Reneau v. Con-Way Trans. Serv.Reneau v. Con-Way Trans. Serv.
{¶ 2} Appellant, Con-Way Transportation Services Inc., sets forth the following five assignments of error:
{¶ 3} "I. The trial court abused its discretion by allowing the opinion testimony of Robert A. MacGuffie, PhD., who was not qualified under
{¶ 4} "II. The trial court abused its discretion by allowing the opinion testimony of Robert A. MacGuffie, PhD., whose opinion was based, in part, on the medical opinion of a doctor who did not testify at trial.
{¶ 5} "III. The trial court abused its discretion in admitting the September, 2001 hospital records of the St. Charles Mercy Hospital without redacting the portions of the records containing medical diagnoses relevance to the ultimate trial issue.
{¶ 6} "IV. The trial court abused its discretion in admitting the unauthenticated records of Lurley Archambeau, M.D., which records constituted inadmissible hearsay under
{¶ 7} "V. The trial court abused its discretion in instructing the jury on dual causation where there was no evidence showing more than one proximate cause for the alleged psychiatric condition at issue."
{¶ 8} The following undisputed facts are relevant to the issues raised on appeal. This case stems from a disputed workers' compensation claim. On December 7, 1998, appellee was employed as a truck driver with appellant. On December 7, 1998, appellee sustained an injury while performing the task of pulling dock plates. *3
{¶ 9} Appellee was subsequently referred to a neurosurgeon at St. Vincent Mercy Medical Center. On February 3, 1999, appellee underwent cervical disc surgery for disk herniation and spurring. Appellee returned to work on light duty three weeks after this surgery. Appellee resumed truck driving duties following three weeks on light duty.
{¶ 10} Shortly after resuming normal duties, appellee continued to experience physical problems and was unable to work. Appellee filed a workers' compensation claim. Appellee's claim was allowed for conditions including cervical strain, herniated cervical disc, adjustment disorder with mixed anxiety and depressed mood, and acute psychosis secondary to steroid injection.
{¶ 11} In the wake of being unable to resume normal duties, appellee sought treatment from a local psychologist. In addition, appellee began treatment at several area pain clinics, including St. Vincent and St. Charles. The course of treatment involved heat massage, epidural shots, steroid shots, ultrasound, and being prescribed a multitude of pain medications. Appellee was prescribed Celebrex, Skelaxin, Vicodin, and OxyContin.
{¶ 12} In April 2001, appellee was admitted to St. Charles for several days to treat a psychosis condition. In response, appellee's pain management physician discontinued the steroid injections and simultaneously increased the dosage of OxyContin. In September 2001, appellee consumed a significant quantity of OxyContin. Appellee was taken to the emergency room at St. Charles and admitted to the psychiatric ward. Following this episode, appellee's psychologist referred him to a psychiatrist for *4 additional mental health treatment. The psychiatrist placed appellee on Zoloft. Appellee continues to treat with Zoloft.
{¶ 13} On March 10, 2003, appellee filed a motion to supplement his prior workers' compensation claim with the additional condition of "major depressive disorder with associated multiple narcotic pendency in the form of medication." On June 4, 2003, appellee's motion was granted by the preliminary level district hearing officer. On November 24, 2003, appellee's motion was similarly allowed by the secondary level staff hearing officer. The Industrial Commission refused appellant's appeal of the staff hearing officer's decision.
{¶ 14} Appellant ultimately appealed to the Wood County Court of Common Pleas pursuant to
{¶ 15} Following trial, the jury ruled in favor of appellee and affirmed the decision to allow him to participate in a workers' compensation fund for "major depressive disorder with associated multiple narcotic dependency in the form of medication." This disputed workers' compensation claim and judgment is the core of this appeal. On January 4, 2007, appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.
{¶ 16} In its first assignment of error, appellant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in permitting the testimony of appellee's psychologist. In support, appellant argues that appellee's treating psychologist was not qualified to testify pursuant to the *5
parameters of
{¶ 17} In conjunction with the first assignment of error, and substantively merged with it, appellant's second assignment of error asserts that allowing the psychologist's testimony was an abuse of discretion as portions of the testimony consisted of the witness concurring with the diagnosis of appellee's treating psychiatrist who did not himself testify. Given that our judgment on the first assignment inevitably entails consideration of the second assignment, we will consider these assignments together.
{¶ 18} In support of these assignments, appellant relied heavily upon the notion that because the disputed witness was a PhD psychologist rather than an M.D. psychiatrist, and could not prescribe the actual medication recommended for appellant's condition, he was unfit to testify regarding the diagnosis of the condition.
{¶ 19} Conversely, appellee asserted that it is standard practice for psychologists to treat patients whose condition may necessitate simultaneous treatment by a psychiatrist for medication purposes. Appellee further argued that there was no authority for the proposition that psychologists are systematically unqualified to testify regarding a diagnosis rendered by a psychiatrist simultaneously treating the same patient.
{¶ 20} The core of this debate revolved around the fact that the psychiatrist, whom appellee was referred to by his psychologist, made the actual diagnosis. The psychologist concurred with the diagnosis and testified to his concurrence, but was not the mental *6 health professional who initially tendered it. Given this scenario, appellant argued that the psychologist was not qualified to testify regarding the diagnosis despite simultaneously treating appellee for previously diagnosed depressive disorders.
{¶ 21} Appellee maintained that the psychologist was not rendered unqualified to testify simply because he concurred with the diagnosis rather than issued it. The trial court denied the motion in limine and permitted the psychologist to testify.
{¶ 22} It is well established that determining whether an individual qualifies as an expert rests within trial court discretion. Such determinations will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion.Porter v. Sidor, 8th Dist. No. 84756,
{¶ 23} In view of the abuse of discretion standard of review applicable to this issue, we must examine the transcript to ascertain whether the psychologist fit within the parameters required for expert testimony established by
{¶ 24} We have carefully reviewed and considered the testimony of appellee's psychologist to ascertain whether it comports with
{¶ 25} Following appellee's September 2001 overdose of OxyContin and hospitalization in the psychiatric ward at St. Charles Hospital, he was diagnosed by his treating psychiatrist with major depressive disorder with associated multiple narcotic dependency in the form of medication.
{¶ 26} Based upon his professional knowledge and experience, history of treatment of appellee, and review of the hospital records connected to the September 2001 hospitalization, appellee's psychologist concurred with that additional diagnosis and continued treating appellee in collaboration with the psychiatrist. The record shows that the psychologist's testimony related to matters beyond the common experience of laypersons and was based upon reliable information. The disputed expert testimony complied with
{¶ 27} Appellee's psychologist testified that he possesses a PhD in counseling psychology from the University of Utah. He is a licensed psychologist with the state of *8
Ohio. He served as the director of rehabilitation counseling at Bowling Green State University. He served as a psychologist at Sauder's Woodworking. He served as a psychologist for the Lucas County Drug Abuse SASI program. He evaluated, diagnosed and treated mental health conditions suffered by appellee. The disputed expert testimony complied with
{¶ 28} The record does not establish that the trial court's decision to allow the expert testimony of appellee's psychologist was arbitrary, unreasonable or unconscionable. Appellant's first two assignments of error are found not well-taken.
{¶ 29} In its third assignment of error, appellant claims that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the hospital records generated by appellee's September 2001 psychiatric hospitalization at St. Charles following his OxyContin overdose. Although appellant concedes the disputed medical records are self-authenticating pursuant to
{¶ 30}
{¶ 31} The staff note to
{¶ 32} When this dispute arose during trial, appellant argued that those portions of the records referencing medical diagnoses be redacted. Appellant cited the Hytha case in support of his argument to redact the diagnoses. In Hytha v. Schwendeman (197 4),
{¶ 33} We have carefully reviewed the contested medical records. These records establish that on September 16, 2001, paramedics delivered appellee to the St. Charles Hospital emergency room for nausea and vomiting. It was discovered that appellee had overdosed on prescribed OxyContin. Appellee denied that the overdose was intentional. *10
Nevertheless, appellee was unable to explain why he ingested an overdose of the narcotics.
{¶ 34} Appellee was referred for a psychiatric evaluation to Dr. Shahid. The records show that Dr. Shahid thoroughly examined and interviewed appellee. Based upon the examination, interview, psychiatric evaluation and in-patient treatment, diagnoses were made. There is absolutely nothing in the record to suggest that the disputed records at St. Charles are somehow unreliable.
{¶ 35} In Smith v. Dillard's Dept. Stores, Inc. (Dec. 14, 2000), 8th Dist. No. 75787, the court carefully scrutinized this type of evidentiary dispute. The court determined that
{¶ 36} In its fourth assignment of error, appellant asserts the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the records of Dr. Archambeau. Our review of the portion of the record relevant to this assignment convinces us to address it briefly and concisely. The *11 record reveals that the parties engaged in thorough and precise discussions and negotiations on the record regarding which portions of Dr. Archambeau's records would be admitted. Pursuant to these discussions, various contested portions of the records were redacted. It is illuminating to note that appellant's own expert witness utilized and relied upon the disputed records in formulating his expert opinion.
{¶ 37} The record clearly reflects that the redacted portions of Dr. Archambeau's records admitted into the evidence were the culmination of a collaborative agreement between the parties. The record shows that both counsel for appellee and the trial court went to great lengths to mollify the multitude of concerns raised by appellant regarding the content of these medical records. To characterize the trial court's cooperation in a negotiated evidentiary agreement between the parties as to the extent of the records coming into evidence as unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable is not persuasive. Appellant's fourth assignment of error is not well-taken.
{¶ 38} In its fifth assignment of error, appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion in furnishing the jury with an instruction on dual causation. Absent an abuse of discretion, we must affirm the trial court's jury instruction language. Chambers v. Admr., Ohio Bur. OfWorkers' Comp.,
{¶ 39} We note that the record contains ample information to suggest that appellant's condition of "major depressive disorder with associated multiple narcotic *12 dependency in the form of medication" could have resulted from more than one cause. During its cross-examination of appellee, appellant aggressively delved into multiple causation testimony. Although it may be strategically sound to contest a jury instruction on dual causation at the conclusion of the proceedings, the record of the proceedings contain no evidence to suggest such a jury instruction was arbitrary, unreasonable or unconscionable. On the contrary, such an instruction comported with the record of evidence. Appellant's fifth assignment of error is not well-taken.
{¶ 40} On consideration whereof, we find that substantial justice was done the party complaining. The judgment of the Wood County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. Appellant is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal pursuant to
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
Mark L. Pietrykowski P.J., Arlene Singer, J., Thomas J. Osowik, J., concur. *1