175 S.W.2d 92 | Tex. App. | 1943
The record in this case shows that at the December 1942 term of the district court, appellee, Ruby Johnson, joined by her husband, and four children by a former marriage, filed suit against appellants on four promissory notes aggregating $3,727.28. One of the notes was due and payable in 1921, one due and payable in 1923, and the other two were due and payable in 1924. Appellants filed an answer in which they pleaded the four-year statute of limitation, Article 5527, R.C.S. 1925, whereupon appellees immediately took a nonsuit and the court dismissed the case without prejudice. On March 12, 1943, appellees filed this suit upon the same notes for the April 1943 term, which was the next term of the court after the case had been dismissed upon their motion for a nonsuit in December 1942. Appellants again filed their pleas of limitation under the four-year statute and alleged that, at the previous term of the court, appellees had filed an identical suit upon the same cause of action and when appellants filed their pleas of limitation appellees took a nonsuit, and that their attorney stated in the courtroom at that time that appellees would file suit against appellants on the notes at every following term of the court. They alleged that the suit was malicious, without probable cause, purely for the purpose of harassing, intimidating, and embarrassing them, and forcing them to expend large sums of money in attorneys' fees, and prayed for an injunction restraining appellees from filing any further suits on the notes. Appellees immediately took another nonsuit, moved the court to dismiss the case, and their motion was granted without prejudice, to their right to re-file the suit. Both dismissals were at the cost of the appellees.
In the judgment, the court found that appellants had not been damaged by the filing of the two suits against them and denied their prayer for an injunction. From that judgment appellants have prosecuted this appeal, and assail the judgment upon the ground that appellees admittedly have no cause of action against them and that, under such circumstances, a court of equity should take jurisdiction and grant an injunction restraining appellees from filing further suits on the same cause of action.
In the findings of fact, the court again states that appellants had suffered no damages by the repeated filing of the suit on the same cause of action and that appellees had filed the suits in an effort to collect the notes. There is no finding that the suits had been filed for the purpose of harassing appellants, nor that appellees had admitted their cause of action was barred by limitations. In their brief, however, appellees admit the notes are barred by limitations, but assert that, under the law, they have the right to file as many suits as they wish, notwithstanding the fact *94 that their cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations.
The law is well established in this, as well as in every other jurisdiction in this country, so far as we know, that no right to an injunction exists if no damages are recoverable or will be suffered by the party seeking it. The right to relief by injunction is dependent upon injury and in order to obtain an injunction, the party seeking it must show that he has been, or in some manner will be, injured. Marshall v. City of Dallas, Tex.Civ.App.
Article 2182, R.C.S. 1925, provides that, in a case tried without a jury, at any time before the decision is announced, the plaintiff may take a nonsuit, but the privilege given by the statute is not entirely without limitation. It is the policy of the law to avoid needless litigation, and public policy requires that there be an end to legal controversies. Galveston, H. S. A. Ry. Co. v. Dowe,
The judgment will therefore be affirmed.