OPINION OF THE COURT
Memorandum.
The order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed, with costs.
Plaintiff maintains that she was discharged because she objected to, and refused to participate in, defendant’s purported fraudulent billing of New York City, and that such retaliatory action is prohibited under Labor Law § 740 (2) (c) (the “Whistleblower” Law). This contention is unavailing, however, primarily because we agree with the Appellate Division that Labor Law § 740 (2) (c), like section 740 (2) (a), is triggered only by a violation of a law, rule or regulation that creates and presents a substantial and specific danger to the public health and safety
(see, Easterson v Long Is. Jewish Med. Center,
In addition, after reviewing the legislative history, we conclude that the conduct complained of — fraudulent billing — is not the type of violation which creates a “substantial and specific danger to the public health or safety”
(see, Leibowitz v Bank Leumi Trust Co., supra
[fraudulent banking activities];
Vella v United Cerebral Palsy,
Chief Judge Wachtler and Judges Simons, Kaye, Alexander, Titone, Hancock, Jr., and Bellacos a concur.
Order affirmed, with costs, in a memorandum.