Reinert v. DolezelReinert v. Dolezel
Bоth plaintiffs appeal from grants of partial summary judgments against them. The appeals were consolidated by the Court of Appeals. The two cases arose out of the same automobile accident but were heard before different trial judges of the Oakland County Circuit Court, both judges concluding that defendants David and Joan Dolezel had no common-law duty tо prevent their 18-year-old son from drinking alcoholic beverages in their home or to provide safe transportation for his similarly-aged friends.
Five young people, all but one of thеm at least 18 years old, including David Dolezel, Jr., age 18, purchased alcoholic beverages on the evening of November 24, 1982, and were consuming them in the home of defendants David and Jоan Dolezel. Sometime after midnight the group decided to go to the home of another friend. They left in two cars, David Dolezel, Jr., driving his father’s car,
Plaintiff Reinert obtained a consent judgment against the Seven-Eleven store defendant for $25,-000, and later obtained a consent judgment against all three Dolezels for $50,000. Although plaintiff Reinert claims an appeal from the partial summary judgment entered prior to the consent judgment with the Dolezels, we consider the consent judgment to have settled the matter.
Plaintiff Kasco (hereinafter plaintiff) agreed to dismiss his claim against the Seven-Eleven store defendant, but pursued his claim against the Dolezels. Aftеr defendants David and Joan Dolezel obtained a partial summary judgment, an order of dismissal with prejudice "with regard to defendants Dolezel only, as it would relate to Count I of the comрlaint and those portions of Count II dealing with auto negligence” was entered. Thus, the only remaining issue on appeal concerns plaintiff Kasco’s allegations in Count II that defendants David and Joan Dolezel (hereinafter defendants) negligently permitted minors to consume alcohol in their home.
Specifically, plaintiff alleges in Count II that defendants David and Joan Dolezel were negligent in that:
"A. Defendants knowingly permitted the use and consumption by under-aged individuals of intoxicating beverages on and about their premises in the presence of оther under-age individuals causing unsafe conditions without proper supervision;
"B. Defendants negligently allowed said Defendant,David Dolezel, Jr., under-aged son, to consume intoxicating beverages and to become visibly intoxicated withоut proper intervention;
[Paragraphs C, D, and E deal only with automobile negligence.]
"F. Defendants did nothing to terminate the consumption of alcohol by the minors or prohibit the driving of autоmobiles which ultimately led to the Plaintiffs injuries;
"G. Defendants after allowing minors to consume alcoholic beverages failed to provide safe transportation to the Plaintiff, when the aforesaid Defendants knew or should have known in the exercise of ordinary care that the providing of safe transportation was necessary;
"H. Defendants in allowing minors to consumе alcoholic beverages had reason to know, or should have known in the exercise of ordinary care that they were dealing with minors whose characteristics make it especially likely that said minors would do unreasonable things and it would be expected by virtue of their youth alone and in connection with the circumstances be involved in dangerous activitiеs after the consumption of alcoholic beverages; and,
"I. Defendants further violated the statutory and common laws by furnishing or allowing alcoholic beverages to be furnished to minоrs in their home.”
Defendants responded with a motion for partial summary judgment "pursuant to Rule 117”, contending that plaintiff’s complaint failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted. This ground for summary judgment is authorized by GCR 1963, 117.2(1), which tests the legal adequacy of the pleadings. In ruling on such a motion, the court determines whether plaintiff’s claim, on the pleadings, is so clearly unenforceable as a matter of law that no factual development can possibly justify a right to recovery.
Abel v Eli Lilly & Co,
A person who knowingly sells or furnishes alcoholic liquor to a person who is less than 21 years of age, or who fails to make diligent inquiry as to whether the person is less than 21 years of age, is guilty of a misdemeanor.
To the extent that plaintiff in this case alleged that defendants furnished alcoholic beverages to persons under 21 years of age in their home, plaintiff stated a сause of action upon which relief can be granted. However, plaintiff’s pleading offers no details supporting this allegation, and plaintiff has not advanced the "furnishing” theory either before the trial court or before this Court. Instead, plaintiff argues that there should be a cause of action against parents who permit persons under age 21 to drink in their home.
Although plaintiff refers to the young people involved in this case as "minors”, they were not. At the time of this incident, decedent Reinert was 19 years old, plaintiff Kasco was 18 years old, as was dеfendant David Dolezel, Jr. A person who is 18 years of age is deemed to be an adult of legal age for all purposes whatsoever and shall have the same duties, liabilities, respоnsibilities, rights and legal capacity as persons heretofore acquired at 21 years of age, notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary.
There is no duty to control the conduct of a third party so as to prevent him from causing physical harm to another unless а special relationship exists. 2 Restatement of Torts, 2d, § 315, p 122. Such a special relationship, making an employer liable for injuries caused by an intoxicated employee аfter leaving an office party, has been held to arise from the master-servant relationship.
Romeo v Van Otterloo,
Plaintiff also contends that defendants had a common-law duty to providе safe transportation for the teenagers drinking in their home. Plaintiff cites no authority for such a duty, and we have found none. To the contrary, this Court held in
Westcoat v Mielke,
The trial court correctly determined that plaintiff failed to state a cause of action against defendants.
Affirmed.