11 Mo. App. 374 | Mo. Ct. App. | 1882
delivered the opinion of the court.
This is a proceeding to charge the assets of the Columbia Life Insurance Company, formerly the St. Louis Life Insurance Company, which assets were in the hands of a receiver, with the payment of certain personal tax-bills in favor of the state, the city and county of St. Louis, and the public schools. The intervening petitioner is the collector holding the tax-bills. Throe of the bills were allowed. As to them there is no question here, since the receiver did not appeal. Tax-bill No. 563, for $2,600, was allowed as to one-half only; and tax-bill No. 788, for $11,075.76, was disallowed.
The answer of the receiver presented three defences, to each of which the collector demurred. The trial court sustained the demurrer to the first defence, and overruled the others, and the parties declining to plead further, the cause was submitted and judgment entered.
The first defence, which went to all the bills, and which was held to be insufficient by the court, was to the effect that the personal property in the possession of the receiver is held by him under the authority of the court; that his possession is the possession of the court; that the property belongs ratably to the creditors of the insurance company, who are to return for taxation all interest which they have in the property so situated, and to pay all taxes on it. Therefore, the receiver says, the property is not taxable against him.
The secoud defence applies to the bill No. 788, for $11,075.76. The answer sets up that this tax-bill does not represent taxes due by the insurance company, or on property which it owned; that the amount is claimed to have been payable only on account of „the stock that different persons held in the company, taxable for that year, which tax was a debt of the stockholders, and not of the company; that, under the statute as it existed at that date, the president of the company was required to furnish to the assessor a list of all persons owning stock in the company, and to add thereto a statement of the value of their stock;
The third defence applies to bill 563, being a tax of $2,600, for 1878. The answer sets up that, the company being dissolved and respondent its receiver, the respondent, being required to do so by the assessor, made a return for 1878, of all the property in his possession, power, or control, and gave the true value thereof; that the bill is based on that return; that after respondent had been assessed on this return in the amount stated in the bill, the chief clerk in the assessor’s office added $100,000 to the return, which the clerk claimed to be the face value of the securities which the company, before its dissolution, had deposited with the insurance department for the security of its polic}'-holders ;vthat these securities, since the dissolution of the company, were never worth more than $50,000 ; that respondent had no notice of this addition to his return, and knew nothing of it; that the board of equalization was never notified that respondent’s return’ was false or fraudulent ; that respondent never received any notification from
The receiver did not appeal. The only questions for us to consider are, whether upon the facts set out in the answer and admitted by the demurrers, tax-bill 788 was a valid charge against the assets in the receiver’s possession ; and, whether the court committed error to the prejudice of appellant in not rendering judgment for the full amount of tax-bill No. 563.
Under the provisions of the statute (Wag. Stats. 745, sects. 21, 22), the life insurance company was compelled to keep on deposit with the superintendent of the insurance department, securities worth $100,000. As it was upon these securities that tax-bill 563 was assessed for the taxes for 1878 ; as this levy was made under an assessment as of date August 1, 1877, and the company was not dissolved, and the receiver not appointed, until the following October, it is claimed that the property existed and was subject to taxation as the property of the company on August 1, 1877 ; that it was not included in the return of property afterwards made by the receiver, because not in his possession ; and
When the life insurance company was dissolved the court took possession of its securities, and they were in the custody and control of the receiver, and not in the custody and control of the superintendent of insurance as trustee ; as we held in Relfe v. Spear (6 Mo. App. 126). It appears by the answer in this case, that Alexander, as-receiver, made a return for 1878, of all the property under his, possession, power, or control as receiver, and that the tax-bill 562, on which a recovery is had in this action, was based on that return. That return could not have been made of property in the receiver’s control on August 1, 1877, for he was not receiver until October. If it was claimed by the assessor that these securities were omitted, the claim must be that they were omitted from that return, the only return that was or could be made by the receiver for the taxes of 1878 ; and if there was such an omission, that return was false, and the act of the assessor in making this additional assessment against the life insurance company in the name of Relfe was, in effect, a finding that the return of the receiver was a false return, and a valuation of the property of the insurance company not based upon that return, and without notice to the receiver, who was the only person who did, or could, at the time the return was made, make the return to-the assessor required by law. Section 32 (Wag. Stats. 1164; Rev. Stats., sect. 6689) does not seem to be made with a view to the case of an omission, whether by fraud or accident, from a list of taxable property, of some personalty under the control of the person making return. If we are to suppose a case, that Alexander, erroneously believing that he, as receiver of the life insurance company, had
We need not consider whether the trial court properly rendered judgment for one-half of this tax-bill. The receiver does not complain of the action of the court in this respect. The contention of appellant is that the judgment should have been for the entire bill. There appears to have been no error committed to the prejudice of appellant, and tiie judgment will be affirmed.