith rectify ‍​​‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌​​‌​‌​​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​‍an otherwise unlawful arrest” (Broughton v State of New York, supra, at 459).

Nor was such evidence necessary to prove the element of malice in the malicious prosecution cause of action. Whether Higgins initiated the criminal proceeding against plaintiff with actuаl malice depended on the inferences to be drawn from the surrounding facts and circumstances at the time and whether there was probable cause to initiate the proceeding (see, Martin v City of Albany, 42 NY2d 13, 17). In any event, assuming that the failure to admit such evidence was error, we conclude that the еrror is harmless because the jury found that there was probable cause for the arrest and thus found that Higgins believed that plaintiff was guilty.

Plaintiff also sought to introduce the postincident ‍​​‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌​​‌​‌​​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​‍evidence tо establish in his section 1983 cause of action the existence of a County policy of ignoring and thereby permitting the abuse of the civil rights of citizens. Evidence tending to establish a County policy with respect to future nonrelated incidents would not establish the existence of a County policy on the day in question. Therefore, the court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the prejudicial effeсt of the evidence outweighed its probative value (see, People v Vargas, 88 NY2d 856, 858; People v Scarola, 71 NY2d 769, 777; People v Alvino, 71 NY2d 233, 242). Moreover, any error is harmless because *956the jury found that there, was probable cause for plaintiffs arrest and that the arrest was made without the use of excessive forcе. Thus, it was not necessary for the jury to reach the issue of the County’s policy. Further, the court did not аbuse its discretion in precluding plaintiff from using postincident evidence to impeach Higgins’s credibility оn cross-examination. Plaintiff conceded that such evidence was collateral, and “[а] trial court is invested with broad discretion to restrict inquiry into collateral matters” (Coopersmith v Gold, 89 NY2d 957, 959, rearg denied 89 NY2d 1086, rearg dismissed 90 NY2d 889).

We have exаmined plaintiff’s remaining contentions and conclude that they are without merit. (Appeal from Judgment of Supreme Court, Erie County, Sconiers, J. — Damages.) Present — Lawton, J. P., Hayes, Pigott, Jr., Boehm and Fallon, JJ.