Under the Maryland law of conflict of laws Maryland courts do not enforce the “penal” laws of other states or nations. The principal question in this case is whether a Virginia consumer protection statute on which the instant transitory action is based is a “penal” statute in the conflict of laws sense. As hereinafter explained, we shall hold that the statute is not penal.
The judgment appealed from was entered on a motion to dismiss. Appellant, Bert W. Rein (Rein), filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County against the appellee, Koons Ford, Inc. (Koons). Rein is a resident of Montgomery County, Maryland, who, we are told, works in the District of Columbia. Koons is a Virginia corporation which conducts an automobile dealership business in Falls *133 Church, Virginia. Rein purchased an automobile from Koons at the Falls Church location in April 1988. The complaint alleges that, throughout the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area, Koons advertised that various models could be purchased at specified prices, plus “taxes and tags” and freight. Rein further avers that, because Koons also charged a $99.90 “document preparation” fee without disclosing that fee in its advertisement, Koons violated Virginia Code Ann. § 18.2-216 (1960, 1988 Repl.Vol.) which provides:
“Any person, firm, corporation or association who, with intent to sell or in anywise dispose of merchandise, securities, service or anything offered by such person, firm, corporation or association, directly or indirectly, to the public for sale or distribution or with intent to increase the consumption thereof, or to induce the public in any manner to enter into any оbligation relating thereto, or to acquire title thereto, or any interest therein, makes, publishes, disseminates, circulates or places before the public, or causes, directly or indirectly to be made, published, disseminated, circulated or placed before the public, in a newspaper or other publications, or in the form of a book, notice, handbill, poster, blueprint, map, bill, tag, label, circular, pamphlet or letter or in any other way, an advertisement of any sort regarding merchandise, securities, serviсe, land, lot or anything so offered to the public, which advertisement contains any promise, assertion, representation or statement of fact which is untrue, deceptive or misleading, or uses any other method, device or practice which is fraudulent, deceptive or misleading to induce the public to enter into any obligation, shall be guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor.”
Rein sues on his own behalf and seeks also to sue on behalf of a class consisting of “all persons similarly situated in Maryland who purchased new automobiles from [Koons] *134 within three years of the filing of [the] Complaint.” 1 The complaint does not specify where Rein read the allegedly deceptive ad and, consequently, does not exclude Rein’s having read it in Virginia. For himself, and for each member of the proposed class, Rein seeks $100 pursuant to Virginia Code Ann. § 59.1-68.3 (1950,1987 Repl.Vol.). That section in relevant part reads:
“Any person who suffers loss as the result of a violation of Article 8 (§ 18.2-214 et seq.), Chapter 6 of Title 18.2 or Chapter 2.1 (§ 59.1-21.1 et seq.) of Title 59.1 of this Code shall be entitled to bring an individual action to recover damages, or $100, whichever is greater. ... Nоtwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, in addition to the damages recovered by the aggrieved party, such person may be awarded reasonable attorney’s fees.”
Koons moved to dismiss the complaint for the reasons set forth in a legal memorandum filed in support of the motion. At a hearing on that motion the circuit court expressly declined to rule concerning the grounds advanced by Koons. The court dismissed the complaint based on its conclusion that § 59.1-68.3 was a penal statute which the court could not enforce. Rein appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, and this Court issued the writ of certiorari prior to review by the intermediate appellate court.
Appellant contends that § 59.1-68.3 of the Virginia Code is not penal. Koons now joins issue on that point. Additionally, Koons asserts that, even if the reason given by the circuit court was incorrect, the judgment is supported by the other reasons advanced by Koons in the trial court. Essentially these arguments are that (A) the statute requires actual damage, which has not been alleged; (B) the statute cannot be applied extraterritorially; and (C) the action is an improper class action so that claims of the class *135 members cannot be aggregated to meet the minimum monetary jurisdiction of the circuit court.
I
“Most causes of action, whether based on statutes or on common law, are transitory, which means that actions can be maintained upon such causes of action in states other than that in which the cause of action arose.”
R. Leflar,
American Conflicts Law,
at 85 (3d ed. 1977). Rein’s theory of the case is that § 59.1-68.3 of the Virginia Code created a transitory cause of action on which Rein sues in Maryland. Koons does not challenge the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County over its person. No issue of forum non conveniens has been raised.
Compare Johnson v. G.D. Searle & Co.,
In dismissing the instant action the circuit court relied on the rule that “[n]o action will be entertained on a foreign penal cause of action.” Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 89 (1969). Of course, to apply the rule one must identify that which is “penal” within the meaning of the rule. This Court recognizes the rule and identifies penal statutes by the test established in
Huntington v. Attrill,
“The question whether a statutе of one State, which in some aspects may be called penal, is a penal law in the *136 international sense, so that it cannot be enforced in the courts of another State, depends upon the question whether its purpose is to punish an offence against the public justice of the State, or to afford a private remedy to a person injured by the wrongful act.”
Texaco, Inc. v. Vanden Bosche, supra,
involved a Virginia statute imposing personal liability on the directors, officers and agents of a foreign corporation which transacted business in Virginia without having obtained a certificate of authority. Judge Hammond, writing for the Court, cleared certain
pre-Huntington
underbrush from Maryland law and decided that the Virginia statute was “primarily compensatory to creditors and not penal.”
The proper focus, therefore, is on whether the individual plaintiff sues to vindicate a private right.
Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of New York,
“A statute penal in [the international sense] is one that awards a penalty to the state, or to a public officer in its behalf, or to a member of the public, suing in the interest of the whole community to redress a public wrong. ... The purpose must be, not rеparation to one aggrieved, but vindication of the public justice.”
Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws, § 89, comment a puts the concept this way:
*137 “[The penal law exception] applies only to actions brought for the purpose of punishing the defendant for a wrong done by him____ [T]he rule does not apply to actions brought by a private person or public body to recover compensation for a loss.”
In the matter at hand the two Virginia statutes illustrate the distinction between penal and nonpenal laws, and Rein clearly bases his action on the nonpenal statute. Section 18.2-216 creates a statutory misdemeanor. That portion of § 18.2-216 set forth above is nearly verbatim
“a Model Statute drawn up in 1911 by Mr. Harry D. Nims at the instance of Printer’s Ink, a magazine published for advertisers. The statute became known as the Printer’s Ink Model Statute and soon received the indorsement of the various organizations interested in truthful advertising. The statute made advertisers criminally responsible for false or misleading statements or representations of fact in any type of advertising, excluding only oral statements. It did not require knowledge or intent to deceive on the advertiser’s part, or reliance on his statement by, or damage to anyone. It imposed absolute responsibility on anyone guilty of the prohibited act.”
Comment, Untrue Advertising, 36 Yale L.J. 1155, 1156-57 (1927) (footnote omitted). The Printer’s Ink Model Statute was enacted in Virginia by the 1924 Acts of Assembly, ch. 409. See Comment, Untrue Advertising, supra, at 1157 n. 11. 2
Section 59.1-68.3 incorporates § 18.2-216 by reference and entitles “[a]ny person who suffers loss as the result of a violation of” the incorporated section “to bring an individual action to recover damages, or $100, whichever is greater.” The statute was first enacted by 1973 Virginia Acts of Assembly, ch. 537. The later enactment seems clearly *138 intended to provide a private civil remedy as an alternative to criminal prosecution for the same conduct proscribed by § 18.2-216. The monetary recovery is awarded to the person who suffered the loss as a result of the violation, and not to the Commonwealth of Virginia or to any of its political subdivisions. Section 59.1-68.3 is not a penal statute in the conflict of laws sense.
Koons contends that the later statute is penal because enforcement of the civil remеdy is contingent on a violation of the earlier enacted criminal statute. But the criminal statute is “penal” only if it is directly enforced by the state. It is not “penal” when used, through incorporation by reference, to provide elements of a cause of action for damages.
Mexican Nat’l R. Co. v. Slater,
Osborn v. Borchetta,
Becker v. Computer Sciences Corp.,
Koons also cites
Henry v. R.K. Chevrolet, Inc.,
Henry
uses the term “penal” in the context of a well recognized rule of statutory construction. That rule of construction continues to apply to an underlying criminal statute when it forms the basis for a civil remedy. For example, in
Smith v. Higinbothom,
Further, even if we assume that
Henry
means that, as a matter of the Virginia law of conflict of laws, a statute identical to § 59.1-68.3, enacted by a state other than Virginia, would be classified as penal in Virginia, that conclusion would not control our decision. Whether a statute is penal in the conflict of laws sense is decided by the law of the forum.
See Huntington v. Attrill,
Thus the Supreme Court in Huntington stated:
“The test is not by what name the statute is called by the Legislature or the courts of the state in which it was passed, but whether it аppears to the tribunal which is called upon to enforce it to be, in its essential character *141 and effect, a punishment of an offense against the public, or a grant of a civil right to a private person.”
For these reasons Rein’s action is not founded on a penal statute.
II
Relying on the principle that a judgment may be affirmed for any supporting reason plainly appearing upon the record, Koons has submitted to us the reasons which it advanced in the circuit court for dismissal of the complaint. We now consider those grounds for affirmance.
A
Section 59.1-68.3 limits the plaintiff in the civil action therein provided to “[a]ny person who suffers loss as the result of a violation[.]” Rein’s complaint concludes by averring that he and the proposed class members have been directly injured by the alleged deceptive advertising. Koons submits that the general allegation is insufficient to satisfy the statutory requirement of “loss.”
Koons’s argument raises a point of Maryland pleading. As a general rule in Maryland damages which necessarily result from the wrong complained of may be shown under a general allegation, and, ordinarily, only special damages need be more particularly set forth.
See McTavish v. Carroll,
*142 Indeed, the statute plainly indicates that proof of a specific amount of actual or compensatory damages is not required. The “person who suffers loss” is entitled to “recover damages, or $100, whichever is greater.” There is no requirement that the plaintiff demonstrate the monetary amount of the alleged loss suffered in order to be entitled to the minimum recovery.
This construction of the Virginia statute is consistent with the construction of similar consumer protection statutes in other states. For example, the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA) permits a private action to be brought by any “person who suffers any ascertainable loss of money or property, real or personal as a result of the” prohibited practice. Conn.Gen.Stat. § 42-110g(a) (1958, 1987 Repl.Vol.). That provision was interpreted in
Hinchliffe v. American Motors Corp.,
“[T]he inclusion of the word ‘ascertainable’ to modify the word ‘loss’ indicates that plaintiffs are not required to prove actual damages of a specific dollar amount. ‘Ascertainable’ means ‘capable of being discovered, observed or established.’ ...
“ ‘Loss’ has been held synonymous with deprivation, detriment and injury. ... It is a generic and relative term. ... ‘Damage,’ on the other hand, is only a species of loss. ... The term ‘loss’ necessarily encompasses a broader meaning than the term ‘damage.’ ...
“Whenever a consumer has received something other than what he bargained for, he has suffered a loss of money or property. That loss is ascertainable if it is *143 measurable even though the precise amount of the loss is not known. CUTPA is not designed to afford a remedy for trifles. In one sense the buyer has lost the purchase price of the item because he parted with his money reasonably expecting tо receive a particular item or service. When the product fails to measure up, the consumer has been injured; he has suffered a loss. In another sense he has lost the benefits of the product which he was led to believe he had purchased. That the loss does not consist of a diminution in value is immaterial, although obviously such diminution would satisfy the statute. To the consumer who wishes to purchase an energy saving subcompact, for example, it is no answer to say that he should be satisfied with a more valuable gas guzzler.
“Under CUTPA, there is no need to allege or prove the amount of the ascertainable loss. ... To satisfy the ‘ascertainable loss’ requirement, a plaintiff need prove only that he has purchased an item partially as a result of an unfair or deceptive practice or act and that the item is different from that for which he bargained. This approach is in keeping with the remedial aims of the statute and will ensure that the private civil action established by the statute will remain a meaningful avenue of redress for consumers who have been the victims of unfair or deceptive trade practices.”
Id.
at 613-15,
A New York statute providing for consumer protection from deceptive acts and practices permits a private action for a minimum $50 recovery by “[a]ny person who has been injured by reason of any violation of” the statute. New York Gen.Bus.Law Art. 22-A, § 350-d(3) (McKinney 1988). In
Beslity v. Manhattan Honda,
Interpreting the same New York statute, the court in
Geismar v. Abraham & Straus,
The Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act was construed in
Leardi v. Brown,
Homsi v. C.H. Babb Co.,
*145 Further, the purpose of a rеstriction on those who can invoke the private remedy provisions of a consumer protection statute is explained in 1 H. Alperin & R. Chase, Consumer Law — Sales Practices and Credit Regulation § 136, at 193 (1986). The authors state:
“Many of the state consumer protection acts permit a consumer to bring a private action against a businessman who has acted unfairly or deceptively only if the consumer has been injured or damaged by the businessman’s conduct. This restriction is said to prevent aggressive consumers who were not personally harmed by the prohibited conduct, or even involved in a transaction with the offending businessman, from instituting suit ‘as self-constituted private attorneys general’ over relatively minor statutory violations. Another fear is that the powerful weapon given to consumers in the form of the private remedy ‘was capable of being used improperly for harassment and improper coercive tactics.’ ”
(Footnotes omitted).
The loss requirement’s purpose is satisfied under Rein’s theory of the deception, a theory which the Koons motion does not challenge. As Rein interprets the statute, the deceptive advertising consisted in stating a sрecific cash price in one or more advertisements which drew Rein, and possibly other Maryland residents, to the Falls Church showroom. In the contract formed there, Koons included the document preparation charge in that section of the written contract dealing with taxes and tags. It is Rein’s position that the document preparation fee, in relation to the advertisement, is an increase in the cash price. By going to Falls Church in response to the ads and there purchasing automobiles under contracts which included the document preparation charge, Rein and others have suffered harm which the statute, under Rein’s interpretation, is intended to prevent. To the extent that the “loss” provision in the statute requires a monetary detriment, that requirement is satisfied by the unquantified expense of traveling to Falls Church in response to the allegedly deceptive ad. See *146 Beslity v. Manhattan Honda, supra; Homsi v. C.H. Babb Co., supra.
B
Koons also argues that enforcing the remedy provided by § 59.1-68.3 would be an extraterritorial application of a Virginia criminal statute. The argument has multiple steps. First, Koons says, there must be a violation of the underlying criminal statute. Next, Koons submits that the acts made criminal by § 18.2-216 are publishing, disseminating, circulating or placing before the public the deceptive advertising. In order for those acts to be punished criminally in Virginia, Koons argues that those acts must be committed in Virginia. Turning to the complaint, Koons reads it to say that “the alleged conduct occurred outside of Virginia and thus beyond the reach of Virginia criminal jurisdiction____” Appellee’s Brief at 15.
Rein’s complaint in fact alleges:
“These advertisements werе intended to and did reach audiences in the Washington metropolitan area including Montgomery County, Maryland. Attached hereto as Exhibit A are copies of such advertisements appearing in the Washington Post and Montgomery Journal.”
The short answer to Koons’s contention is that the Washington Post circulates in Virginia, a fact of which we take judicial notice.
See Wilhelm v. State,
C
The third string to Koons’s bow of alternative grounds for supporting the judgment is that the action can invоlve only Rein’s claim for the minimum recovery of $100. *147 If that is so, the action does not meet the minimum $2,500 amount in controversy for circuit court jurisdiction under Md.Code (1974, 1989 Repl.Vol.), § 4-402(d) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. The argument rests on that portion of Virginia § 59.1-68.3 which permits the person who suffers loss “to bring an individual action----” Koons says that use of the word “individual” prohibits class actions.
We are inclined to think, as a matter of Virginia law, that “individual” connotes a private action, in contrast to a civil enforcement proceeding brought by the Attorney Gеneral of Virginia. We need not, however, construe the Virginia statute because it does not govern the issue. The law of the forum governs procedural matters.
Billingsley v. Lincoln Nat’l Bank,
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR MONTGOMERY COUNTY REVERSED. CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. COSTS TO BE PAID BY THE APPELLEE.
Notes
. At oral argument counsel for Rein further limited "persons similarly situated" to those who purchased new automobiles from Koons at the Falls Church place of business.
. The Printer’s Ink Model Statute is also discussed in Note, The Regulation of Advertising, 56 Colum.L.Rev. 1018, 1058 et seq. (1956); Handler, False and Misleading Advertising, 39 Yale L.J. 22, 31 (1929); 1A R. Callmann, Unfair Competition, Trademarks and Monopolies § 5.02, at 17 (4th ed. 1981 rev.).
. Our "short" answer does not imply that a state lacks power to impose, for deceptive advertising circulated exclusively outside the legislating state, criminal or civil liability on an advertiser who is a resident of the legislating state where the transaction solicited by the advertising actually takes place.