{¶ 1} Appellant, Joyce Reinbolt, guardian of the estate of Justin Reinbolt, brings this appeal from a decision of the Court of Common Pleas of Henry County granting summary judgment in favor of appellee, Westfield Insurance Company. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment.
{¶ 2} The facts of this case are not in dispute. On June 2, 1999, Justin Reinbolt was seriously injured while a passenger in a motor vehicle. At the time of the accident, Reinbolt was employed by Northwest Landscape Service, a sole proprietorship owned and operated by Ronald Foor. Reinbolt was occupying a friend’s vehicle and was not acting in the scope of his employment during the
{¶ 3} Appellee filed a motion for summary judgment on February 15, 2001, asserting that Reinbolt was not an insured under the terms of the policy. Appellant submitted a memorandum in opposition and a cross-motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of coverage. On March 15, 2001, the trial court denied appellant’s motion and granted аppellee’s motion. A nunc pro tunc entry was filed on March 27, 2001, making the previous judgment a final appealable order. This timely appeal followed.
{¶ 4} Appellant presents the following single assignment of error:
Assignment of Error
{¶ 5} “Under Ohio law, the trial court errеd when it denied Plaintiff-Appellant’s cross-motion for partial summary judgment and granted Defendant-Appellee’s motion for summary judgment finding that Plaintiff-Appellant, Justin Reinbolt, did not qualify as an insured pursuant to the terms of his employer, Northwest Landscape Service’s, рolicy of insurance.”
{¶ 6} Appellant argues that pursuant to the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in Scott-Pontzer v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., infra, Justin Reinbolt is an insured under appellee’s commercial insurance policy. Appellee contends that this case is factually distinguishable and cоverage should not be extended to Reinbolt.
{¶ 7} As a threshold matter, we set forth the standard of review. In considering an appeal from a summary judgment, we review the summary judgment independently and without giving deference to the trial court’s determination. 1 Instead, wе apply the same standard for summary judgment used by the trial court. 2
{¶ 8} Summary judgment is appropriate when, looking at the evidence as a whole, (1) no genuine issue of material fact remains to be litigated, (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of lаw, and (3) construing the evidence
{¶ 9} The outcome of the case at bar is dependent upon the interpretation of the terms of the insurance contract. It is well settled that an insurance policy is a contract and that the relationship between the insured and the insurer is purely contractual in nature. 6 Insurance coverage is determined by reasonably construing the contract “in conformity with the intention of the parties as gathered from the ordinary and commonly understood meaning of thе language employed.” 7 “Where provisions of a contract of insurance are reasonably susceptible of more than one interpretation, they will be construed strictly against the insurer and liberally in favor of the insured.” 8 However, where the intеnt of the parties to a contract is evident from the clear and unambiguous language used, a court must not read into the contract a meaning not contemplated or placed there by an act of the parties to the contraсt. 9
{¶ 10}
Scott-Pontzer
involved a commercial insurance coverage policy issued to a corporation, Superior Dairy, Inc., by Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company.
10
The plaintiff, Kathryn Scott Pontzer, asserted a right to underinsured motorist coverage under the Liberty Mutuаl policy after her husband, an
{¶ 11} Upon concluding that the plaintiffs husband was an “insured” under the Liberty Mutual policy, the court turned to the question of whether he would still be entitled to coverage despite the fact that he wаs not acting within the scope of his employment at Superior Dairy when he was killed in the automobile accident.
17
The court noted that the Liberty Mutual policy did not contain any language that made coverage contingent upon employees acting within the scope of their employment.
18
Quoting a previous decision, the court stated that “ ‘[in] the construction of insurance contracts, “[w]here exceptions, qualifications or exemptions are introduced into an insurance contact, a general presumption arises to the effect that that which is not clearly excluded from the operation of such contract is included in the operation thereof.” ’ ”
19
Accordingly, the Ohio Supreme Court held that in the absencе of contract language restricting coverage to employees who were acting within the scope of their employment, no such
{¶ 12} Appellant argues that Scott-Pontzer stands for the proposition that underinsured motorist coverage “is included in the commercial automobile insurance policies issued to any type of employer which defines its insureds as ‘you’ or ‘if you are an individual, any family member.’ ” (Emphasis added.) We do not agree.
{¶ 13} A scrupulous reading of the Scott-Pontzer decision reveals nоthing that mandates automatic coverage where a business insurance policy incorporates the aforementioned definition of “you.” In fact, the court’s rationale was based upon several interdependent analytical steps. Only in the face of an ambiguity permitting inclusion of the plaintiff as an insured was the court able to reach the coverage terms of the policy. To find that ambiguity, the court specifically compared the policy’s definition of “you” with Ohio’s definition of corporate entities. Therefore, we must first determine whether Justin Reinbolt is an insured under the subject policy.
{¶ 14} In this case, appellee’s Commercial Insurance Coverage Policy number CWP 3706693 contains commercial auto, including uninsured/underinsured motоrist coverages, and umbrella coverage. Appellant contends that Reinbolt is an insured under both policies and is entitled to the policy limits of the uninsured/underinsured coverage to the extent of his damages. The named insured throughout the policies is “Ronald Foor dba Northwest Landscape Service.” “Named insured” is further defined in the common policy declarations as an “individual.”
{¶ 15} Relying in part upon the recent case of
Leeann Johnson v. State Farm Ins. Co.,
21
an unreported decision from the Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County, appellant asserts that naming the insurеd, “Ronald Foor dba Northwest Landscape Service,” when the insured is designated an “individual,” created an ambiguity as to who is an insured under appellee’s policy. Appellant further contends that Ronald Foor and Northwest Landscape Service should be considered separate insureds. In spite of the fact that
Leeann
is of no precedential value to this court, the facts of
Leeann
and the authority cited therein are distinguishable in that partnerships and corporations were the named insured in those underlying policies.
22
Furthermore, while a partnership analysis is analo
{¶ 16} In making the determination of whether the policy language is ambiguous, we must generally give words and рhrases their plain, ordinary, natural, or commonly accepted meaning. 23 Furthermore, it is well settled that insurance contracts incorporate existing law. 24
{¶ 17} In Patterson v. V. & M Auto Body, the Supreme Court of Ohio defined a sole proprietorship as follows:
{¶ 18} “A sole prоprietorship has no legal identity separate from that of the individual who owns it. It may do business under a fictitious name if it chooses, but * * [d]oing business under another name does not create an entity distinct from the person operating the business. The individual who does business as a sole proprietor under one or several names remains one person * * *’ ” 25 (Emphasis added.)
{¶ 19} This definition is straightforward. Unlike a corporation, partnership, or other entities, Ronald Foor and Northwest Landscape Service “remain one person” even though Ronald Foor “does business as” Northwest Landscape Service. Northwest Landscape Service is a legal nonentity, merely the name under which Ronald Foor does business, having no separate legal identity from, and being synonymous with, Ronald Foor. Therefore, we proceed to determine whether an ambiguity arises when the term is considered in conjunction with other provisions.
{¶ 20} Appellee’s commercial auto policy defines “who is insured” for purposes of medical payments coverage under paragraph B:
{¶ 21} “1. You while ‘occupying’ or, while a pedestrian, when struсk by any ‘auto.’
{¶ 22} “2. If you are an individual, any ‘family member’ while ‘occupying’ or, while a pedestrian, when struck by an ‘auto.’
{¶ 23} “3. Anyone else ‘occupying’ a covered ‘auto’ or a temporary substitute for a covered ‘auto.’ The covered ‘auto’ must be out of service because of its breakdown, repair, servicing, loss or destruction.”
{¶ 24} The commercial umbrella policy defines “who is an insured” under Section II:
{¶ 25} “1. If you are designated in the declarations as:
{¶ 26} “a. An individual, you and your spouse are insureds but only in connection with the conduct of the business of whiсh you are the sole owner.
{¶ 27} “b. A partnership or joint venture, you are an insured. Your members, your partners and their spouses are also insured but only in connection with the conduct of your business.
{¶ 28} “c. A limited liability company, you are insured. Your members are also insureds, but only with respect to the conduct of your business. Your managers are insureds, but only with respect to their duties as your managers.
{¶ 29} “d. An organization other than a partnership, joint venture or limited liability company, you are insured. Your ‘executive officers’ and directors are insureds, but only with respect to their duties as your officers or directors. Your stockholders are also insureds, but only with respect to their liability as shareholders.”
{¶ 30} Inasmuch as Ohio law does not recognize a sole proprietоrship as a separate legal entity, but as a single individual, no ambiguity arises when the declaration page is read in conjunction with the provisions contemplating coverage for an individual. The named insured is entirely consistent with the definitions of “who is an insured” in both the business auto and umbrella coverage provisions. We therefore find that the intent of the parties is evident from the policy’s clear and unambiguous language and will not read into the contract a meaning not contemplated or plаced therein by the parties. Justin Reinbolt is clearly excluded from coverage under the insurance contract provisions. As a result of the foregoing, appellant’s assignment of error is not well taken and is therefore overruled.
{¶ 31} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein, in the particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
.
Schuch v. Rogers
(1996),
.
Mid-west Specialties, Inc. v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.
(1988),
. Civ.R. 56(C);
Horton
v.
Harwich Chem. Corp.
(1995),
.
Dresher v. Burt
(1996),
. Id.
.
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Marsh
(1984),
.
King v. Nationwide Ins. Co.
(1988),
.
King v. Nationwide Ins. Co.
(1988),
.
Gomolka v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co.
(1982),
.
Scott-Pontzer v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.
(1999),
. Id.
. Id. at 663-664,
. Id. at 664,
. Id.
. Id.
. Id. at 665,
. Id. at 665-666,
. Id.
. Id., quoting
King v. Nationwide Ins. Co.
(1988),
. Id.
. Johnson v. State Farm Ins. Co. (Mar. 1, 2001), Cuyahoga C.P. No. 408866.
. Id., citing
Kiggins v. Allstate Ins. Co.
(Sept. 27, 1994), Franklin App. No. 94APE02-219,
.
Gomolka v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co.
(1982),
.
Home Indemn. Co. of New York v. Plymouth
(1945),
.
Patterson v. V & M Auto Body
(1992),