This wrоngful death action arises from an accidental electrocution that occurred in the Grand Coulee Dam National Recreation Area in the State of Washington. Plaintiffs decedent, Gary Morgan, was canoeing with a companion and two dogs on Lake Roosevelt in the Reсreation Area. Morgan beached the canoe to let the dogs run. After running along the beach a slight distance, one dog stepped into the lake and suddenly disappeared. When Morgan entered the lake to rescue the dog he was instantly overcome and rendered disabled. Morgan’s companion cautiously entered the water and, upon feeling a tingling sensation, immediately withdrew and went for help. Divers recovered Morgan’s body later that day at the lake’s bottom. Subsequent investigation revealed that an electrically-driven irrigation pump located nearby had shorted and discharged electricity into the lake. The pump was owned and operated by a special use permittee, Vem Leach.
Plaintiff initiated suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1846(b), 2401(b), 2671-2680, against Leach and the government. Both defendants filed motions for summary judgment, contending Wash.Rev.Cоde Ann. §§ 4.24.-200-.210 (Supp.1983), the Washington Recreational Use Statute, absolved them of liability. 1 Holding the government owed plaintiff’s decedent no duty with respect to the irrigation pump whether or not the Washington statute applied, the district court granted the government’s motion for summary judgment and denied Leach’s. Having settled her case with Leach, plaintiff appeals from summary judgment in favor of the government.
I.
We do not find it necessary to decide whether summary judgment would be proper absent the Washington statute because we hold the statute does apply. Under the FTCA, the government is liable for nеgli
*582
gence “in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.” 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). Because the accident occurred in Washington, we apply Washington tort law. In
Jones v. United States,
Plaintiffs first argument that the Washington statute does not apply is based on 16 U.S.C. § 457, which provides:
In the case of the death of any person by the neglect or wrongful act of another within a national park or other place subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Unitеd States, within the exterior boundaries of any State, such right of action shall exist as though the place were under the jurisdiction of the State within whose exterior boundaries such place may be; and in any action brought to recover on account of injury sustained in any such place the rights оf the parties shall be governed by the laws of the State within the exterior boundaries which it may be.
Plaintiff argues for the interpretation of 16 U.S.C. § 457 found in
Quadrini v. Sikorsky Aircraft Division,
Plaintiff’s argument lacks merit.
Quadrini
was not initiated under the FTCA because the government was not a defendant. Rather,
Quadrini
arose under 16 U.S.C. § 457, which is merely a federal wrongful death statute, paralleling similar state statutes, designed to give a right of recovery for deaths oсcurring on property within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States. The
Quadrini
court recognized its result would be different under the FTCA,
Plaintiff also contends the Washington statute is inapplicable because the government contrаctually assumed a higher duty to recreational entrants than the statute requires. Plaintiff points to a 1946 agreement between the Bureau of Reclamation, Bureau of Indian Affairs, and National Park Service, in which the National Park Service agreed to “[ejstablish and maintain supervisory, informational, and protective services as may be necessary for the safe and full use of the Recreational Area for recreational purposes . ... ” Additionally, plaintiff cites language in Leach’s special use permit that reserves to the government “the right to go upon said рremises or upon any property of the permittee at any time in the performance of any duties .... ” We do not interpret those provisions as imposing any higher duty than the government normally owes under state law. The 1946 agreement establishes a very general obligation on the government to provide a safe recreational area. That obligation creates no separate or independent duty, but merely is a recognition of the government’s *583 responsibility under state tort law. The permit language, moreover, creates simply a right to enter, not a duty to inspect equipment installed by the permittee. We conclude that the scope of the duty owed plaintiff’s decedent derives solely from the Washington Recreational Use Statute.
II.
Under the Washington statute, landowners who open their property for recreational use are immune from liability except in three limited circumstances: (1) when a fee is charged; (2) when injuries are intentionally caused; (3) when injuries are sustained “by reason of a known dangerous artificial latent condition for which warning signs have not been conspicuously posted.” Wash.Rev.Code Ann. § 4.24.210 (Supp. 1983). The partiеs agree both that Morgan paid no fee to canoe on Lake Roosevelt and that his death was not intentionally caused. What remains in dispute is the government’s residual duty under the “known dangerous artificial latent condition” language.
The residual duty language is not a model of clarity. It aрpears somewhat inconsistent to describe a condition as “known” and “latent” in the same breath. Although the Washington courts have never construed the clause, we believe they would adopt the commonsense interpretation that “known” refers to the landowners’ mental state, while “lаtent” refers to a condition not readily apparent to the recreational user. We believe, moreover, that the statute contemplates actual, not constructive, knowledge of the landowner. Had the Washington legislature intended to charge landowners with constructivе knowledge it could have used more precise terminology such as “known or should have known.” It did not, and the reason is apparent from the statute’s purpose and history.
At common law, the recreational entrant in Washington would be characterized as a “public” invitee.
McKinnon v. Washington Federal Savings and Loan Association,
The Washington Recreational Use Statute was enacted against the background of the foregoing common law. The purpose of the statute is “to- encourage owners or others in lawful possession and control of land and water areas or channels to make them available to the public for recreational purposes by limiting their liability toward persons entering thereon ....” Wash.Rev.Code Ann. § 4.24.200 (Supp.1983).
See McCarver v. Manson Park & Recreation District,
*584 Legislative history supports our conclusions. During debate in the Washington Senate, it was proposed that the word “known” should be added preceding “dangerous artificial latent condition.” The senator offering the amendment gave the following example:
Senator Donohue buys a sеction of range land. He has not explored it foot by foot. Someone says, “Can I hunt on this range land?” and the Senator says, “Yes, you can hunt.” Unbeknownst to Senator Donohue, the prior owner somewhere dug a well and didn’t properly cover it. Now this is an artificial, latent defect — artificial bеcause man made, latent because it appears to be covered and isn’t. Senator Donohue has not personally explored this whole section. This amendment says that the Senator does not have to post something he doesn’t know about. If there is an open well that he knows about, he has to post it. But he shouldn’t be liable for something on this land that he doesn’t know about.
H.R. 258, Wash.S.Jour., 42nd Legis. 875 (1967) (emphasis added). In light of the statute’s language, history, and purpose, we believe Washington courts would require actual knowledge on the part of the landowner.
III.
Our standard of review over summary judgments is identical' to the district court’s standard for granting them. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment is sought, we must decide whether there are genuine issues of material fact and, if not, whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Beckham v. Safeco Insurance Company of America,
Anticipating our holding that the Washington statute precludes the government’s continuing duty to inspect, plaintiff theorizes the government may have known the pumping system was dangerous when installed. Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e), however, plaintiff’s bare theory cannot withstand the government’s evidence that it had no such knowledge.
See Mitchell v. General Electric Co.,
Considering the testimony of both witnesses, we still find no genuine issue of material fact that would preclude summary judgment. The testimony of plaintiff’s witness is essentially that the gоvernment should have known of the dangerous condition. We have held, however, that constructive knowledge is insufficient under the Washington statute. Plaintiff has failed to meet the government’s evidentiary showing that it lacked actual knowledge. Accordingly, summary judgment for the government is
AFFIRMED.
Notes
. Wash.Rev.Code Ann. §§ 4.24.200-.210 (Supp. 1983) рrovide as follows:
4.24.200. The purpose of RCW 4.24.200 and 4.24.210 is to encourage owners or others in lawful possession and control of land and water areas or channels to make them available to the public for recreational purposes by limiting their liability toward persons entering thereоn and toward persons who may be injured or otherwise damaged by the acts or omissions of persons entering thereon.
4.24.210. Any public or private landowners or others in lawful possession and control of any lands whether rural or urban, or water areas or channels and lands adjacent to such areas or channels, who allow members of the public to use them for the purposes of outdoor recreation, which term includes, but is not limited to, the cutting, gathering, and removing of firewood by private persons for their personal use without purchasing the firewood from the landowner, hunting, fishing, camping, picnicking, swimming, hiking, bicycling, the riding of horses or other animals, clam digging, pleasure driving of off-road vehicles, snowmobiles, and other vehicles, boating, nature study, winter or water sports, viewing or enjoying historical, archaeological, scenic, or scientific sites, without charging a fee of аny kind therefor, shall not be liable for unintentional injuries to such users: Provided, That any public or private landowner, or others in lawful possession and control of the land, may charge an administrative fee of up to ten dollars for the cutting, gathering, and removing of firewood from the land: Provided further, That nothing in this section shаll prevent the liability of such a landowner or others in lawful possession and control for injuries sustained to users by reason of a known dangerous artificial latent condition for which warning signs have not been conspicuously posted: Provided further, That nothing in RCW 4.24.200 and 4.24.210 limits or expands in any way the doctrine of attractive nuisance: And provided further, That the usage by members of the public is permissive and does not support any claim of adverse possession.
. We express no opinion on the reasoning of
Quadrini,
but we note that in
Vasina v. Grumman Corp.,