The plaintiff brought an action seeking damages in the United States District Court, District of Connecticut, alleging that, as a result of a negligently performеd tonsillectomy, the plaintiff’s decedent had died. Following a pretrial hearing, all counsel agreed to submit the case to arbitration аnd George E. McGoldrick, a member of the Connecticut and federal bars, was selected as arbitrator. The plaintiff’s counsel preрared the submission agreement which provided that the arbitration should be conducted under the rules of the American Arbitration Association.
Bеfore the hearing proceeded, the plaintiff’s counsel raised the question of McGoldrick’s taking an oath. All counsel agreed that thеy had confidence in McGoldrick and that he would properly perform his duties as arbitrator whether or not an oath was administered. The рlaintiff’s counsel consented to the fact that an oath need not be administered to *26 the arbitrator. No oath was administered to the arbitrator either before he commenced his duties as arbitrator or during the course of the hearing. The requirement that the arbitrator take an oath was never waived in writing by the parties to the arbitration agreement. The plaintiff’s counsel drew up and executed with other cоunsel stipulations extending the time for the arbitrator to make his award on two occasions before the arbitrator filed his decision.
The аrbitrator filed his decision, finding the issues for the defendants. The plaintiff applied to the Superior Court to vacate the award under Generаl Statutes § 52-418 on the ground that the arbitrator had not been sworn as required by General Statutes § 52-414 and that there was no written waiver of the oath. The court granted the application and from this judgment the defendants have appealed.
General Statutes § 52-414 states in part that “[b]efore hearing any testimony or examining other evidence in the cause, the arbitrators and umpire shall be sworn to hear and examine the mattеr in controversy faithfully and fairly and to make a just award according to' the best of their understanding, unless the oath is waived in writing by the parties to the аrbitration agreement.” (Emphasis added.)
At common law, it was not necessary that the arbitrators be sworn before entering their duties except pursuant to an express requirement in the submission agreement. 5 Am. Jur. 2d, Arbitration and Award, § 109. In 1929, by virute of 1929 Public Acts, chapter 65, the legislature enacted what is now chaptеr 909 of the General Statutes which, in
*27
effect, rendered arbitration contracts subject to specific statutory requirements, eliminating the weаkness inherent in written agreements to arbitrate and providing guidelines for acceptance or rejection of awards.
International Brotherhood of Teamsters
v.
Shapiro,
The defendants claim that the statutory requirement that a waiver of the arbitrator’s oath be in writing was itself waived by the plaintiff, or, alternatively, that the plaintiff is estopped from asserting that claim. It would serve no purpose to repeat the extended discussion on waiver and estoppel and the citations of authorities made in
Novella
v.
Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co.,
The defendants further claim that the plaintiff, having agreed that the arbitratоr need not be sworn, is estopped from attacking the award on that ground. The idea of submitting this case to arbitration originated with the plaintifPs сounsel, and, when all parties agreed, he drafted the submission agreement. The facts relevant to the oath of the arbitrator have been previously stated.
“There are two essential elements to an estoppel— the party must do or say something that is intended or calculated to induce another to believe in the existence of certain facts and to act upon that belief, and the other party, influenced thereby, must actually change his position or do some act to his injury which he otherwise would not have done.”
Fawcett
v.
New Haven Organ Co.,
When we review the facts found by the court in light of those prinсiples, it is apparent that all parties acted in concert with no intent on anyone’s part to induce another to act to his dеtriment. Counsel for the defendants, as well as the arbitrator himself, were as able as the plaintiff’s counsel to determine the state of the lаw. This comment is not meant to fault any counsel for not knowing of the specific requirements of a particular statute. Where, however, аs here, none of the counsel was cognizant of the requirements of a pertinent statute, such lack of knowledge cannot be used against one of those counsel in the absence of evidence indicating that that counsel intentionally induced the others to act to their detriment.
The defendants urge that a party to arbitration should not be permitted to agree with other parties that an arbitrator need not be sworn, to proceed with' the hearings without objеction, and then to seek to vacate an unfavorable award on the very procedural step he had agreed was unnecessary. Whatever one’s sentiment may be, it cannot control where it is shown that a statutory requirement, neither waived nor subject to the doctrinе of estoppel, has not been followed. The trial court erred in its reasoning; this court may, however, affirm a trial court’s decision althоugh based upon an erroneous ground if the same result is required by *30 law. Maltbie, Conn. App. Proc. § 36. The subordinate facts found support the conсlusion we have reached.
There is no error.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
Notes
Even if we assume, without deciding, that pursuant to the parties’ agreement the rules of the American Arbitration Association relating to waiver were applicable, those rules, too, require a knowledge of the right before the same can be waived. Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association § 37.