25 W. Va. 36 | W. Va. | 1884
The record does not show the grounds on -which the municipal court founded its decrees. The counsel for the appellants, however, state that it decided that no proper notice forthe stockholders’ meetingof Jnly9, 1881, had been given, and, therefore, what was done at said meeting was not binding and on that account perpetuated the injuntion. The first question then to be decided is the sufficiency of this notice.
In the absence of any by-law on the subject, the mode of calling a meeting of the stockholders of a corporation is prescribed by statutes as follows: “A general meeting of the stockholders may be called at any time by the board of directors, or by any number of stockholders, holding together at least one-tenth of the capital.” Code, ch. 53, § 41. In this instance it is admitted that the meeting -was not
The court did not, therefore, err in holding. that said notice was insufficient, and that the sale about to be made by the said Barr should be enjoined. Nor did it err in overruling the demurrer to the plaintiff’s bill.
It is further claimed by the appellants, that conceding the coi’rectness of the conclusion thus aunonneed, the decree of
The plaintiffs in the cause hold, in all, fourteen shares of the stock of the corporation, and the defendants hold the balance, 159 shares. From this, it is argued that the plaintiffs, being the holders of less than one-tenth of the capital, could not call a meeting of the corporation for any purpose, and all the other stockholders being perpetually enjoined from selling the property, no meeting could be called by them for that purpose; and, consequently, this corporation which has abandoned the object of its creation, is forever deprived of the power to sell its property and wind up its affairs.
Technically, this conclusion may be legitimate upon a literal interpretation of the decree, but it is evident that such was not the intention of the court. If attention had been called to it the decree would, no doubt, have been modified and the injunction confined to the prohibition of any sale under or by virtue of the pretended authority of the resolution adopted at the meeting of July 9, 1881. The omission to qualify the injunction was, I have no doubt, simply an inadvertence and oversight which the court would not have made if a modification had been requested.
The appellees, the plaintiffs below, claim that the record establishes, that the appellants have entered into a fraudulent scheme to force a disadvantageous sale of the property so that they may become the purchasers at a price below its value and thus defraud the other stockholders. And, assuming this to be the fact, they insist that this Court should not merely affirm the decree of the court below, but that it should pass upon the question of fraud and thus prevent the appellants from carrying out their scheme by calling a new meeting and ordering a sale of the same character attempted at the meeting of July 9, 1881.
Whether this enquiry could be material in any event depends upon the fact whether or not the appellants could in the case assumed legally become purchasers of the corporate property. It is a well settled principle of equity jurisprudence that a party holding a fiduciary relation to trust-property cannot become the purchaser of such property either
This rule is not confined to trustees and fiduciaries in the technical sense of those terms, but it extends to every person coming within the reason of the rule. It embraces trustees, guardians, executors, administrators, agents, cashiers of banks, factors, auctioneers, sheriffs, commissioners in bankruptcy and their solicitors, assignees of bankrupts, attorneys at law, directors of corporations and parties bearing many other relations to each other which may not well be clasified. — 16 W. Va. 63, and cases cited.
In Abbott v. American Hard Rubber Co., 33 Barb. 578, a sale of the corporate property was set aside because directors of the company were interested in the purchase. In that case the court held: “A person having a duty to perform for others can not act in the same matter for his own benefit. Hence, a trustee cannot, directly or indirectly, by himself or through the agency of another, become the purchaser of the trust estate. Neither can he purchase an interest in property and hold it for his own benefit, when in respect to such property he has a duty to perform inconsistent with the character of a purchaser on his own account.” The same rule as to purchasers of corporate property by directors has been applied in many cases. Cumberland Coal Co. v. Sherman, 30 Barb. 553; Banks v. Judah, 8 Conn. 145; Hoffman Steam Coal Co. v. Cumberland Coal Iron Co. 16 Md. 456.
The same rule does not generally apply to the stockholders of a corporation which is managed by a board of directors. Whether it does or not must depend upon the special facts of the particular case, the general rule being that a stockholder of such corporation may purchase. Banks v. Judah, supra.
In the case before us, there being no board of directors, the stockholders assumed and preformed the duties which ordinarily belong to a board of directors. The resolution passed at the alleged meeting of July 9, 1881, not only directs the sale of the corporate property, but it appoints the agent who is to make the sale, fixes the time, place, terms
In what has been said it is not intened to intimate that any such fraudulent intent has been shown. I have not examined the proofs on that question except in a very casual manner and from that examination it does not appear that any actual fraud was intended.
For the foregoing reasons, I am of opinion that the decree of August 28, 1883, should bo reversed and the decree of September 1, 1883, be affirmed with costs to the appellees, the plaintiffs below, they being the parties substantially prevailing, and instead of said decree of August 28, 1883, it is
Reversed in part — Aeeirmbd in part.