321 Mass. 571 | Mass. | 1947
The defendant in these two actions of tort was the owner of a building at 113 Munroe Street, Lynn, part of the fourth floor of which was leased to one O’Callaghan, who ran a factory where were employed the female plaintiff in the first action and the five plaintiffs, all females, in the second action
The following facts could have been found by the jury: On the day in question during the noon hour the plaintiffs were in a room of their employer on the fourth floor when a fire occurred in a freight elevator well at the rear of the building. They started to leave by the. “front way” as usual, but were deterred by smoke. They then went out by a door to a fire escape, which descended on the wall of the building and connected by a balcony over a passageway with a fire escape on an adjacent building (known as the Hurley building and not owned by the defendant) which led by metal stairs straight down to a cantilever stairway connecting with the ground. The plaintiffs descended uneventfully by the fire escape to the second floor level. There one of the plaintiffs swung forward a horizontal bar which was across the steps. They all descended the metal steps, eleven in number, and twenty-two and one half inches wide, and walked forward out onto the cantilever, which remained horizontal. When the last plaintiff had gone four or five feet out on the cantilever, it “went down with a crash,” and all were thrown to the ground. The cantilever was not on the defendant’s building but on the Hurley building, both owners having reciprocal rights in the passageway.
The cantilever rotated on a pintle as a fulcrum on the principle of the see-saw. The pintle was an iron rod affixed at one end to the Hurley building and supported from above on the other end. On the descending side of the cantilever was a flight of thirteen steps, which was about twelve or thirteen feet long, and on the opposite side, which was shorter, was a counterweight sufficient to keep the descending side (when swinging free and not in use) in slightly above a horizontal position, where it was checked by a chain running from the counterweight to the upper part of the fire escape. In normal operation the distance which one
On the date of the accident G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 143, § 21, as appearing in St. 1943, c. 546, § 2, provided: “Any . . . building in which ten or more persons are employed in a factory . . . the owner, lessee or mortgagee in possession whereof is notified in writing by an inspector that sections fifteen to sixty, inclusive, apply thereto, shall be provided with proper egresses or other means of escape from fire sufficient for the use of all persons . . . employed . . . therein; but no owner, lessee or mortgagee in possession of such building shall be deemed to have violated this provision unless he has been notified in writing by an inspector as to what additional egresses or means of escape from fire are necessary, and for thirty days has neglected or refused to provide the same. The egresses and means of escape shall be kept unobstructed, in good repair and ready for use . . ..” Section 51 of the same chapter, as amended by St. 1943, c. 544, § 3, provided: “The owner, lessee or occupant of a . . . factory, workshop or manufacturing establishment, or whoever owns any building or part thereof mentioned in and subject to . . . [section] twenty-one . . . or controls the use thereof, shall cause the provisions thereof to be observed, and such person shall be liable to any person injured for all damages caused by a violation of the provisions of said . . . [section].” By § 53 there was provided a criminal penalty.
The statute was designed for the protection of human life against fire. Stevens, landowner, 228 Mass. 368, 373, 374. It is to be broadly construed so as to achieve this supremely important purpose. Aldworth v. F. W. Woolworth Co. 295 Mass. 344, 348. An intent to pass an ineffective statute is not to be imputed to the Legislature. MacInnis v. Morrissey, 298 Mass. 505, 509.
The defendant argues that it is not clear what egresses came within the act, and that before a statute can be interpreted to cast upon an owner the duty of an insurer it should be sufficiently definite to establish that result. We are of the opinion, however, that, reasonably construed, once there had been the written notice to the previous owner, the statute conferred a direct right upon the plaintiffs, as employees in a factory in the building, to have available for their use the prescribed egresses and other means of escape in the event of fire, and that those egresses and means of escape must be “in good repair and ready for use.” A reciprocal duty was imposed by the statute upon the owner, among others, to provide such egresses and means of escape. We are not concerned here with the second reference in the statute to the subject of notice,by an inspector, as that “provision” we construe as having to do with failure to provide additional egresses or means of escape from fire, which is not the cause of complaint here.
The question remains whether the statute was in fact violated. There was evidence from which the jury could find that the cantilever was not “in good repair” and “ready for use” within the intent of the statute. There was expert testimony from one Powers, a construction engineer, to the effect that if the plaintiffs walked down the fire escape to the horizontal bar, and one of them “turned the bar to the left,” and all in single file went onto the horizontal cantilever, and, while they were in that position,
Since the plaintiffs were entitled to go to the jury on the statutory counts, we forbear discussion as to whether there was also a case for the jury on the counts based upon negligence.
Exceptions overruled.
See G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 231, § 4A, as inserted by St. 1943, c. 350, § 1.
See now St. 1945, c. 536.
See now St. 1945, c. 510.