Sharon A. REO v. UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE; United States of America; Patricia D‘Esposito. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff v. Joseph J. REO, Jr.; Marjorie Reo; Third-Party Defendants v. STATE FARM INSURANCE COMPANY, Fourth-Party Defendant. Sharon Reo, Appellant.
No. 96-5051
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit
Argued June 6, 1996. Decided Oct. 15, 1996.
98 F.3d 73
VII.
Finally, Lawrence argues the statutory violations he alleged were also violations of New Jersey public policy. We hold the district court correctly dismissed Lawrence‘s public policy claim.
Under New Jersey law “an employee has a cause of action for wrongful discharge when the discharge is contrary to a clear mandate of public policy.” See Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505, 512 (1980). “The sources of public policy include legislation; administrative rule, regulations or decisions; and judicial decisions.” Id. Because the sources of public policy Lawrence relies on are coterminous with his statutory claims, he cannot advance a separate common law public policy claim. See Catalane v. Gilian Instrument Corp., 271 N.J.Super. 476, 638 A.2d 1341, 1349 (App.Div.) (ruling common law claim of violation of public policy should not be submitted to jury where statutory remedy under LAD exists), certif. denied, 136 N.J. 298, 642 A.2d 1006 (1994); cf. Shaner v. Horizon Bancorp., 116 N.J. 433, 561 A.2d 1130, 1141 (1989) (“Because the LAD provides ... a remedy, it might be unnecessary to recognize or create a Pierce-type action to vindicate substantially the same rights and provide similar relief.“).
Moreover, the paradigmatic dismissal giving rise to a public policy cause of action is the termination of an employee in retaliation for the employee‘s refusal to act contrary to public policy. See Citizens State Bank, New Jersey v. Libertelli, 215 N.J.Super. 190, 521 A.2d 867, 869 (App.Div.1987) (explaining Pierce protects an employee from retaliation for refusal to commit an act violating a clear mandate of public policy). As noted, we agree with the district court that Lawrence has advanced no evidence of retaliation.
We will affirm the district court‘s grant of summary judgment against Lawrence on his public policy claim.
VIII.
For the foregoing reasons we will affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the district court. We will remand to the district court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
William G. Cole (argued), Frank W. Hunger, Assistant Attorney General, Faith S. Hochberg, United States Attorney, Appellate Staff Civil Division, Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for United States of America.
James S. Braaten, Lomell, Muccifori, Adler, Ravaschiere, Amabile & Pehlivanian, Toms River, NJ, for Joseph J. Reo, Jr. and Marjorie Reo.
OPINION OF THE COURT
SCHWARZER, District Judge:
The question before us is whether the acceptance by a minor‘s parents of an administrative settlement of the minor‘s claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA“) releases the United States from further liability where the settlement was not judicially approved as required by state law.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On May 23, 1975, plaintiff Sharon Reo was playing in the front yard at the New Jersey home of her aunt, defendant Patricia D‘Esposito. While a United States Postal Service employee was handing mail to her aunt, Sharon (who was only 21 months old at the time) apparently stepped off the curb and in front of the Postal Service truck. As the truck drove away, it struck Sharon, crushing the third and fourth fingers of her left hand.
Sharon‘s parents, through their attorney, filed a tort claim on her behalf. They entered into an administrative settlement, accepting $2,500 to release her claim. Neither Sharon‘s parents nor the Postal Service sought judicial approval of the settlement.
Subsequent to the settlement, Sharon had three operations on her fingers, which remain deformed. On August 11, 1993, when she was 19 (legally an adult), Sharon filed this action. She seeks damages against the United States and against D‘Esposito. The United States moved to dismiss the complaint as barred by the 1976 settlement and release and the district court granted the motion. Sharon dismissed the claim against her aunt. Judgment was entered on January 4, 1996; the notice of appeal was filed December 21, 1995 (after the court had announced its decision to dismiss), and is timely under
DISCUSSION
The FTCA subjects the United States to tort liability for negligence. See
In order to promote the efficient disposition of claims against the government, the FTCA establishes an administrative system. The claimant is required to file a claim with the agency allegedly responsible for her injuries.
Section 2672 of title 28 provides government agencies with the authority to settle tort claims administratively. It also provides that such settlements will preclude a subsequent suit:
The acceptance by the claimant of any such award, compromise, or settlement [administrative settlement pursuant to this provision] shall be final and conclusive on the claimant, and shall constitute a complete release of any claim against the United States and against the employee of the government whose act or omission gave rise to the claim, by reason of the same subject matter.
Both parties agree that Reo did not herself settle the claim, and that the question is whether her parents could settle her claim on her behalf. See
Under
The government claims that New Jersey law simply does not apply—first, that federal law defines who may settle a tort claim on behalf of another, and second, that under federal law no judicial approval is required for the settlement of a minor‘s claim. Because we find that state law governs here, we need not reach the second of these contentions.
Section 2672 does not define who may accept a settlement on behalf of the claimant. While the interpretive regulations indicate that a claimant‘s “legal representative” can bind the claimant to an administrative settlement, see
In order to fill this gap, we turn to state law. Cf. Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 98, 111 S.Ct. 1711, 1717, 114 L.Ed.2d 152 (1991). Federal legislation generally “builds upon legal relationships established by the states, altering or supplanting them only so far as necessary for the special purpose.” Paul M. Bator, et al. Hart and Wechsler‘s The Federal Courts and the Federal System, 533 (3rd ed. 1988). On the one hand, where application of state law would impair the federal policy, or where there is a “distinct need for nationwide legal standards,” federal standards must be developed. See Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 42, 109 S.Ct. 1597, 1605, 104 L.Ed.2d 29 (1989); Kamen, 500 U.S. at 98, 111 S.Ct. at 1717. On the other hand, where state law on an issue is well-developed, or where Congress specifically intends to subject federal actors to local standards, state law is preferred. See De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580-81, 76 S.Ct. 974, 980, 100 L.Ed. 1415 (1956); Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Beaver County, 328 U.S. 204, 210, 66 S.Ct. 992, 995, 90 L.Ed. 1172 (1946). Thus, on issues such as corporation law, see Kamen, supra, commercial law, see United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728, 99 S.Ct. 1448, 1458, 59 L.Ed.2d 711 (1979), and family law, see De Sylva, supra, state-law standards have been used to fill the gaps in federal statutory schemes.
The basic purpose of the FTCA is to subject the United States to tort liability under state law to the same extent as private individuals. State law thus governs both the creation of liability and the effect of a purported release of liability. Green v. United States, 709 F.2d 1158, 1165 (7th Cir.1983). Courts uniformly look to state law to determine the validity of settlements entered between the government and the claimant both before the administrative claim is filed, see, e.g., Montellier v. United States, 315 F.2d 180, 185 (2d Cir.1963); Cordaro v. Lusardi, 354 F.Supp. 1147, 1149-50 (S.D.N.Y.1973); cf. Matland v. United States, 285 F.2d 752, 754 (3rd Cir.1961) (holding that state law governs release of liability under FTCA; release of joint tortfeasor therefore released United States), and after suit has been commenced. See, e.g., Reed By and Through Reed v. United States, 891 F.2d 878, 881 n. 3 (11th Cir.1990) (applying Florida law requiring court approval to enforce settlement of minor‘s FTCA claim); Dickun v. United States, 490 F.Supp. 136 (W.D.Pa.1980).
The government asserts that these cases do not apply, because the release in this case was executed after the claim was filed, but before litigation began. This distinction might make sense when comparing the effect of a release under the specific authority of section 2672 on the settling par
This circuit has previously applied state law to determine the validity and scope of a release under section 2672. See Thompson v. Wheeler, 898 F.2d 406, 410 n. 3 (3rd Cir.1990); cf. Macy v. United States, 557 F.2d 391, 394 (3rd Cir.1977) (same under 1346(b)). Turning to state law again in this case is appropriate—the rules governing settlement of minor‘s claims are embedded in the traditional state-law domain of contract, agency, and family law. Rather than developing a federal common law to govern such questions of authority to settle another‘s claim, we can instead rely on the well-established rules of the various States. National uniformity is not particularly important here, especially since Congress specifically contemplated in the FTCA that federal agencies would be held to the same standards as private individuals. Compare Reconstruction Finance Corp., 328 U.S. at 210, 66 S.Ct. at 995 (in subjecting federal corporation to local real property taxes, Congress intended that “real property” be defined under state laws), with Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, 490 U.S. at 44-45, 109 S.Ct. at 1606-07 (because Congress was concerned about the rights of Indian families vis-a-vis state authorities, it was unlikely that Congress would have intended to leave the scope of the statute‘s key jurisdictional provision subject to definition by state courts as a matter of state law). The state law here does not discriminate against the government, or run counter to the purposes of the FTCA. See Reconstruction Finance Corp., 328 U.S. at 210, 66 S.Ct. at 995. State law therefore should govern.
The primary focus of the government‘s brief, as well as of the district court‘s oral explanation of its decision, was on the 1966 amendment to the FTCA and on the legislative history that explains its purpose. Prior to 1966, the statute required judicial approval of all claims (not just those involving minors) where the government was to pay more than $2,500. P.L. 89-506. Congress eliminated the requirement of judicial approval in 1966, and the legislative history is replete with statements about promoting quicker settlements by doing away with the necessity of court proceedings. See 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2524. Nothing in the statute or the legislative history, however, indicates that Congress intended to eliminate all possibility of court proceedings, especially where the interests of minor children and other incompetent individuals were involved. Given that Congress was legislating against the background of the “ancient precept of Anglo-American jurisprudence” requiring court approval of the settlement of minor‘s claims, see Dacanay v. Mendoza, 573 F.2d 1075, 1079 (9th Cir.1978), it would be surprising if the 1966 amendment took away this longstanding protection without comment. Likewise, the implementing regulations contain no indication that individuals otherwise unauthorized to settle a claim alone (here, the parents) can nevertheless settle a claim administratively under the FTCA.
We therefore hold that state law governs whether an individual has the legal authority to bind a claimant to an administrative settlement under the FTCA.
The government also contends that a rule requiring judicial approval of minor‘s settlements is impracticable, because there is no procedure in place by which it could obtain
Finally, the government asserts that applying the state law requirement of judicial approval here allows Sharon to effectively toll the statute of limitations based on her minority. The government points to cases holding that the federal tort claims filing period is not tolled for minors. See e.g. Zavala v. United States, 876 F.2d 780, 783 (9th Cir.1989); Jastremski v. United States, 737 F.2d 666, 669 (7th Cir.1984). But in this case, the six-month limitations period never began to run, because the agency did not formally deny the claim.
The judgment of the district court is REVERSED and the matter is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Costs awarded to appellant.
SCHWARZER
District Judge