This case involves a dispute between two developers over the payment of property assessments allegedly due under certain restrictive covenants. The plaintiff-below, The Reserves Management, LLC (“Reserves”), appeals from two Superior Court rulings granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants-below, R.T. Properties, LLC, Mountain Range, LLC, Fountain, LLC, Waterscape, LLC, and Wind Chop, LLC. Wé affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Reserves is an entity created to administer and maintain The Reserves Resort Spa and Country Club, a planned residential community consisting of approximately 180 lots located in Sussex County, Delaware. On August 13, 2001, The Reserves Development Corporation
In April 2005, Reserves Development LLC, together with The Reserves Development Corporation, entered into a contract (the “Sale Agreement”) to sell seventeen lots to R.T. Properties, LLC (“R.T. Properties”) for $4,250,000. The Sale Agreement recited that R.T. Properties was “acquiring the Property in order to construct homes thereon for sale to the general public.” In November 2005, R.T. Properties transferred all seventeen lots to four affiliated entities — Mountain Range, LLC, Fountain, LLC, Waterscape, LLC, and Wind Chop, LLC.
On August 24, 2009, Reserves sent R.T. Properties an invoice for $517,778.01, representing outstanding assessments claimed to be due from all seventeen lots from their date of purchase. Thereafter, Reserves regularly sent R.T. Properties invoices for each additional quarterly assessment.
In September 2010, Reserves filed an action in the Superior Court against R.T. Properties to enforce the payment of the assessments allegedly due. In response, R.T. Properties moved to dismiss the complaint, claiming that under Paragraph 10 of the Sale Agreement, the payment of assessments for each lot was to be deferred until the lot was transferred to a third party homebuyer and a certificate of occupancy was issued. The Superior Court denied the motion to dismiss.
Thereafter, the parties cross-moved for summary judgment. In a bench ruling issued on February 27, 2013, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of R.T. Properties with respect to all claimed assessments, except for the sewer connection assessments. The court concluded — on the basis of the Sale Agreement, the deposition testimony of Korotki,
ANALYSIS
Reserves claims that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of R.T. Properties based on the forbearance agreement, and that summary judgment should have been granted in Reserves’ favor, for five reasons. First, Reserves argues that the Sale Agreement, which the Superior Court found embodied the forbearance agreement, in fact contains no promise to forbear from collecting the assessments. Reserves’ remaining four arguments are to the effect that even if the Sale Agreement contained or was subject to a forbearance condition, Reserves is still not legally required to forbear from collecting the assessments. Reserves also claims, that, at a minimum, the trial court improperly resolved disputed issues of material fact, and therefore the grant of summary judgment on the forbearance issue should be reversed and the case remanded for a trial.
Reserves further argues that the Superi- or Court’s grant of summary judgment on the sewer assessment claim should be reversed, on two alternative grounds. First, Reserves contends, the Superior Court erroneously awarded judgment to R.T. Properties, because in an earlier case the Superior Court had held that R.T. Properties was contractually obligated to pay the sewer assessments to Reserves Development LLC. Second, Reserves argues that the grant of summary judgment on the sewer assessment claim was improper because material facts were in dispute.
We review a trial court decision on cross-motions for summary judgment de novo
Pervading Reserves’ claims are two core issues: (i) were the Superior Court’s judgments based on disputed issues of material fact, and (ii) if not, which party (if any) is entitled to judgment as a matter of law? We address those issues, first in connection with the forbearance agreement de
I. The Forbearance Agreement
We conclude that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of R.T. Properties on its forbearance agreement defense, because material facts are in dispute. The Superior Court interpreted Paragraph 10 of the Sale Agreement as containing a forbearance provision and, therefore, afforded R.T. Properties a complete defense as a matter of law. That was error, because Paragraph 10 addresses only the assessments payable by third party homebuyers after a certificate of occupancy has been issued. That provision does not contain an explicit agreement to forbear from collecting those assessments. Paragraph 10 may be consistent with an agreement to forbear, but it does not embody any such agreement.
However, the record does contain evidence — notably Korotki’s deposition testimony — of an oral agreement to defer payment of the assessments on each lot until the lot (with a completed home) is sold to a third party buyer. That evidence is incomplete, in that it does not identify the specific parties to that agreement or the agreement’s other terms and conditions, including its duration. Nonetheless, this evidence of the existence of an oral forbearance agreement, together with Paragraph 10 of the Declaration, is sufficient to create triable issues of material fact. On this basis we must reverse the Superior Court’s judgment in favor of R.T. Properties and remand the case for a trial on the forbearance agreement issue.
Reserves claims that the Superior Court should have granted summary judgment in its favor on the ground that, as a matter of law, there was no legally valid forbearance agreement between the parties. This argument ignores the evidence of an oral forbearance agreement discussed immediately above. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by declining to grant judgment in Reserves’ favor as a matter of law.
Second, Reserves argues that even if a forbearance agreement exists, it is not enforceable against Reserves, because neither Reserves nor the R.T. Properties affiliates were parties to the Sale Agreement. Therefore, summary judgment should have been granted to Reserves on that basis. That argument lacks merit. Although neither Reserves nor the affiliates were parties to the Sale Agreement, that does not necessarily establish that those entities were not parties to a separate oral agreement to forbear. That is an issue of fact that must be resolved at trial.
Third, Reserves argues that because R.T. Properties breached the Sale Agreement, Reserves is no longer bound by any separate forbearance agreement that the parties may have reached.
Fourth, Reserves argues that because the Sale Agreement was not recorded with the Recorder of Deeds for Sussex County, any forbearance agreement lacks legal force.
Fifth, Reserves argues that because the forbearance agreement would indefinitely delay the vesting of the assessments, it violates the rule against perpetu-ities. Reserves cites no authority to support that argument, which in any event lacks merit. A restrictive covenant is a servitude,
We conclude that the Superior Court erred by granting summary judgment to R.T. Properties on the contractual forbearance issue, but committed no error in denying summary judgment to Reserves.
II. The Sewer Assessment
We further conclude that the Superior Court’s grant of summary judgment on the sewer connection assessment claim is correct as a matter of law. The Superi- or Court determined that the amendment authorizing the sewer connection assessment was not a valid amendment to the original Declaration, that would be enforceable against R.T. Properties.
Reserves next claims that the Superior Court erred by granting summary judgment to R.T. Properties, because whether or not the sewer connection assessment
Finally, Reserves argues that a ruling by the Superior Court in a separate proceeding between Reserves Development LLC and R.T. Properties required that summary judgment be granted in Reserves’ favor.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. Jurisdiction is not retained.
. The Reserves Development Corporation is now known as The Reserves Resort Spa & Country Club LLC.
. Article VII Section 1 relevantly provides that: “each Owner of any Lot or Condominium Unit ... hereby covenants and agrees to pay the Association: (1) annual assessments or charges; (2) liquidated damage assessments, if imposed ... (3) an initial assessment in the amount of Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) due upon the conveyance of any Lot or Condominium Unit from the Declarant to a third party purchaser for value to help capitalize the Association ... and (4) included in the annual assessment shall be a maintenance element for the individual lots to cover landscaping maintenance and repair....”
. R.T. Properties and the four affiliated entities are referred to collectively as “R.T. Properties.” The lots were distributed among those four companies.
. In his deposition, Korotki testified that "there was a forbearance of the assessments to take place upon the construction of single family homes on these lots.” He went on to explain that the forbearance "applied to an initial assessment, a capital assessment, an annual assessment, and a quarterly assessment.”
. We refer to this alleged deferment as the "forbearance agreement.”
. Tr. of Decision on Cross Motions for Summary Judgment at 18, 23, 28, The Reserves
. The Reserves Mgt., LLC v. R.T. Properties, Del.Super., C.A. No. S10C-09-020, Bradley, J. (Feb. 27, 2013) (Letter Op.).
. Reserves also claims that, with respect to the forbearance agreement, the Superior Court considered evidence not properly before the court on a motion for summary judgment. We reverse and remand this judgment on other grounds, making it unnecessary for us to address this argument.
. Telxon Corp. v. Meyerson, 802 A.2d 257, 262 (Del.2002).
. Arnold v. Soc'y for Sav. Bancorp, Inc., 678 A.2d 533, 535 (Del.1996) (citing Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1375 (Del.1996)).
. Telxon Corp., 802 A.2d at 262 (citing Anglin v. Bergold, 565 A.2d 279 (Del.1989)).
. Reserves claims that the R.T. Properties’ failure to build any homes on the seventeen lots is a breach of the Sale Agreement.
. 25 Del. C. § 153 (2009).
. Id.
. Black’s Law Dictionary 475 (9th ed. 2009).
. Id. at 717.
. Restatement (Third) of Property: Servi-tudes § 1.1(2) (2000).
. Id. § 3.3.
. We assume without deciding that the reasonableness standard applied by the trial judge governs the issue, as neither party has challenged the application of the standard itself.
. The Declaration contains only three references to amendments or changes. The first, in the Background section, refers to "future amendments or supplements.” The second, in Article VII Section 3, provides that the annual assessment will be "fixed annually” and "periodically adjusted as needs for annual assessments arise.” The third, in Article X Section 1, provides that "the Association may waive, abandon, terminate, modify, alter, change, amend, eliminate or add to these Restrictions and this Declaration,” although the Declaration does not specify the procedure for amendment.
.The Reserves Mgt., LLC v. R.T. Properties, DeLSuper., C.A. No. S 10C-09-020, Bradley, J. (Feb. 27, 2013) (Letter Op.), at 2.
. Reserves Dev. LLC v. R.T Properties, L.L.C., 2011 WL 4639817 (Del.Super.Ct. Sept. 22, 2011).
. rd. at *5-6.
