116 Mo. App. 390 | Mo. Ct. App. | 1906
Plaintiffs, William O. Rendlen, Albert E. Rendlen, Theodore G. Rendlen, Lydia M'. Schanbacher, L. Aurora and Lillian T. Glenn and John A. Schnizlein, are the heirs at law of Catharine Rendlen, who died on January 2, 1902, seized in fee of a part of lot 4, block 13, in the city of Hannibal, State of Missouri, worth about thirty-five hundred dollars and described as follows: Beginning at the southeast corner of said lot four, thence north on west line of Main street, sixteen and four-twelfths feet; thence westerly parallel with the south line of said lot four, forty-two feet; thence southerly parallel with the west line of Main street, sixteen and four-twelfths feet to the south line of said lot four; thence easterly on the south line of said lot four, forty-two feet to the place of beginning. As to this parcel of real estate, Catharine Rendlen died intestate. Plaintiff Alice Rendlen, is the wife of Theodore G. Rendlen, who is the son of Catharine Rendlen and inherited an undivided one-fifth interest in the above described real estate. On July 26, 1900, Theodore Rendlen and his- wife executed and acknowledged a deed conveying the interest of Theodore Rendlen in the above described real estate to Albert R. Smith, which deed contained general convenants of warranty. On the following day Smith executed and acknowledged a quit-claim deed conveying the same parcel of land to Alice Rendlen. Neither of these deeds was filed for record until about two weeks after the death of Catharine Rendlen. Alice Rendlen testified that they were not delivered to her until after they were recorded. At the September term, 1902, of the Hannibal Court of Common Pleas, defendant Willie Edwards obtained a judgment against John Herí and Theodore
It is admitted that John Herí has no interest in the land levied upon and it is conceded by both parties that if the deed from Theodore Rendlen and wife to Smith, and the deed from Smith to Alice Rendlen were delivered to her prior to the death of Catharine Rendlen, then the said Alice took nothing by said deeds; on the other hand it is conceded that if these deeds were not delivered to her until after the death of Catharine Rendlen, she took a good title, having paid a good and valid consideration for the land with money procured from her mother, and the injunction should be made perpetual. Therefore the case is to be decided on the facts and requires an examination of the evidence in respect to what, was done and said by the parties to the deeds. It appears that Smith is an attorney at law and was attorney for Theodore Rendlen and wife at the time the deeds were executed. He did not purchase the land, paid nothing whatever for it, but was used as a mere conduit to pass the title from Theodore Rendlen to his wife Alice. Smith testified that the deed from Rendlen and wife to himself was made out and executed in his office; that he handed the deed to Mrs. Rendlen and she read it, and after it was acknowledged it was left in his office; that on the following day, at his office, he made a quit-claim deed from himself to Mrs. Rendlen; that she was not present when he made this deed and did not know that it was ex-
Alice Rendlen testified that her husband owed his brother and sister a thousand dollars, which he was anxious to pay, but he had no money, and she got the thous- and dollars from her mother; that the only property her husband had for security was his interest in his mother’s lot and she bought his expectancy in it; that she did not know of his owing any other debts and thought the thousand dollars was all he owed; that the deeds were not delivered to her until about two weeks after Catharine Rendlen’s death. On cross-examination witness testified as follows: “I was present when the deeds were
The evidence is clear that the deeds were not put in Smith’s possession to be held until the performance of some condition, therefore, they were not held in escrow by him . [Whelan v. Tobener, 71 Mo. App. 370; 4 Kent, sec. 454.] Were they delivered to Alice Rendlen? Delivery, in legal phraseology, as said in Black v. Shreve, 13 N. J. Eq. 455, means “the final absolute transfer to the grantee of a complete legal instrument sealed by the grantor, covenantor, or obligor.”
In Vanstone v. Goodwin, 42 Mo. App. 39, it was held: “The infallible test of delivery is the fact that the grantor has divested himself of all dominion over the conveyance, and when the depositary, though the agent of the grantee, holds the instrument subject to recall of the grantor, there is no such delivery as to render it efficacious as a'conveyance.” The same ruling is made in Huiser v. Beck, 55 Mo. App. 668. [See also Tyler v. Hall, 106 Mo. l. c. 321-2,17 S. W. 319.]
In Hammerslough v. Cheatham, 84 Mo. 13, it is said: “To constitute a delivery of a deed by placing it in the hands of a third person, it must be done with the intent on the part of the grantor that it shall take effect as his deed in favor of the grantee.”
Whether or not there was a delivery of the deeds to Mrs. Alice Rendlen depends, we think, upon the intention of the parties. According to Smith’s evidence, the quit-claim deed was made without the knowledge of Mrs. Alice Rendlen and never left his possession until after the death of Catharine Rendlen. He being the