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Reiterman v. Westinghouse, Inc
308 N.W.2d 612
Mich. Ct. App.
1981
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*1 WESTINGHOUSE, INC v REITERMAN 19, 1980, February at Detroit. Decided No. 45897. Submitted Docket 3, June 1981. Reiterman, A. of the of Thomas estate as administratrix Linda Westinghouse, deceased, against Reiterman, brought action resulting Inc., wrongful a of from breach death for subsequently component. product of a the manufacture Company complaint L. as a to add the J. Hudson her amended Later, again product. as seller defendant Company complaint Electric add the General her amended component of the as the manufacturer a defendant as summary for and/or product. moved General Electric acceler- period of judgment limitation on the basis that ated Court, Freder- wrongful Circuit actions had run. Oakland death J., Ziem, Electric was the motion. General denied ick C. Following hearing, appeal. the Court of granted leave to ruling unpublished per in an Appeals the trial court’s affirmed (Docket Westinghouse, opinion. Inc No. v curiam 45897, Reiterman 20, [unreported]). General Electric June decided rehearing, petition subsequently petitioned for was granted. Held: plaintiffs of decedent The death established sought. action thus accrued The cause of nature of the plaintiff knew that the date of death. At that time on defective, upon her to product it was was incumbent period within the of limitation for discover [1] [2, [4, [6] [3] [7] [5] 63 When cause of Running 3] 5, 63 Am Jur seller manufacturer allegedly 7] 63 Am Jur Am Jur Am Jur Am Jur Am Jur Am of statute causing personal injury 2d, 2d, 2d, 2d, 2d, Jur References 2d, Death Death Products Limitation Products as affected action 2d, Products causing of Limitation limitations §§ §§ arises 35, 36, 40-46. Liability 222. Liability Liability Actions Points plaintiffs on action of Actions §§ 38. § §§ or death. §§ §§ disease. 91 221, 221-223. Headnotes lack against 4 ALR3d 821. 62. 222. 107, 108,135. of liability knowledge ALR3d 991. manufacturer claim of defect against identity bring any actions defendants and to actions them. The was tolled discovery. pending such Defendant General Electric was added *2 by complaint period amended after the of limitation had run. prior Appeals The Court of is order of the vacated and the case entry judgment of is remanded for accelerated for General Electric. Vacated, reversed, and remanded. J., plaintiff Burns, T. M. dissented. would He hold that pleaded

properly warranty a cause of action breach of notwithstanding brought wrong- the that action was the under ful act. Thus her claim death General Electric did not begin to run until she discovered it was the manufacturer component product. of the the of would He affirm the denial of summary/accelerated judgment. General Electric’s motion for op op Wrongful — — 1. Limitation Actions Death Statutes. period The of of actions for is three (MCL years 600.5805[8]; from the death of the decedent MSA 27A.5805[8]). Liability — — 2. Products Quality Actions Warranties of or — Fitness Statutes. damages A claim for based on a of a of breach or fitness accrues at the time breach the is discovered or (MCL reasonably 600.5833; should be discovered MSA 27A.5833). Liability — — Wrongful 3. Products Accrual of Claims Death. products liability The rule that in claims cases accrue when a plaintiff discovers or should have discovered a Warranty apply breach of does not to actions for death. Tolling — — — 4. Limitation of Actions Torts of Accrual Claims of Period of Limitation. periods The of limitation of to actions recover injuries persons property to pending discovery are tolled not identity alleged of an tortfeasor where all elements other exist; necessary plaintiff of a cause of action it is not a action, the know details of the evidence of to establish his cause enough exists, it is that he knows that thereafter the cause and it his own fault where he not avail of those does himself provided claim; by prosecute preserve means law the it is abeyance prospec- necessary until to hold the action help to determine exis- professional plaintiff obtains tive of action. cause tence Liability Wrongful — — of Actions Products 5. Limitation — Claims. Death Accrual of product may is manifested as have been defective The a fact that instrumentality of law where the is the of matter begins thus, run death; for limitation of actions death, it is incumbent on the dece- then date investigate product to liabil- determine dent’s survivors ity. Damages — — Forms of 6. Limitation of Actions Nature Actions. damage sought rather than the form action The nature of proceeded has which a determinative under action applica- periods of actions is of several for limitation ble. *3 Liability Wrongful — — Actions Products 7. Limitation — Death Statutes. pleaded properly breach of A cause of action for fitness accrues at the time the breach was discovered discovered, though have been even should instrumentality was an of death and the action act, wrongful brought under the death and in which by statutory bring to the action not be limited should (MCL provisions wrongful for death actions 27A.5833). 600.5833; 600.580518], MSA 27A.5805[8] Gage, Byington (by Bushnell, Doctoroff, Reizen & Kohl), plaintiff. David D. for Ogne Buchanan, Jinks, P.C., & for defendant Westinghouse, Inc. Cooney, Stanczyk

Plunkett, Rutt, Watters, & (by Stanczyk, Jacobs, Pedersen B. I. Chris- John P. Morganti), Raymond Oldani, tine D. and W. Company. defendant General Electric Westinghouse op P.J., Before: and D. F. and Bashara, Walsh JJ. Bashara, P.J. General Defendant Electric Com- (G.E.) hybrid pany summary/ filed a motion for judgment asserting plaintiff accelerated failed had commence an action it within the three-year statutory limitation for motion, The trial actions. G.E. was court denied granted appeal. 20, leave On June panel ruling 1980, this affirmed the trial court’s unpublished per opinion, curiam Docket No. again by way 45897. The cause is us before of our August rehearing. granting petition 26, 1980, order G.E.’s plaintiff’s 22, 1975,

On June decedent received attempted plug an electrical shock when he dryer electric clothes into an electri- September 24, 1975, cal outlet. On he died as a injuries result of sustained the accident. Plaintiff filed the instant death action May against Westinghouse. 2, 1977, on ary Janu- On plaintiff

25, filed her first amended com- plaint against Westinghouse, alleging a breach of warranty in the manufacture of the electrical cord dryer. on the clothes filed a second complaint, again alleging amended a breach of warranty, against Co., L. the J. Hudson the seller dryer, August of the clothes 1978. October, 1978, In discovered that dryer electrical motor in the clothes was also defective. This motor had been manufactured *4 Company. 14, the General Electric On November complaint, 1978, filed her third amended adding ing alleg- General Electric as a defendant and warranty respect

a of breach to the with manufacturer of the motor.

It is well established that the statute of limita App Mich of three years action is wrongful in a tions 600.5805(7); MSA MCL decedent’s death. from the Armstrong, 20 App Mich 27A.5805(7),1 Ruhle v aff'd (1969), 709; 573; 174 NW2d 292 Corp, Motors General Coury NW2d (1965). however, her asserts, claim that since Plaintiff accrual date estab- warranty of the alleges breach 600.5833; MSA 27A.5833 is control- in MCL lished It states: ling. of a war- based on breach "In actions time at the fitness the claim accrues

ranty of warranty the is discovered the breach of be discovered.” should the did not claim argues therefore 1978, October, she learned when

accrue until through G.E. alleged breach process. discovery to the at germane most issue bar The case Collier, 187; 288 Stoneman v in Stoneman had Plaintiffs’ decedent asphyxia monoxide died as the result of carbon Corporation Motors operating while a General vehicle. A action was commenced timely and installer of the exhaust the manufacturer death, plaintiffs three after the system. years Over party as a defen- attempted to add General Motors of limita- dant. Plaintiffs the statute claimed begin discovery tions did not run until trial cause of action. The existence 5805(7) the residual statute of limitations statute Section was specific at time statute established tort actions for which no construction, brought. By judicial held it had been action was this Ruhle, supra. Effective Decem death actions. 5805(8) three-year specifically ber establish was added § 1978 PA 495. death actions. limitation for commencement Application leads to the current or the former subsection of either same result. *5 v 703 Opinion of the Court ruled court rule2 discovery liability cases is in wrongful death cases.

In affirming decision, the trial court’s Richard, v Dyke distinguished 213 where it was held that statute of limitations malpractice medical cases begin did not to run until plaintiff discovered or should have discovered the existence of the claim.

The Court stated: malpractice present special claims prob- "[M]edical lems since it is distinguish sometimes difficult to symptoms from of the condition for which treat- sought. ment was "Here the factors may patient’s obstruct a malpractice awareness of a claim present. are not From plaintiffs the outset were aware that decedent Ollie died of carbon poisoning monoxide in a General Motors automobile, proceeded and could have General Motors accordingly. "As set forth in Co, Sedlak v Ford Motor (1975): App 63; 235 NW2d 63 " 'It would extremely dangerous be an rule of law the accrual date of a cause of action is held in abeyance indefinitely prospective until a plaintiff ob- professional tains assistance to determine the existence cause of action. Under theory, such a no limitations would ever binding. be " Supreme 'The Court up summed this all as follows: "It is not necessary party that a should know the details of of the evidence which to establish his cause enough action. It is that he knows that a cause of action favor, exists in his and when he has this knowl- edge, it is his own fault if he does not avail himself of those means which provides prosecuting law “discovery The term commonly phrase rule” is a used for accruals which commence when the discovers or should have discovered the breach. App Mich Court Mich v Vanden Berg, claim.” Kroll preserving his ” (1953).’ Id., 192-193.

306, 311; Co, Inc, Glass Fiber Szlinis Moulded see, Also (1977), appeal dis- 55; 263 NW2d missed 407 Mich 893 *6 This distinguished. be

Stoneman arguably can the know that G.E. was one plaintiff did months until two of the machine manufacturers Stone- In it defendant. adding party as a before man, knew the decedent immediately plaintiffs car. in a General Motors died However, to be without find the distinction we the date of dece- knew at significance. Plaintiff his machine caused faulty the dent’s death her to time, upon it was incumbent At that injury. various manufac- discover, three the years, within is mechanisms. There possible faulty the turers of the statute of holding law of case plethora the discovery of pending is not tolled limitations where all the alleged the tortfeasor identity See the of action exist. elements of cause other Inc, Laboratories, Thomas v Ferndale (1980), and the cases cited 718; 296 NW2d 160 therein. manufacturing complex marketing

Today’s in consumer commonly result systems although components name the bearing one brand several have been manufactured product is that enterprises. judgment Our considered aware of this fact. public generally begins limitations holding that the statute of By death, necessary run on the date of it is not in the discovery hold void the rule established Rather, find as a statute.3 we warranty breach negating the not the effect of must not be construed as This decision provision death has accrual where breach of been claimed. Opinion of the Court

matter of law that product where a is the instru- mentality of death the fact that product may been have defective has been manifested. It is then incumbent upon the survivors investigate to determine liability.

The result reached is in today agreement with an analogous line of addressing cases question which of two statutes of limitation Wise, In Rach v applicable. Mich App 731- 732; 208 NW2d 570 the general rule in those cases was stated: succinctly choosing which of several statutes of "[W]hen limita- * * * tions is nature of action particular to a case[,] damages sought, rather than the form of the proceeded has under is determinative.” accord, In State Mutual Cyclone Ins Co v O & A Electric Cooperative, 161 NW2d 573

The Court in Rach concluded that the three-year *7 statute of limitations personal cases controlled though even the action was premised an express contract. bar,

In the case at the wrongful death of Mr. establishes the nature of the damages sought. Hence, application accrual results in consistency with the rule cited in Rach.

Our previous decision relied upon heavily two cases which hold that medical two-year mal- practice statute of limitations wrongful death actions. Weiss v Bigman, App 487; 270 (1978), NW2d 5 v Harri- Olijnyk and son Inc, Community Hospital, 80 App 366; Mich (1977). 263 NW2d 33 Upon reflection, further we find that line of cases persuasive in this case. not. We agree with the Stoneman opinion where it App Mich Burns, M. J. T. malpractice medical between distinguishes notice due differ- liability cases Stoneman, of action. type inherent in each ences Furthermore, not the issue accrual was 192. supra, between cases, upon turned conflict in those periods. statutory two holding that the cases

Finally, find that we is a statute controls where there specific more general specific and a statute conflict between controversy. Mayor germane to this are also not Huron, of Port City Port Huron v Treasurer v Bernard (1950), People 99; 43 NW2d 77 Mich (1978). Smith, The 561; App Mich topics, in this concern different two statutes case and the other a one a time statutory than the specific Neither is more time accrual. holding the breach of By other. upon dece-

reasonably should have been discovered death, given effect. statutes are dent’s both Appeals opinion dated June The Court entry The matter is remanded for vacated. 1963, 116.1(5), GCR judgment, of accelerated favor of defendant G.E. Costs G.E. J., Walsh,

F.D. concurred. (dissenting). I dis- respectfully in this prior opinion sent and would follow our matter. limi applicable period

Without question, three-year tations death actions is 600.5805(7); time forth in formerly set MCL 27A.5805(7). Armstrong, Ruhle v MSA 709; aff'd 174 NW2d 292 general The rule regarding three-year pe wrongful death actions is this *8 begins to run on the date the decedent’s riod Corp, v General Motors 376 Mich Coury death. v (1965). 248; general rule, This 137 NW2d however, case. application has no in this 600.5833; provisions MCL MSA

Under 27A.5833:

"In actions for on breach of a war- based ranty or fitness the claim accrues at the time the breach of the is discovered or should be discovered.”

Plaintiff’s suit defendant General Elec- premised upon tric a breach of war- Company Therefore, it ranty of fitness. falls within squarely the statutory language that neither admits of exception wrong- nor on account of the ambiguity ful death statute. particular

Statutes relate matters questions contrary general control over law. of Port Huron v Mayor City Treasurer Port Huron, (1950). Thus, 99; 328 Mich NW2d Bigman, Weiss v instance, in 487; 84 Mich App NW2d this Court held that a com plaint brought act, under but upon allegation was based of medical malpractice, required was to be filed within the pertaining of limitations to medical mal practice 600.5805(4); actions. See MCL MSA Community 27A.5805(4). See also Olijnyk v Harrison Inc, spital, App 366; Ho properly pleaded has a cause of action for breach of warranty. The fact that her decedent had the suffering misfortune of rather than dying severe physical way no affects the valid- ity of her claim for breach of is this warranty. Nor 600.5833; fact of any import under MCL MSA I 27A.5833. dissented in opinion this Court’s Wise, Rach *9 App 698 Burns, do so I (T. J., dissenting), (1973) M. of redraft- the business not in This Court

here. rules to fit our artificial litigant’s pleadings ing a procedure. circuit court’s affirm the and would I dissent Company’s General Electric of defendant denial judgment. motion for accelerated

Case Details

Case Name: Reiterman v. Westinghouse, Inc
Court Name: Michigan Court of Appeals
Date Published: Jun 3, 1981
Citation: 308 N.W.2d 612
Docket Number: Docket 45897
Court Abbreviation: Mich. Ct. App.
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