| New York Court of Common Pleas | Dec 5, 1881
The principal, I may say, the only question is, is the attorney liable to the sheriff for what is now called “ calendar fees ?”
The sheriff’s right to calendar fees is created by 2nd Revised Statutes, p. 645, § 38, which reads thus: “ for summoning the jury to attend any court, fifty cents in each cause noticed for trial at such court, or placed on the calendar for trial.’’ Some one is to pay that fee, and the rule in this state has always been that the attorney is liable to the sheriff for his fees. An attempt was made, at the argument, to draw a distinction between fees for executing process, either mesne or final, and fees for other services rendered by the sheriff, but the cases do not warrant any such discrimination. In the leading case of Adams v. Hopkins (5 Johns. 252" court="N.Y. Sup. Ct." date_filed="1810-02-15" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/adams-v-hopkins-5472506?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="5472506">5 Johns. 252), the sheriff sued for poundage on a ca. sa., and in Ousterhout v. Day (9 Johns. 114" court="N.Y. Sup. Ct." date_filed="1812-05-15" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/ousterhout-v-day-5472998?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="5472998">9 Johns. 114), the fees sued for were for serving several writs of cap. ad resp., but the language of the court did not limit the sheriff’s claim against the attorney to services rendered in the service of writs. In the Ousterhout case, the court said, “ the sheriff was entitled to look to the attorney for his fees.” The reasons for giving such a right to the sheriff were stated by the court in Adams v. Hopkins. Those reasons were that the attorney is the sheriff’s immediate employer, and the sheriff can not be considered as giving credit to the client, with whose residence and responsibility he can not be supposed to be acquainted. The sheriff is obliged to execute every legal process delivered to him, and all reasonable security ought to be given to him for his compensation. From the time of the decision in the 5tli Johnson, which was delivered in 1810, to the present time, the courts of New York have uniformly adhered to the principle then enounced. Some of the reasons given by the court in that case are not so cogent now as they were at that time, for, in many cases, the sheriff may demand his fees in advance, but the courts have not made any exceptions to the rule, and they have regarded the attorney, as most attorneys have considered themselves, as liable to the sheriff for all his fees of every character chargeable to a suitor in a civil action. In the case of Judson v. Gray (11 N.Y. 408" court="NY" date_filed="1854-09-05" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/judson-v--gray-3627868?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="3627868">11 N. Y. 408),
Applying the most rigid rule suggested by Judge Selden, the plaintiff would be entitled to look to the defendant for his fees. The statute makes it the duty of the sheriff to summon a jury, and gives him a prescribed fee for the service. The sheriff does not know, and cannot ascertain who the suitors are whose cases will be on the calendar, nor is it possible for him to know who and where the attorneys are, by whom the notes of issue will be filed. The sheriff can not go round to the attorneys, and demand the fee in advance. Such a proceeding is out of the question, as every lawyer knows. He must, therefore, do the work, without knowing, at the time, for whom it is done, or how he is to get his pay, if the attorney be not responsible for it. The calendar fee is, therefore, peculiarly and especially within the reason of the rule which Judge Thompson first announced, and which Judge Selden said was
There can be no doubt that the sheriff is entitled to the calendar fee for every term that the ease is on the calendar for trial. For every such term a jury must be summoned, and the calendar fee is the compensation prescribed by statute for the labor of serving the summonses. The language of the statute does not admit of two constructions, and the subject requires no further discussion.
None of the defendant’s exceptions seems to us to be tenable.
The judgment should be affirmed.
J. F. Daly, J., concurred.
Judgment affirmed, with costs.