794 N.E.2d 769 | Ohio Ct. App. | 2003
{¶ 2} The facts of this case are not in dispute. On January 13, 1999, Remer was scheduled to begin her 2:00 p.m. shift at Kroger. There was snow and freezing rain that day and the temperature was approximately six degrees Fahrenheit. Remer arrived for work nearly 20 minutes before the start of her shift. At the time, Kroger had a policy that prohibited employees from clocking into work more than eight minutes before their scheduled shift. Finding she *509 was too early to clock in, Remer decided to return to her car to go to the bank. While leaving, Remer slipped and fell on ice on the cart ramp at the store entrance, fracturing her left patella.
{¶ 3} Remer filed a workers' compensation claim which the district hearing officer allowed. This decision was vacated by the staff hearing officer on August 24, 2000. The Industrial Commission refused further review on September 19, 2000, and Remer filed an appeal with the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas on October 13, 2000. Cross motions for summary judgment were filed by the parties. The trial court found that Remer was within the zone of her employment at the time of her injury and therefore was entitled to participate in the Workers' compensation system.
{¶ 4} Kroger sets forth the following sole assignment of error:
{¶ 5} "The trial court erred in granting appellee Joyce Remer's motion for summary judgment and denying appellant The Kroger Company's motion for summary judgment when the undisputed material facts establish Ms. Remer's fall did not occur in the course of her employment with The Kroger Company."
{¶ 6} A review of the trial court's granting of summary judgment is de novo, and thus, we apply the same standard as the trial court.Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co. (1996),
{¶ 7} This appeal turns on whether Remer was injured while in the course of her employment. An employee is entitled to participate in the workers' compensation fund if the employee sustains an injury, "whether caused by external accidental means or accidental in character and result, received in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee's employment." R.C.
{¶ 8} A "totality of the circumstances" test was created to determine whether in a particular case there is a sufficient causal connection between the injury and the employment to justify participation in the workers' compensation fund. Lord v. Daugherty (1981),
{¶ 9} Kroger argues first that, while Remer may have been on its property, she was not performing an act required by employment and therefore was not in the course of her employment at the time of her injury. In support of this "no benefit" argument that Remer was not acting within the course of her employment, Kroger relies on Indus.Comm. of Ohio v. Ahern (1928),
{¶ 10} Since Ahern, decided over seventy years ago, the Ohio Supreme Court has altered the "in the course of employment" definition. Specifically, compensation has been broadened to include employees injured within the "zone of employment" or those injured while participating in an employer sponsored event. See, Kohlmayer v. Keller (1970),
{¶ 11} Kroger argues next that the zone of employment exception does not apply because of the timing of Remer's injury; she was not leaving after completing a work day. The "zone of employment" rule, however, has been applied before, during and after an employee's work hours. See, Indus. Comm. v. Henry (1932),
{¶ 12} Along with at least an indirect benefit to an employer, the critical issue appears to be the location of the employee's injury. In this case, it is undisputed that Remer was injured on the cart ramp at the entrance to the Kroger store, an area Kroger owned and controlled. Therefore, Remer was injured within the "zone of employment." She came to the Kroger store to start her work shift, but did not actually clock into work upon her arrival because Kroger's policy prohibited employees from clocking in more than eight minutes before their shift.1 Remer was not violating any conditions of her employment when she was injured. She was complying with company policy by waiting to clock in. An injury occurs in the course of, and arises out of, the employment if the injury follows as a natural incident of the work and as a result of exposure occasioned by the nature, conditions, and surroundings of the employment. Sebek,
{¶ 13} Kroger finally argues that even if Remer was in the course of employment at the time of her injury, she deviated from the course of her employment when she left the store to run a personal errand. On this point, we look to the place where her injury occurred and agree with the reasoning expressed in Lemming v. Univ. of Cincinnati (1987),
{¶ 14} By any measure, Remer's injury occurred within the course of her employment, entitling her to participate in the workers' compensation fund. Kroger's sole assignment of error is not well taken, and thus, the judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. Appellant is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal.
Peter M. Handwork, P.J., dissents.