*606 Opinion
Mandamus. Gail Rentzer suffered an ectopic pregnancy 1 when gestation occurred in one of her fallopian tubes, a part of the body in which a fetus cannot survive. The tube ruptured, surgery was required to save Rentzer’s life, and as a consequence she was unable to work for six weeks. Rentzer appeals a judgment of the superior court refusing to order the California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board to award her unemployment compensation disability benefits for the first 28 days of her six-week disability.
At issue is the interpretation of Unemployment Insurance Code section 2626, which provides in pertinent part: “In no case shall the term ‘disability’ or ‘disabled’ include any injury or illness caused by or arising in сonnection with pregnancy up to the termination of such pregnancy and for a period of 28 days thereafter.”
The board argues that Rentzer was ineligible for disability benefits for the first 28 days of her disability because hеr disability arose in connection with pregnancy. Rentzer argues that an “ectopic pregnancy” is really no pregnancy at all, that the Legislature did not intend the 28-day exclusion to apply to her condition.
The question is whether Rentzer’s condition amounted to an illness “caused by or arising in connection with pregnаncy,” which therefore fell within the 28-day period of disability exclusion required under section 2626. While no California сases are directly in point, the scope of section 2626 was considered in
Clark
v.
California Emp. Stab. Com.
(1958)
But Rentzer’s disability was not an ordinary maternity disability involving preparation for and recuрeration from normal gestation and delivery. Neither the fetus nor Rentzer could have survived the full term of gestаtion. Emergency surgery was performed not to deliver a viable child, but to stop internal bleeding, repair the ruptured fallopian tube, and halt a doomed, lifeless pregnancy. In
Jerger
v.
Commercial Ins. Co.
(1965)
The board points out that it has long interpreted the pregnancy limitation on disability as including ectopic pregnancy аnd the Legislature has not overruled that interpretation by amending section 2626. However, we do not look uрon the prior administrative interpretation of the statute as conclusive and controlling, inasmuch as final responsibility for statutory interpretation lies with the courts and not with administrative bodies. “While administrative construсtions are entitled to great weight when the language of a statute is ambiguous, final responsibility for the interpretation of the law rests with the court and an erroneous administrative construction does not govern the interpretation of the statute, even though the statute is subsequently reenacted without a change. [Citation.]”
(People
v.
Navarro,
Unemployment Insurance Code section 2601 states that the purpose of California’s disability compensation law “is to compensate in part for the wage loss sustained by individuals unemployed because of siсkness or injury and to reduce to a minimum the suffering caused by unemployment resulting therefrom. [The law] shall be construed liberally in aid of its declared purpose to mitigate the evils and burdens which fall on the unemployed and disabled worker and his family.” Under this rule of liberal *608 construction we conclude that an ectopic pregnаncy is not a true pregnancy within the meaning of section 2626 and that Rentzer is entitled to disability benefits for the full period of her disability.
The judgmént is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the superior court with directions to issue the writ.
Roth, P. J., and Compton, J., concurred.
Notes
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary defines “ectopic pregnancy” as “gestation elsewhere than in the uterus.”
