32 Ind. App. 189 | Ind. Ct. App. | 1903
Action by appellee to recover damages from appellant on account of personal injuries received by him while in its service. He is alleged in the complaint to have been employed as a heater in appellant’s rolling-mill, part of his duty being to put iron in a furnace by means of an iron instrument about eight feet long, one end of which was flattened so that the iron would lie thereon, there being a ring or handhold on the -other end. It is alleged that appellant failed to furnish appellee a' safe place in which to work, in that one foot east of the mouth of the furnace and seven feet south thereof was an oak post sis in®hes thick
Appellant’s motion for judgment on the interrogatories and their answers notwithstanding the general verdict was overruled, and judgment rendered on the general verdict. No other question raised need be decided than that arising upon this motion, which is based upon the claim that such interrogatories and answers establish contributory negligence.
The answers to interrogatories show facts as follows: Appellee had been a heater for twelve or thirteen years, lie was an efficient man, had worked five years in the mill before he was injured, and at the furnace where he was hurt two or three days. ILe was charging iron into the furnace when injured, using a “peel,” an instrument eight feet one inch long, made of two-inch iron, flattened at the end for-eighteen inches to a width of three and three-quarter inches. The furnace door was two and a half feet from the ground. The fore plate of the furnace door was five and a half inches wide. The package of iron he was putting into the furnace when injured was two feet long, four inches wide, and four and a half inches thick. It was placed on
The general verdict includes a finding by the jury that appellee was guilty of no negligence contributory to his injury. If interrogatory thirty-nine calls for, and the answer thereto states, a “mere conclusion,” .this court can not say that the jury, in view of the facts detailed, had no right to find for appellee. On the other hand, if interrogatory thirty-nine and its answer are to be considered, the general verdict can not stand, for the standard for appellee’s conduct was one of ordinary care, and the failure to exercise it was contributory negligence. The distinction between “ultimate facts” and “mere conclusions” is an interesting one, as is evidenced by the following extract; “It some
The rule by which the effect of the answer to interrogatory thirty-nine must be determined is stated as follows: “First and foremost the jury must find the ultimate facts. If these are such that only one inference may be drawn from them, viz., negligence or no negligence, the jury need not find the inferential fact also, and the court will determine as a matter of law, from such facts found, whether there was or was not negligence. If, however, the ultimate facts are such that reasonable men of equal intelligence may honestly and rationally differ as to the inferences and conclusions to be drawn from such facts, it is for the jury to determine the inferences also; and in such cases these must be stated in the verdict.” Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Hadley, 12 Ind. App. 516. See, also, Citizens St. R Co. v. Hoffbauer, 23 Ind. App. 614; Keller v. Gaskill, 20 Ind. App. 502; Keller v. Gaskill, 9 Ind. App. 670; Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Dugan, 18 Ind. App. 435; Board, etc., v. Bonebrake, 146 Ind. 311, 319; Smith v. Wabash R. Co., 141 Ind. 92; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Miller, supra; Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. v. Grames, 136 Ind. 39; Indiana Pipe Line, etc., Co. v. Neusbaum, 21 Ind. App. 361.
The facts are fully stated. They leave the conclusion uncertain. It was therefore the province of the jury to settle the question. ■ The answer to the thirty-ninth interrogatory settles it adversely to the appellee. The conflict between the general verdict and the answers is irreconcilable upon this one vital proposition.