RENO FENELLI SIGGERS A/K/A RENO F. SIGGERS A/K/A RENO SIGGERS v. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2021-CP-00985-COA
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
06/28/2022
HON. ALBERT B. SMITH III
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 07/28/2021; COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: TUNICA COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT; ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: RENO FENELLI SIGGERS (PRO SE); ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: ASHLEY LAUREN SULSER; NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF; DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 06/28/2022
BEFORE WILSON, P.J., McCARTY AND SMITH, JJ.
¶1. Reno Siggers filed a motion for post-conviction collateral relief (PCR) challenging the 2018 revocation of his parole. The Tunica County Circuit Court dismissed Siggers‘s PCR motion as a successive writ. Upon review, we find that Siggers‘s current PCR motion fails to constitute a barred successive motion. We further find, however, that Siggers‘s arguments lack merit, and we therefore affirm the circuit court‘s dismissal of Siggers‘s PCR motion on that ground. See Clark v. Middlebrooks, 328 So. 3d 1272, 1274 (¶7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2021) (“An appellate court may affirm a trial court if the correct result is reached, even if the trial court reached the result for a different reason.” (quoting Davis v. City of Jackson, 240 So. 3d 381, 384 (¶13) (Miss. 2018))).
FACTS
¶2. In April 1995, the circuit court sentenced Siggers to life imprisonment in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC) for the crime of murder. In October 2011, the Mississippi Parole Board (Parole Board) granted Siggers conditional parole.
¶3. On May 18, 2018, Siggers was involved in a domestic-disturbance incident that resulted in a charge being brought against Siggers for simple domestic violence. On June 14, 2018, the Tunica County Justice Court issued an arrest warrant for Siggers on the simple-domestic-violence charge. The following day, on June 15, 2018, Siggers was involved in a second domestic-disturbance incident. The
¶4. On June 27, 2018, the justice court issued a second warrant for Siggers‘s arrest for the June 15, 2018 domestic-disturbance incident. Siggers stated in his PCR motion that while he was detained in the Tunica County Detention Center, he signed “papers” on July 6, 2018, for a preliminary-revocation hearing that occurred on July 17, 2018. According to Siggers‘s PCR motion, he attended the preliminary hearing on July 17, 2018. As the record reflects, also on July 17, 2018, the Parole Board issued a revocation warrant based on reasonable cause that Siggers had violated the terms of his parole. The following day, on July 18, 2018, the Parole Board held a final parole-revocation hearing. After finding that Siggers had “more likely than not” violated the conditions of his parole, the Parole Board revoked his parole for 120 days. After serving 120 days in a technical violation center, Siggers was once again released on parole in November 2018.
¶5. On February 13, 2019, the justice court held a trial on Siggers‘s simple-domestic-violence charge stemming from the May 18, 2018 incident. After considering the testimony and evidence, the judge found Siggers guilty of the offense and sentenced Siggers to thirty days in jail, with fifteen days suspended and fifteen days to serve.
¶6. In August 2019, the Parole Board again revoked Siggers‘s parole for the June 15, 2018 incident that resulted in an
¶7. Relevant to the instant matter, Siggers filed a June 2021 PCR motion challenging the Parole Board‘s July 18, 2018 revocation of his parole and the justice-court trial on the charge of simple domestic violence. Aggrieved by the circuit court‘s dismissal of his current PCR motion, Siggers timely appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶8. We review a trial court‘s “dismissal or denial of a PCR motion for abuse of discretion” and “will only reverse if the trial court‘s decision is clearly erroneous.” Hunt v. State, 312 So. 3d 1233, 1234 (¶6) (Miss. Ct. App. 2021) (quoting Carr v. State, 291 So. 3d 1132, 1137 (¶16) (Miss. Ct. App. 2020)). We review questions of law de novo. Id.
DISCUSSION
¶9. On appeal, Siggers raises numerous claims. For clarity, we group Siggers‘s allegations into three categories related to the following: (1) his 2018 parole revocation; (2) his 2019 trial for simple domestic violence; and (3) the legal representation provided by his trial attorney.
I. The 2018 Parole Revocation
¶10. Siggers argues that in revoking his parole on July 18, 2018, the Parole Board failed to comply with the procedures established in
¶11. In relevant part,
¶12. Here, Siggers was arrested for simple domestic violence on June 27, 2018. In his PCR motion, Siggers vaguely references, without providing further detail, “papers” that he signed related to a preliminary hearing scheduled for July 17, 2018. Also in his PCR motion, Siggers claims that he subsequently attended the July 17, 2018 preliminary hearing. On the same date that Siggers alleges he attended his preliminary hearing, the Parole Board issued a revocation warrant after finding there was reasonable cause to believe that Siggers had violated the terms of his parole. The following day, which marked exactly
¶13. As
¶14. Upon review, we conclude Siggers has failed to identify any prejudice that arose from a delay in his preliminary hearing. Moreover, even if a delay occurred, Siggers acknowledges that he received and attended his preliminary hearing, and nothing in the record indicates that either the preliminary hearing or the final revocation hearing failed to afford Siggers with all the due process safeguards required before the Parole Board determined whether to revoke his parole. Thus, upon the facts presented, and in the absence of any showing of actual prejudice to Siggers, we conclude that any delay in the preliminary hearing was at most harmless error that does not entitle Siggers to post-conviction relief. Accordingly, we find this issue lacks merit.
II. The 2019 Trial
¶15. Siggers alleges that the February 2019 trial held in justice court violated his due process rights in numerous ways and that the trial judge, MDOC officials, Parole Board members, and various law-enforcement officers conspired to violate his constitutional rights. As the State notes in its appellate brief, however, Siggers‘s arguments that “the trial judge was not impartial; the judge colluded with
¶16. Other than his bare assertions, Siggers provides no supporting evidence, meaningful argument, or citation to relevant authorities to substantiate his claims, and we find nothing upon our own review of the record to support his alleged errors. See
III. The Ineffective-Assistance-of-Counsel Claim
¶17. Siggers also contends that his trial attorney provided ineffective assistance by (1) failing to adequately investigate every plausible defense; (2) misinforming him about his right to appeal the Parole Board‘s decision and the trial conviction; (3) failing to seek a trial continuance; (4) failing to make certain trial objections; and (5) failing to advise him on his right to a speedy trial or to raise an objection based on a speedy-trial violation.
¶18. To prevail on his ineffective-assistance claim, Siggers must demonstrate that (1) his “counsel‘s performance was deficient[,]” and (2) “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel‘s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Lovett v. State, 270 So. 3d 133, 135 (¶¶5) (Miss. Ct. App. 2018) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). In addition, “[a] defendant must plead claims of ineffective assistance of counsel with specificity, and the claim must be supported by affidavits other than his own.” Parks v. State, 326 So. 3d 505, 509 (¶¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2021) (quoting Moore v. State, 250 So. 3d 521, 525 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2018)). If “the defendant fails to attach any supporting affidavits and relies solely on his own sworn motion, his ineffective-assistance claim must fail.” Id. (quoting Evans v. State, 237 So. 3d 1271, 1275 (¶18) (Miss. Ct. App. 2018)).
¶19. As with the previous assignment of error, other than his own mere assertions, Siggers fails to substantiate his claims of ineffective assistance with any supporting evidence or affidavits. Moreover, Siggers‘s bare assertions fail to establish with any specificity that his trial attorney acted in a deficient manner or that any alleged deficiency prejudiced his defense. We therefore conclude that this issue also lacks merit.
CONCLUSION
¶20. Because we find no reversible error, we affirm the circuit court‘s dismissal of Siggers‘s PCR motion.
¶21. AFFIRMED.