*1 rеmanding juvenile that determination to the and domes- court, deprived tic relations district the circuit court on de novo to have that determina- parties right appeal tion made circuit court. a de novo is by appeal When court, circuit are entitled to have the parties taken if originally case tried “as it had been instituted that court.” Tuttle, 28, 33, 155 Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. 208 Va. Instead, the circuit court ordered the matter arrearag- remanded to the district court for calculation of the es, deprived which Slawski of his to de novo review § the circuit court.2 See Code 16.1-113. reasons, fully
For these we hold that this matter is not reviewable, entry and we remand to the circuit court for of an confirmation, оrder of which includes a determina- necessarily any arrearages.3 tion of the amount of Reversed and remanded.
514S.E.2d775 Christopher John REITTINGER Virginia. COMMONWEALTHof Record No. 0246-97-3. Appeals Virginia,
Court
Richmond.
25,May 1999. Department in the circuit court or in this 2. No issue was raised appeal challenging the de novo from the district court Court circuit court. by appellant any in this 3. We do not other issues raised consider Therefore, fully any subse- appeal. such issues remain reviewable in quent Court. appeal pursuant to the rules of this *3 Crawford, Malcolm G. Lexington, for appellant. *4 (Mark Decker,
Marla Graff Attorney Assistant General L. briefs), General, Earley, Attorney on for appellee. C.J., FITZPATRICK, BENTON, COLEMAN,
Present: WILLIS, ELDER, BRAY, ANNUNZIATA, BUMGARDNER LEMONS, JJ., OVERTON,* and and Judge. Senior *Judge participated hearing prior Overton in the and of decision this case January the effective date of his on retirement 1999 and thereaf-
UPON A REHEARING EN BANC BUMGARDNER, Judge.
A
of
panel
Christopher
of this
the conviction
Court reversed
marijuana.
for
Reittinger
possession
Reittinger
John
of
Upon
A stopped sheriff the defendant for his deputy headlight p.m. van a broken 10:30 in rural Volkswagen with The determined that the defen- Rockbridge County. deputy bulb, already though had bought replacement dant had he not The warned the defendant not to yet deputy installed it. until but him was night light drive at he fixed the told that he thereafter, Immediately although deputy “free to did go.” not criminal he any particular suspect activity, have reason to asked if had or firearms any the defendant contraband not Eventually, responded vehicle. the defendant he did if have The then asked he could search the any. deputy drugs. for stated that deputy vehicle stops most traffic asks consent search after routinely majority so of cases. permission and that he receives to do in a seat, two in his looked at his The defendant turned around whispered something dеputy could passengers, times, but the deputy repeated question hear. The his several standing A was did not answer. second defendant Finally, being without asked passenger’s beside the door. out, started get opened the van door and defendant out. getting 17.1-401, § designation judge pursuant to Code
ter his as a senior § recodifying Code 17-116.01:1.
729 van, the ob- deputy As the defendant climbed out if bulge right pocket. deputy served a in his front The asked the on his defen- anything illegal person. defendant had The dant that did not replied up he but “moved his hand to cover bulge.” patted clothing, the The the outer deputy defendant’s and in the which large, bulge pocket, thought felt hard he might Again a weapon. he asked the defendant what was causing bulge, the the not but defendant did answer. The deрuty told him empty pocket, to the but the defendant emptied his left the with pocket, bulge. one the Increasingly that defendant was suspicious hiding the some- said, thing, deputy “you the that bring your need out of pocket,” and the out pulled smoking defendant device. It marijuana contained residue was for charge and basis the the placed against the defendant.
The filed a defendant motion to suppress evidence arguing deputy that illegally searched him. The trial court ruled the was deputy justified frisking the defendant safety, for his own denied the motion to suppress, and convict- ed marijuana. the defendant of possession of
On appeal, the defendant bears the burden to estab lish denying suppress the motion to was reversible error. Commonwealth, See Greene Va.App. 17 440 S.E.2d (1994). 138, 139-40 Whether a seizure occurred and whether a frisk for weapons constitutionally was questions valid involve of law fact which we review de on appeal. novo Commonwealth, 193, 197-98, McGee v. 25 (1997) (en banc) States, Ornelas v. United (citing (1996)). “In L.Ed.2d performing analysis, such we are bound the trial court’s findings historical fact ‘plainly wrong’ unless or without them____” Ornelas, to support evidence Id. (citing 1657). 699, 116 at S.Ct We view the evidence most light favorable the Commonwealth. See Fore v. Va. initial stop driving was a defendant valid
with headlight a broken which the con- night, defendant offense, for that deputy’s investigation
cedes. Following left, leave, defendant was free but before *6 permission to search the defendant’s van. The asked request deputy’s subsequent defendant contends disagree and hold that the actions constituted seizure. We immediately into a consensual lawful detention flowed encoun- ter.
A
can
legitimate
consensual encounter
follow a
de
Robinette,
33, 39-40,
v.
519 U.S.
117 S.Ct.
tention. See Ohio
(1996)
417,
(holding
A
is “seized” under
Fourth Amendment
person
have believed that he was
when “a reasonable
would
States,
544,
446
not free to leave.” Mendenhall v. United
U.S.
(1980).
554,
1870,
In order for a
100
Under the circumstances of this a reasonable person would have believed that investigation had ended and that he was free to leave. See Wechsler v. Common wealth, 20 Va.App.
deputy engaged the
defendant
a consensual encounter
following a lawful detention for defective equipment.
Immedi
ately after telling the defendant he was “free to go,” the
deputy asked the defendant whether he
any
had
contraband or
weapons and whether he
permit
would
the deputy to search
the vehicle. The defendant eventually exited the vehicle
*7
being
without
facts,
asked to do so. Under these
the contin
ued encounter did not constitute a seizure. The deputy did
not seize the defendant when he began asking to search.
Compliance
with a
request
negate
does not
the consen
sual nature of the response.
Commonwealth,
See Baldwin v.
191, 197,
243 Va.
645,
(1992); Greene,
413 S.E.2d
648
17
610,
Va.App.
The trial court ruled that the deputy could frisk for weapons reasonable, because he had articulable suspicion that the defendant was However, armed and dangerous. argues defendant permissible frisk was not unless the deputy had suspicion reasonable that the defendant was en in gaged activity criminal as well as a suspicion reasonable that he was armed and dangerous. We disagree.
A protective frisk for is an intrusion an upon individual’s personal privacy implicates the Fourth Williams, Amendment. See 143, 2, Adams v. 407 U.S. 147 n. 1921, 92 (1972); S.Ct. 32 L.Ed.2d 612 Toliver v. Common wealth, 34, 23 36, (1996). Va.App. 722, 473 S.E.2d 724
732
by “balancing
determined
an
of an intrusion is
reasonableness
intru
arbitrary government
from
to be free
individual’s
preventing
interest
in
society’s countervailing
against
sions
offi
in
its law enforcement
protecting
crime and
detecting
,
474, 476,
14
419
cers.” Bethea v. Commonwealth
(en banc) (citation
on
(1992)
omitted),
249,
250
aff'd
(1993).
416,
other
429 S.E.2d
Officer
grounds,
245 Va.
rights
which
against
personal
those interests
safety
among
is
Iowa,
113,--
v.
balanced. See Knowles
525 U.S.
must
(1998)
484, 487-88,
-,
(citing
Virginia’s a reasonable an need not have occasions that activity protecting in criminal before person engaged that a is weapons. Courts carefully limited frisk himself with an officer circumstances which frisks under approved have lawfully suspicion that developed a reasonable the officer dangerous though even confronted was armed subject was suspicion that particularized not have a did Bethea In involved criminal (1993), involved which 245 Va. violation, Supreme vehicle for a decal the lawful of a first of a who was passenger conviction upheld Court *8 he was though later frisked from the car and removed Moore In of criminal suspected (1997), 277, 286, 868-69 which 487 S.E.2d 25 Va.App. this Court speeding, a vehicle for lawful involved the as of a stranded passenger, frisk protective an officer’s upheld the transported passen- before the officer stop, a of the result Commonwealth, Welshman In in cruiser. police his ger (en banc), (1998) we held a suspected to arrest with cause probable officers that they when Fourth Amendment violate the did not drug dealer bystanders ground ordered to lie on the one frisked bystander whose furtive actions caused an to believe he James v. Common- was armed and in dangerous. Finally, wealth, 740, 745-46, (1996), 22 Va.App. in which officers in engaged were the driver of a arresting warrant, vehicle on a felony we held that the officers were in justified a frisking passenger jittery who was to and failed to respond an officer’s his in request keep hands view. cases, In each of these the officer duty involved had a initiate the encounter which him in put lawfully presence of the individual frisked. Under settled in principles, order to (1) frisk, conduct a pat-down weapons an rightly officer must in presence party be of the frisked so as to be endangered (2) if person is armed and have suspicion reasonable See 4 Wayne R. person is dangerous. LaFave, armed and Search (3d and Seizure 9.5(a), 1996). § at 246 ed. requirement that an officer be in rightly presence of the person frisked means that the officer must have a duty in the person’s presence, such as to a execute search warrant or to an conduct investigatory stop or arrest of some other person. id. at 247 (citing Terry, 32-33, (Harlan, J., S.Ct. 1868 concurring)). Such a duty existed in Bethea, Moore, Welshman and James. Conversely,
a frisk for self-protection cannot be undertaken when the officer has unnecessarily put himself a position danger by not avoiding the question. individual in This means that in the absence of legitimate some basis for the officer being in the proximity immediate person, degree of suspicion that is armed which would suffice to justify frisk there were that basis will not justify alone if such a search.
LaFave, (footnote omitted). supra, at 247
Extrapolating from principles, these we hold that where a lawful encounter basеd on reasonable probable cause encounter, flows into a immediately consensual an officer remains lawfully presence of the individual previously purposes detained for of conducting pat-down *9 Therefore, for frisk the individual may the officer
search. that the individ- suspicion if a reasonable weapons develops may dangerous. ual be armed and Here, objectively an may provided evidence not have the in engaged was crimi- suspicion reasonable that the defendant of the encounter. activity during portion nal the consensual However, rightly it establish that the was deputy because did objectively in the defendant’s and that he had an presence and dan- reasonable that the defendant was аrmed lawful. The we hold that the frisk for was gerous, on immediately in this case followed the consensual encounter not involve an initial of a lawful detention. It did heels to avoid. Both deputy liberty that the was at encounter duty demanded a forced encoun- circumstances warranted and ter.1 told the completing stop, deputy the traffic the
Upon
the consensual
go”
beginning
he was “free
before
defendant
for
during
permission
of the encounter
which he asked
portion
the
Although
portion
to search the defendant’s van.
lawful
had
that continued after the initial
encounter
consensual,
as
remained vulnerable
deputy
terminated was
the
In
moments
precarious
encounter continued.
long as thе
from
unexpectedly emerged
suddenly
as the defendant
and
van,
suspicion that he
deputy acquired a reasonable
bulge
the defen
deputy
be armed. The
observed
might
him what it was. On
front
and asked
right
pocket
dant’s
his hand
seeing the defendant move
receiving no answer but
up,
deputy
to cover it
bulge
attempt
toward the
large,
He felt a
hard
time
the defendant.
the first
touched
The defendant
weapon.
and believed it could be
bulge
about what was
deputy’s questions
to evade the
continued
object.
him
ordered
to remove
pocket,
deputy
his
so the
confrontation,
upon
deputy
duty
insist
the initial
had a
1. Because
type
immediately following it was not the
the consensual encounter
Terry,
conсurring opinion in
Harlan in his
concerned Justice
32-33,
to avoid the
This
did not have
These facts show that deputy pat did the defendant down for weapons immediately upon seeing bulge in the pocket. Commonwealth, defendant’s- See Stanley v. 16 Va. 873, 876-77, (1993) App. 512, 433 S.E.2d 514-15 (holding that officer’s observation of in bulge clothing of driver of motor scooter traffic during stop was insufficient support pat- down for weapons unless was of bulge size or to warrant shape reasonable suspicion that it could a weapon or оther facts supported reasonable suspicion that driver was armed and Rather, dangerous). the deputy made graduated responses to escalating concerns that the defendant was armed danger and ous. reasonable, made carefully inquiry measured regarding the in bulge pocket, defendant’s but at each level of inquiry, his suspicions were not dispelled; they were heightened. When the deputy finally touched the defendant by patting the bulge, he defendant, did seize the but by then he had developed reasonable suspicion to believe that defendant was armed.
This case involved an encounter at close range. The deputy was vulnerable before he told the defendant he was “freе go,” he remained vulnerable after making that state ment, and he particularly became vulnerable when the defen dant began exit the van. Under all the circumstances of case, this the deputy’s actions were reasonable and constituted a permissible interference with the defendant’s personal secu rity as permitted under Terry, 1, 392 1868, 88 S.Ct. 889, L.Ed.2d and its progeny. “Based on the inordinate risk of danger to law enforcement officers during traffic stops, observing a bulge that could be made weapon in a suspect’s clothing reasonably warrants a belief that sus pect is potentially dangerous, even if suspect was stopped only for a Baker, minor violation.” United States 78 F.3d — (1996), denied, U.S.-, cert. 118 S.Ct. (1998). L.Ed.2d 643 “The law does not expect police gamble must on turning from away possible danger and in Lansdown a bullet the back....” taking chance (1983), cert. Va. denied, L.Ed.2d was reasonable under the frisk for We hold that therefore, court, trial case and that the facts of this we Accordingly, to suppress. denied the motion properly conviction. affirm the defendant’s Affirmed. FITZPATRICK, C.J.,
COLEMAN,
whom
Judge, with
ANNUNZIATA, JJ., join, dissenting.
BENTON and
of the United
of the Constitution
The Fourth Amendment
to be
people
that “the
provides
part
States
effects,
houses,
against
and
papers,
persons,
secure
their
seizures,
not be violat-
shall
unreasonable searches
*11
”
security belongs
of
right
personal
This inestimable
ed....
citizens,
in the comfort of their
they
whether
are
to all
of our citiеs.
homes or in the streets
241 Va.
Harris
1, 8-9,
(1991)
Ohio,
S.Ct.
Terry
(quoting
(1968)).
1868,
The citizen, a lawful but following a encounter with consensual Fourth violating the may, without stop, concluded traffic has Amendment, when the officer a citizen for frisk suspect no reason to is armed but reason to believe the citizen in criminal The engaged may the citizen is or be that Fourth Amend- upon required majority holding bases its free right to be “balancing an individual’s analysis of ment coun- society’s against intrusions arbitrary government from in detecting crime and in or preventing interest tervailing doing, In so enforcement officers.” its law protecting safety, standing that a officer’s police concludes majority privaсy a citizen’s alone, upon the intrusion outweighs The weapons. citizen for of the justifies pat-down a and major component a ignores balancing analysis majority’s balancing which is equation prong second privacy right against individual’s both the officers’ police safety “society’s interest in or countervailing preventing crime.” In detecting- justify order to an intrusion an upon privacy right, individual’s there must suspect be a reason to be frisked is armed and dangerous and a reason requiring the officer to remain on the scene—such as duty pursue officer’s criminal suspected activity or some duty other official of his or her office.
The mere fact that a bulge observes a pocket citizen’s during reasonably consensual encounter and suspects that it is a weapon type justify some does not frisk of the I citizen.2 find no authority proposition that a police officer in a engaged consensual encounter with a may citizen frisk the citizen for weapons without either some suspicion that the citizen may involved criminal activity duty some to remain on the scene to fulfill other law Thus, enforcement responsibilities. Deputy Bolen’s frisk of Reittinger, based solely upon the fact that the deputy suspect- ed he might have a weapon, was not a reasonable search as required by the Fourth Amendment. I would hold that because Amendment, the frisk violated the Fourth the trial court erred in not suppressing smoking seized device that marijuana contained residue. I would reverse the conviction. majority holds that the frisk for weapons occurred during a consensual encounter in which the was at- deputy tempting persuade Reittinger to consent to a search of his vehicle for weapons or contraband. The conceded when he requested van, to search the he had no reason to *12 suspect that the van contained or that Reittinger possessed weapons or contraband. In order to justify the frisk of Reittinger during encounter, the consensual majority the at- Commonwealth, 873, Stanley 876-77, 2. See v. Va.App. 433 S.E.2d 512, (1993) (holding 514-15 that it was unreasonable for the officers suspect bulge pocket operator the of a motor scooter was a case, weapon). present In the the Reittinger officer stated he frisked safety” thought for "his bulge might weapon; and because he be a however, the officer testified at trial that Reittinger he did not believe dangerous. was armed and by charac- original stop link to the traffic the frisk tempts event that encounter as seamless terizing the consensual I stop. respectful- from lawful traffic immediately” “flows of circum- characterization majority’s with the ly disagree If the of that characterization. consequences stances and the three encounter, separate which the made during van, of traffic stop was Reittinger’s part to search requests into a consensual immediately because the events “flow[ed] dissent, encounter,” then, in his Judge as Benton asserts this continu- during felt free to leave Reittinger could have thus, continued detention and traffic stop; ation of the majority For the illegal. both Reittinger frisk of were part the frisk was by simply suggesting this reach result immediately into a consensual which “flows the traffic between a consensual the distinction encounter” obliterates suspi- on reasonable a lawful detention based encounter and has the activity. A motorist or cause of criminal probable cion he or she is of law intrusion when to be free enforcement in criminal being involved reasonably suspected no longer However, I utilization rejeсt majority’s although encounter” ratio- immediately into a consensual of the “flows that the frisk nale, majority’s I ultimate conclusion accept the encounter.3 during a consensual occurred frisk, implicated a "seizure” that the encounter was not 3. Until may trepidation though a citizen feel some Amendment. Even Fourth may officer and during encounter with a consensual implicate the away, police officer’s conduct does not to walk reluctant merely questions individu- poses to an if the officer Fourth Amendment public place chooses to answer them. in a and the individual al L.Ed.2d 229 Royer, v. 460 U.S. Florida 301-02, (1983); v. Buck restraint, (1995). questioning mere some indicated Without served, purpose stop is over and its a routine traffic officers after See United Fourth Amendment. to a seizure under the does not amount Cir.1998). Sullivan, (4th long "As as the 138 F.3d States disregard the put free to questions are remains to whom [individual] upon that away, intrusion there has been no questions and walk Amendment] under the liberty privacy [Fourth as would person’s objective justification.” United States require particularized and some Mendenhall, S.Ct. 64 L.Ed.2d
739
give judi
courts must
Terry
emphasized
decision
that
investigative
restrained
con
“approval
legitimate
cial
of
and
justification,”
ample
on the basis of
factual
duct undertaken
must be mindful of the “traditional
but cautions that courts
...
conduct
which
guard against police
responsibility
objective
personal security without the
eviden
upon
trenсhes
Terry,
requires.”
which the Constitution
tiary justification
of the fact
1868. I am not unmindful
The cases relied Commonwealth, In 429 authority. Bethea Va. (1993), defendant, passenger S.E.2d who was a infraction, was stopped lawfully a car for a traffic frisked being lawfully because he was detained and his “bizarre” reasonably behavior caused the officer to be “startled” and weap- that the defendant have had access to “might “scared” Commonwealth, ons.” In Moore v. Va.App. (1997), required
S.E.2d 868-69 a officer was in a presence transporting remain citizen’s while the stranded in his off interstate Perfor- pedestrian highway. cruiser mance of the officer’s remain in the required duties presence Similarly, citizen’s in a vulnerable situation. 20, 32, Welshman (1998) (en banc), defendant, among who was an group bystanders, lawfully during was detained arrest sale; making drug two the lawful deten- persons observed might persons being tion of those who aid and assist justified bystander arrested frisk of the protective *14 Commonwealth, And, James v. 740, in 22 Va.App. weapons. 744-46, (1996), 92 was passenger 473 S.E.2d a who frisked for was while the officers arrested weapons lawfully detained on a warrant. felony driver case,
In
lawfully
each
officers either
detained the defendant
or,
as
of a criminal
or traffic
in
part
investigation
stop
function,
out a
was
carrying
police
required
the officer
to
in
in
In
presence
remain
the citizen’s
a vulnerable situation.
none of these cases was
defendant frisked
a
during wholly
consensual encounter without the
of the officer
added element
in
in
neеding
presence
to remain
the defendant’s
order
to
fulfill his
fact
ask
duty.
Deputy
may
or her
that
Bolen
for
to
on the scene
may lawfully
consent
search and
remain
responds
request
until the citizen
to his
is of no moment. The
there;
question
right
is not whether the officer had the
to be
it is whether
the officer had the
or
to be
duty
responsibility
safety.
there and the commensurate
to
his or her
right
protect
in
may
any
An officer
have the
to
citizen
right
engage
public
encounter,
not,
may
in a consensual
but
in
the officer
these
circumstances,
frisk
merely
the citizen
because
officer
or
reasonably
safety.
fears
his
her
upon
An
frisk for
is an intrusion
protective
officer’s
that
personal privacy
an individual’s
and is itself a “seizure”
Terry,
the Fourth Amendment. implicates
Commonwealth,
16-19,
1868;
Toliver
23
(1996).
as to
724
The determination
a
“on a balance
depends
the reasonableness of
seizure
public
per-
between the
interest and the individual’s
security
arbitrary
sonal
free from
interference
law [en-
v. Brignoni-Ponce,
422
officers.” United States
forcement]
873, 878,
S.Ct.
L.Ed.2d
that,
may
In
Terry,
Supreme
police
Court held
a
“
point
‘specific
frisk if
or she can
protective
conduct
which,
facts
taken
with rational infer-
together
and articulable
”
facts,’
to con-
reasonably
ences from those
lead the officer
”
“
(2)
(1)
afoot,’ that
activity may
clude:
that
‘criminal
“
”
‘may
presently dangerous.’
be armed and
suspect
204, 209, 212,
Lansdown
Va.
(1983)
(quoting Terry,
Terry, 392 U.S. at
concurring)
742 ly himself or herself in a situation placed precarious with an initiating continuing baseless encounter individual See 4 dangerous. whom he or she considers armed and LaFave, 9.5(a), Thus, supra § at 246^47. consistent .with Amendment, commands of the Fourth a police may officer not approach reasonably and frisk an he or individual whom she if may believes be armed and the officer has no dangerous reason to that the individual is or be also suspect may engaged Toliver, 36-37, in criminal See 23 at activity.4 473 Couture, Commonwealth v. 724; 178, S.E.2d at 407 Mass. Giltner, v. (1990); 374, State N.E.2d 540-41 56 Haw. Batino, (1975); People P.2d A.D.2d N.Y.S.2d individual,
Similarly,
lawfully “stops”
where an officer
an
through investigation dispels any
reasonable
may
engaged
activity,
the individual
in criminal
may
protective
weap-
officer
not thereafter conduct
frisk for
ons,
if
reasonably suspects
even
the officer
that the individual
is
unless
circum-
presently
dangerous,
subsequent
armed and
stances renew the officer’s reasonable belief that criminal
Thomas,
activity may be afoot. See United States v.
863 F.2d
White,
(9th
Cir.1988);
State
856 P.2d
States,
(Utah
Ct.App.1993); Coleman v.
United
337 A.2d
supra,
see also 4
LaFave,
9.5(a),
§
771-72
(D.C.App.1975);
An
may
justify
protective
by using
247.
search
legitimate safety
bootstrap
suspicion of
concerns to
the lack of
Terry,
id.
criminal
rule of
if
general
Under
*16
justification
stop
person dissipates,
the officer’s
to
or detain a
a
In
constitutionally impermissible.5
then
frisk is
colorfully
appealing
4.
one
has
stated the rule: "No matter how
As
court
States,
be,
may
precede
the cart
the horse must
it.”
United
Gomez
(D.C.App.1991).
597 A.2d
There,
officer,
police
5. The decision in Thomas is demonstrative.
a
suspected
passing
receiving
report describing
two men
of
after
money,
possible suspects
stopped
counterfeit
a vehicle in which two
Thomas,
vehicle,
stopping
the
riding.
were
“[Shopping an automobile and detaining
occupants
its
con-
stitute a ‘seizure’ within the meaning of
Fourth
[the
Amend-
ment], even though
purpose
the
the
is limited and the
resulting
quite
Prouse,
detention
brief.” Delaware v.
440 U.S.
648, 653,
99 S.Ct.
seamless 502-03, 103 460 U.S. at Royer, initial seizure had ended. him or herself of detain- An cannot free 1319. S.Ct. the de- simply stating protections constitutional ee’s subsequent words go” if the officer’s is “free to tainee Therefore, I would hold contrary message. convey conduct unlawfully drags concerning inquiry completed had seizure, because extended Reit- subjected actions investigation. deputy’s equipment under circumstances inquiry unrelated to a new and tinger not have believed would that a reasonable such leave. or she was free to or that he initial seizure had ended 34, 37, 473 S.E.2d See Toliver (1996) (Benton, J., concurring). reasons, expressed by Cole- these and for the reasons For man, J., I would reverse dissenting opinion, in the text of his suppress the evidence. judge’s the trial refusal POWELL, Louis Jordan Jr. v. Virginia.
COMMONWEALTH of Record No. 1051-98-2. Appeals Virginia,
Court of
Richmond.
May 1999.