Opinion
Plaintiff Ella Respers appeals from a judgment denying her petition for writ of mandate (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5). Plaintiff sought to *867 compel respondent University of California Retirement System (hereafter UCRS) to set aside its decision denying disability benefits.
On appeal plaintiff contends: (1) the trial court should have reviewed UCRS’s decision using the independent judgment test rather than the substantial evidence test; (2) the UCRS Board (hereafter Board) abused its discretion by rejecting the findings of its hearing officer as to the credibility of evidence and witnesses; (3) assuming the substantial evidence test applies, the Board’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence; and (4) the Board failed to make findings sufficient to enable appellate review of its decision.
We conclude the last of plaintiff’s contentions has merit. We therefore reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand with directions that a peremptory writ of mаndate issue commanding the Board to vacate its decision and to make findings sufficient to support its decision and facilitate judicial review. We also conclude that, on any judicial review following remand, the trial court should review UCRS’s decision using the substantial evidence test.
Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiff was hired by the University of California (hereafter University) in September of 1971 as a licensed vocational nurse (LVN) at the University’s Davis Medical Center (Medical Center). In May оf 1972 plaintiff injured herself as she attempted to lift a patient out of his bed. Plaintiff experienced pains in her lower back and became diaphoretic. Plaintiff’s injury was diagnosed as a pulled muscle. She was off work for nine weeks.
Plaintiff returned to work but could only work for short periods. Plaintiff was given a “floating” assignment which involved different duties every day.
Plaintiff continued to experience back pains and was hospitalized in 1978 for exploratory surgеry. The surgery revealed a fractured spine.
Plaintiff returned to work in July of 1979. She was assigned to an alcohol abuse floor where she had to weigh patients in their beds. 1 She reinjured herself while in this assignment. Plaintiff was given large doses of medication which affected her eyesight.
*868 When plaintiff returned to work after this injury she was initially assigned to the mental health department. She was then assigned to be a door monitor, a position she held for nine months. Plaintiff suffered some minor injuries while working as a door monitor.
After plaintiff was terminated from her position as door monitor she was not reemployed by the Medical Center. 2
Plaintiff began seeing Dr. James Peal, a psychiatrist, shortly after she stopped working as a door monitor. Peal concluded plaintiff suffered from psychophysiological musculoskeletal reaction as a result of her injuries while working as an LVN.
On September 24, 1980, plaintiff was medically separated from her employment with the University. On October 27, 1980, plaintiff filed an application for disability income from UCRS.
A UCRS disability review committee (hereafter Review Committee) considered plaintiff’s application for disability income. Included for the committee’s consideration was an October 2, 1979, letter from Dr. Peal to plaintiff’s then-counsel describing the degree of plaintiff’s mental impairment as “slight” but becoming “moderate under stress.”
On July 14, 1981, the Review Committeе denied plaintiff’s application for disability income citing the Regents’ definition of “Disabled Member” as a “Member who is prevented from performing the duties of his present position or a comparable position because of a physical or mental incapacity of permanent or extended and uncertain duration. ...” The Review Committee determined plaintiff’s medical information did not establish she was precluded from perfоrming as an LVN or in a comparable position.
On November 4, 1981, the Review Committee formally reconsidered its decision denying disability income. The committee received a new report *869 from Dr. Peal, dated October 4, 1981, one full year after his earlier report. In this report Dr. Peal stated plaintiff was unable to perform duties as an LVN or in a comparable position. Dr. Peal concluded plaintiff was too depressed and apprеhensive to function in University employment. The Review Committee rejected Dr. Peal’s report on the basis it did not indicate plaintiff was disabled as of her requested date of disability, October 1980. On November 4, 1981, the Review Committee reaffirmed its decision to deny disability income.
Pursuant to UCRS regulation 11.01 plaintiff requested an administrative hearing de novo to review the denial of disability income. On October 7, 1982, a hearing was conducted before an administrative law judgе (ALJ). Evidence presented to the ALJ included testimony of Mary Anne Keenan, a personnel analyst at the Medical Center. Keenan testified she thought plaintiff was qualified to be a communications assistant at the Medical Center. Keenan also testified plaintiff was qualified for the position of senior clerk.
Plaintiff presented the testimony of Dr. Peal, who had listened to Keenan’s testimony. Dr. Peal testified that plaintiff could not perform the job оf communications assistant and could not perform any of the functions of the senior clerk. Dr. Peal explained that plaintiff had difficulty attending to her own personal needs and had difficulty thinking, concentrating, remembering, and paying attention. Dr. Peal explained the position of senior clerk required contact with people which would prove overly stressful. The same was true of the communications assistant position. Dr. Peal also exрlained that plaintiff was on medications (Etrafon, Donnatal, Inonmin, and Dalmane) which would hamper her work-type activities.
Dr. Peal testified plaintiff was unable to work as of approximately January of 1980. Dr. Peal noticed no dramatic changes in plaintiff’s condition since that time, except that her condition has gotten steadily worse.
On November 3, 1982, the ALJ issued a proposed decision in favor of plaintiff. The Review Committee rejected the ALJ’s proposed decision and a majority of the Board concurred with its committee’s decision. So far as the record discloses, neither the Review Committee nor the Board made findings supporting their rejection of the ALJ’s proposed decision.
Plaintiff filed this action August 11, 1983, seeking a writ of mandate (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5) directing UCRS to set aside its denial of disability benefits. In its statement of decision the trial court rejected plaintiff’s contention that thе Board had to adopt findings. The trial court first noted that UCRS’s own regulation did not require adoption of findings. The trial *870 court then explained that “when the Board rejected [the ALJ’s] recommendations, it upheld the Disability Review Committee’s decision to reaffirm denial of disability benefits. Thus, the Board relied on findings made by the UCRS staff during the initial determination of eligibility and during reconsideration of eligibility. The Board’s decision was based on these findings; therefore, it did not err by not making its own findings. ” (Italics added.)
Thе trial coiirt also concluded it should review UCRS’s decision using the “substantial evidence” test rather than the “independent judgment” test.
The trial court concluded the UCRS Board’s decision was supported by substantial evidence. Judgment denying the writ was duly entered for UCRS ■ and plaintiff timely filed notice of appeal.
Discussion
I
We first consider whether the Board was obligated to articulate its reasons for its rejection of the ALJ’s decision in the form of “findings.” We conclude it was.
We begin with the proposition that the Board’s decision to reject the ALJ’s decision was an
adjudicatory
administrative decision. The decision is adjudicatory in nature because it involves the application of geheral standards, set forth in the Regents’ standing orders, to specific individuals’ applications for benefits.
(Griffis
v.
County of Mono
(1985)
Ordinarily, when an administrative agenсy makes an adjudicatory decision, it is required to make findings sufficient both to enable the parties to determine whether and on what basis they should seek review and, in the event of review, to apprise a reviewing court of the basis for the decision.
(Topanga Assn. for a Scenic Community
v.
County of Los Angeles
(1974)
In rejecting plaintiff’s argument that the Board was required to make findings, the trial court relied in part on the fact that UCRS regulations *871 did not expressly require the Board to make findings. 3 This conclusion was erroneous.
The need for findings is not based upon rule or regulation. In part, the need for findings is imрlicit in Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, subdivision (b) which defines “abuse of discretion” to include instances in which an administrative order or decision “is not supported by the findings, or the findings are not supported by the evidence.”
(Topanga Assn. for a Scenic Community
v.
County of Los Angeles, supra,
Nor is the Board’s obligation to make findings affected by the Regents’ status as a constitutionally established entity. In
Robinson
v.
State Personnel Bd.
(1979)
UCRS contends the Board’s failure to make findings was harmless under the circumstances because, when it rejected the ALJ’s recommendations, it impliedly adopted findings that staff and its Review Committee had made when the committee rejected plaintiff’s claim at the reconsideration stage in 1981 prior to the administrative hearing. The trial court adopted this view but we cannot agree with it.
*872
For present purposes, we assume arguendo that in 1981 the Review Committee made adequate findings in reliance on staff reports. Nonetheless, these findings cannot suffice as those of the Board. The record fails to show where the Board adopted the committee’s findings аs its own, and indeed, UCRS makes no contention that the Board did so. It is true that an administrative agency may make findings by incorporating findings made by others. (See
Swars
v.
Council of City of Vallejo
(1949)
We cannot allow the Board impliedly to rely upon the 1981 findings of the Review Committee for another equally important reason. Proceedings before thе ALJ in 1982 were governed by UCRS regulation 11.01, paragraph 11, which provided in effect for a hearing
de novo
before the ALJ at which evidence could be submitted and testimony taken. In this case Dr. Peal’s testimony provided the ALJ with a detailed explanation of why plaintiff was unable to perform each of the jobs identified by the University’s personnel analyst. This testimony had not been presented to the Review Committee. It goes without saying that the Review Committee’s 1981 findings could not рossibly have been based on a review of testimony it did not receive. The findings requirement serves to facilitate orderly analysis of the evidence actually presented to the administrative decisionmaker.
(Topanga Assn. for a Scenic Community
v.
County of Los Angeles, supra,
*873
UCRS relies on
Carmel Valley View, Ltd.
v.
Board of Supervisors
(1976)
We conclude the Board’s failure to adopt findings is prejudicial and precludes meaningful judicial review. Nor will we assume that a remand for findings is an idle act. In this case, the record before the ALJ presents substantial evidence both in favor of and against the granting of disability benefits to plaintiff. Whether plaintiff is entitled to bеnefits depends on how conflicts in the evidence are resolved and on what inferences are drawn from the evidence presented. Having heard the evidence first hand, the ALJ decided in favor of plaintiff. The Board reversed that decision. The Board’s reasons for that reversal are far from obvious. The Board must articulate to plaintiff and to the courts, in the form of findings, its reasons for rejecting the ALJ’s decision. Faced with the task of articulating and adopting findings, the Board could conceivably reverse its decision. 5
Accordingly, we must reverse the judgment and remand to the trial court. The court shall issue a peremptory writ of mandate ordering the Board to vacate its decision subject to its right to review further the existing record and to make findings adequate to apprise the courts of the reasons for its decision.
(Robinson
v.
State Personnel Bd., supra,
II
Since it is possible that plaintiff will again seek judicial review of this mаtter, in the interest of judicial economy we address plaintiff’s contention that the trial court erroneously applied the substantial evidence test, rather than the independent judgment test, in its review of the Board’s decision.
A
The parties acknowledge that the Regents of the University of California derive limited adjudicatory powers from the state Constitution and
*874
that judicial review of acts of the Regents is under the substantial evidence test.
(Amluxen
v.
Regents of University of California
(1975)
Plaintiff contends, however, that UCRS is an entity separate and distinct from the Regents. Plaintiff errs.
The state Constitution confers Upon the Regents “all the powers necessary or convenient for the effective administration of its trust, including the power to . . . delegate to its committees or to the faculty of the university, or to others, such authority or functions as it may deem wise.” (Cal. Const.; art. IX, § 9, subd. (f).) The Regents are thus constitutionally authorized to delegate to UCRS the power tо implement and manage a retirement system. (See
Coleman
v.
Regents of University of California
(1979)
B
Plaintiff contends her right to equal protection of the laws will be violated if retirement-benefit disputes involving University employees are reviewed by trial courts using the substantial evidence test while rеtirement
*875
disputes involving other public employees are reviewed by trial courts exercising their independent judgment. (See, e.g.,
Strumsky
v.
San Diego County Employees Retirement Assn., supra,
“The first prerequisite to a meritorious claim under the equal protection clause is a showing that the state has adopted a classification that affects two or more
similarly situated
groups in an unequal manner.”
(In re Eric J.,
(1979)
*876
Here, UCRS, a part of the University, is obviously not similarly situated to state or local gоvernment generally. As our Supreme Court recently observed, “ ‘the University is intended to operate as independently of the state as possible. [Citation.]’ ”
(San Francisco Labor Council
v.
Regents of University of California
(1980)
Because plaintiff chose to work for the University—an agency distinguished frоm other public employers by provisions of the state Constitution—she was not situated similarly to employees of agencies of government not subject to special constitutional rules. Because employees of the University are not similarly situated with employees of other agencies of government, there is no violation of plaintiff’s right to equal protection when a decision of the University’s retirement board is reviewed by a cоurt using a different evidentiary standard than that applicable to review of decisions made by non-university retirement boards.
Disposition
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded to the trial court with directions to issue a peremptory writ of mandate in accordance with the views set forth in this opinion.
Carr, Acting P. J., and Sparks, J., concurred.
A petition for a rehearing was denied September 26, 1985, and appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied November 13, 1985.
Notes
This somewhat unusual task is performed with bed scales which weigh about 25 pounds. If the patient is unable to be weighed on regular scales, the patient is rolled over in bed, the bed scales are placed on the bed, and the patient is then rolled onto the scales and weighed.
Efforts by the personnel department to find plaintiff another job proved unavailing. Plaintiff worked with Joel Bryan, a university vocational rehabilitation officer, in February 1980. Plaintiff was enthusiastic in hеr first meeting with Bryan. Bryan prepared an employee placement profile which was circulated to personnel staff who worked with medical units. Medical Center personnel identified four possible positions for which plaintiff could qualify: hospital pharmacy assistant I; communications assistant I; nursing unit manager assistant II; and emergency room senior clerk.
Plaintiff was interested in the nursing unit management assistant position, but it developed that othеr applicants for that position possessed degrees in hospital administration which plaintiff did not. The other positions did not interest plaintiff because they did not offer her a challenge and the pay was too low.
Bryan was unaware of plaintiff’s emotional problems and did not consider them in preparing her employee placement profile. Bryan would have altered his approach if he had been aware of those problems.
UCRS Regulation 11.01, subdivision 2e simply provided: “When the UCRS Board Disability Review Committee rejects the recommendation of the Administrative Law Judge, concurrence by a majority of all Board members shall be obtained.”
In the instant case, the requirement of findings will also insure that the adjudicative agency has reviewed the evidence presented to the ALJ and not simply its own staff reports.
At this juncture, plaintiff’s contention that the Board unlawfully disregarded сredibility determinations of the ALJ is premature and we do not address it.
In
County Sanitation Dist. No. 2
v.
Los Angeles County Employees’ Assn.
(1985)