69 Ct. Cl. 691 | Ct. Cl. | 1930
delivered the opinion of the court:
During the war the Government was in need of buildings to be used for hospital purposes. The plaintiff, Resort Hotel Company, a New Jersey corporation, owned and operated a hotel at Lakewood, New Jersey. The hotel building was a brick one of large dimensions, five stories in height, and surrounded by about twelve acres of ground. A garage, a power house, and a stable adjoined the hotel building and were adapted for use in connection therewith. Officials of the Government made a personal inspection of the hotel and the entire premises and found it suitable and available for the purposes of the Government. This statement is sustained by the fact that following the above-mentioned inspection, on December 15,1917, a written lease was executed by the parties. The lease contained the usual provisions inserted by the Government in leases of this character, i. e., the right to terminate the same by giving ten days’ advance notice in writing of an intention so to do, and the additional right to remove within thirty days subsequent to termination all buildings or improvements erected by the Government and affixed to the premises. The Government was to pay as rental for the premises $4,166.66 per month, reserving an option to extend the lease for yearly periods so long as the
Lakewood, New Jersey, is a winter resort; the hotel season generally extends from October to May. The hotel in catering to its winter guests had provided 80 private baths, glass-inclosed sun parlors, dining rooms, ballroom, billiard room, indoor tennis court, three large parlors, two hydrotherapeutic baths, barber shop, laundry, kitchen, indoor squash court, and servants’ quarters. (Finding Y.) The hotel was completely, furnished and equipped with furniture, carpets, draperies, china, glassware, kitchen utensils, etc., etc., all in fairly good condition. As a matter of fact, as the findings indicate, the building, its contents, and the surroundings seem to have been admirably adapted for the Government’s intended purpose.
The officials in charge of the building absolutely destroyed the indoor squash court by erecting, as admitted, a cement floor between the floor and ceiling of the court and a partition above the second floor so as to make three rooms out of one room that was used as the court. Not only this, a glass roof was substituted for the existing roof, and the alterations made, it was said, to provide an operating room, morgue,
On June 13,1919, the Government notified the plaintiff in . writing that the lease would be terminated on June 30, 1919. Most of the patients were removed from the building on or prior to June 30, 1919, but the Government did not surrender possession until December 4, 1919.
The case is substantially one of fact. It is apparently nonessential to discuss in this case the doctrine of waste. The defendant justifies upon two theories; first, that the tenant under the lease was privileged to adapt the premises to hospital purposes and, even if not, the improvements added to them by the Government enhanced rather than depreciated their value.
The lease provided that all improvements affixed to or upon the premises should remain the property of the lessee, and expressly extended the right to the lessee to remove them within thirty days after the premises were vacated, and all the so-called improvements made by the lessee that could be removed were removed, so that the second defense is practically without force. It is clear that the defendant did not intend the lessor to profit to any appreciable extent by improvements. As a matter of fact, unless it may be said that the word “ improvements ” authorizes alterations, it is difficult to ascertain the precise number, nature, and value of improvements added to the premises. The benefits accruing to the plaintiff from this source, in our view of the case, were of diminished consequence.
As to the remaining defense, the lease involved did not authorize alterations, nor did it contain a stipulation authorizing a system of changes which would convert the building into a hospital. The building as it stood was to be used as a hospital. The officials of the Government were not misled as to its availability for use as a hospital, for prior to the execution of the lease the officials of the Government inspected the hotel building and premises, and the subsequent execution of the lease attests the fact that, in their judgment, the hotel was suitable for the intended purpose. The case of Davenport v. McGoon, 4 Pac. Rep. 299, does not sustain the defendant’s contention in this respect. There the lease expressly authorized the tenant to make alterations so as to adapt the leased building to the lessee’s purposes. Both parties to the lease conceded by the terms of the same that the building leased was not adapted to the
We are unable to perceive wherein the written lease by any of its stipulations, or the law in reference to implied covenants, authorized the doing of what the defendant did. The plaintiff cites a number of State cases wherein it is held that the removal of doors, chandeliers, and other fixtures constituting a material part of the freehold, is voluntary waste. Regan v. Luthy, 11 N. Y. Supp. 709; McCullough v. Irvine, 13 Pa. St. 438. To the same effect, respecting destruction and removal of fixtures, as well as changing the identity of the property, are the following cases: Beekman v. Van Dolsen, 63 Hun 487; Peer v. Wadsworth, 67 N. J. Eq. 191; Agate v. Lowenstein, 57 N. Y. 604; Hayman v. Round, 82 Neb. 598; Cosgriff v. Dewey, 164 N. Y. 1; 31 Corpus Juris, 1221.
The Government employed an interior decorator to examine the building and estimate the cost of restoring it to the condition it was in when received. The estimate reported totaled $246,380. The record establishes the fact
Possession of the building was not surrendered by the Government in accord with its notice to quit. On the contrary, the Government remained in possession until December 4, 1919, and paid no rent therefor subsequent to June 30, 1919. At the rate of rent stipulated in the lease the plaintiff is entitled to $21,370.94, less $9,435 paid to the plaintiff as rent or compensation for use and occupation. We therefore think the plaintiff is entitled to a judgment for $104,075.94, an amount arrived at after giving the Government credit for the said $9,435 paid as rent and for improvements of value added to the premises.
Judgment for $104,075.94 will be awarded the plaintiff. It is so ordered.