81 Ga. App. 110 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1950
The record shows that the petitioner was served
1. The order on the adoption petition, which was served personally on Julian Respess, set July 20, 1945 as a date for hearing the petition. The hearing was held on December 16, 1946, at which time the attorney for Julian Respess appeared and urged written objections to the adoption, which included a denial of abandonment. The order setting a date for a hearing of the question whether the interlocutory decree allowing adoption should be made final was dated January 2, 1948. As to notice its provision is: “It is further ordered that the clerk mail a copy of this notice to persons at interest as provided in Acts of 1941: Frank A. Bowers, attorney for Julian Respess, father of said child.” This order is construed to mean that the court adjudged notice to the attorney to be in compliance with the act of 1941, and not that he delegated to the clerk the decision of the question as to who should be served. The requirement of the mailing of notice of the date set for the final hearing (Ga. L. 1941, p. 305, Ga. Code Ann. § 74-414), is a jui'isdictional prerequisite, insofar as a natural parent charged with abandonment is concerned, as is the requirement of personal service in the first instance. The General Assembly elected to require that the notice be given to the party himself and made no provision for notice to an attorney or anyone else. This is true because the findings' of the judge at the interlocutory hearing are not final and irrevocably binding on the court or parties. There is no limitation on the number or kind of objections which may be urged at the final hearing and the judge on a final hearing may make findings contrary to those made at an interlocutory hearing. In such serious matters as are involved in an adoption proceeding, nothing should restrict the judge in the solemn finding involving the adoption of a child, not even his findings on an interlocutory hearing. It will be noted that the original
Judgment reversed.