231 Pa. Super. 444 | Pa. Super. Ct. | 1974
Opinion by
Stella M. Heist and David H. Heist, her husband, plaintiffs below, appeal from the court’s denial of their motion for a new trial.
Mrs. Reist underwent an operation for cervical radiculitis as a result of spinal injuries sustained in the accident. Dr. Johnson, the neurosurgeon who performed the operation, testified that he discharged Mrs. Reist from treatment on March 16, 1970, and that she was fully recovered and symptom free as of that date. The trial judge limited Mrs. Reist’s recovery for pain and suffering, and Mr. Reist’s recovery for loss of consortium, to the period from November 28, 1969, the date of the accident, to March 16, 1970.
The jury awarded a verdict of $100 for Mrs. Reist and $1600 for Mr. Reist. Actual medical expenses and lost wages amounted to over $1600. Appellants filed a motion for a new trial in which they alleged that the court erroneously submitted the question of contributory negligence to the jury and that the trial judge erred in prohibiting testimony as to pain and suffering,
Appellants contend that the court should have instructed the jury specifically that Mrs. Reist was not contributorily negligent as a matter of law. Contributory negligence is normally a question for the jury, and thus the trial judge may decide the issue only in the clearest of cases. Heffernan v. Rosser, 419 Pa. 550, 215 A. 2d 655 (1966); Walker v. Martin, 214 Pa. Superior Ct. 287, 257 A. 2d 619 (1969). It is proper for a trial judge to submit the question to the jury “. . . if there is any evidence upon the consideration of which reasonable minded individuals might disagree as to whether or not the plaintiff was guilty of negligence which contributed to the accident, . . .” Heffernan, supra, at 555.
Considering only Mrs. Reist’s testimony at trial,
Appellants’ next contention is that the lower court erred by not permitting Mr. Reist to testify as to the difficulties involved in his sexual relations with Mrs. Reist after March 16, 1970, and by instructing the jury that damages could not be awarded for pain and suffering and loss of consortium beyond March 16, 1970.
Dr. Johnson testified that he discharged Mrs. Reist from treatment on March 16, 1970, and that she had no pain, discomfort, or limitation of motion at that time. The lower court ruled that appellants thereby established, through their own witness, that March 16, 1970, was “the date for complete recovery from injuries or other consequences resulting from the collision.” (Emphasis added). Appellants do not contend that Mrs. Reist was not physically recovered as of March 16,1970. They seek an opportunity to show pain and suffering and loss of consortium beyond that date. The most that can be attributed to Dr. Johnson’s statement is that on March 16, 1970, Mrs. Reist had no pain or other symptoms, and was physically able to return to work. His testimony is silent as to Mrs. Reist’s emotional state. Further, Dr. Johnson did not state that Mrs. Reist would thereafter be free from pain or mental anxiety, and he was incompetent to testify that Mrs. Reist had
In its opinion, the court below stated that it would have been error to allow recovery for pain and suffering
Order of the court below is reversed and the case is remanded for a new trial.
On cross-examination, it was disclosed that Mrs. Reist previously stated on being deposed that although she saw the appellee before she entered the intersection, she did not see him again until after the collision on the other side of the intersection.
It is presently the law in Pennsylvania that a spouse can recover for loss of consortium. Hopkins v. Blanco, 224 Pa. Superior Ct. 116, 302 A. 2d 855 (1973).
In fact, Dr. Johnson refused to ventare an opinion as to Mrs. Reist’s complaints of pain after March 16, 1970.
In Niederman v. Brodsky, 436 Pa. 401, 261 A. 2d 84 (1970), our Supreme Court held that a plaintiff can recover damages for injuries resulting from the negligent infliction of fright and shock, even in the absence of contemporaneous physical impact. That is merely the reverse of the present situation. If a plaintiff can recover for physical injuries resulting from emotional disturbance, then a plaintiff can recover for emotional disturbance following physical injuries. Furthermore, a plaintiff can recover for emotional distress alone, if the tortfeasor intended to produce emotional distress in the plaintiff and did so by “outrageous” conduct. Forster v. Manchester, 410 Pa. 192, 189 A. 2d 147 (1963). See also, Papieves v. Kelly, 437 Pa. 373, 263 A. 2d 118 (1970) ; Restatement (Second) of Torts, §46 (1965). Recovery is allowed despite the total absence of physical injury and actual damages.
It has long been the law of this Commonwealth that mental suffering resulting from physical injury is compensable. “The object of a trespass action involving personal injuries, where the plaintiff has proved his case, is to compensate him for what he has lost as a result of defendant’s negligence. The loss of well-being is as much a loss as an amputation. The inability to enjoy what one has theretofore keenly appreciated is a pain which can be equated with the infliction of a positive hurt. The conscious loss of a benefit to which one is entitled hurts as much as a festering wound”. Corcoran v. McNeal, 400 Pa. 14, 161 A. 2d 367 (1960). Thus, if Mrs. Reist can prove the existence of mental suffering, and if Mr. Reist can prove loss of consortium, they are entitled to compensation. To deprive them of the opportunity to prove their ease is contrary to basic legal concepts of the role of damages in personal injury cases.