18 Mo. 220 | Mo. | 1853
delivered the opinion of the court.
In the examination of this and of the kindred case of Slevin v. Robert and wife, we have investigated and stated the general principles by which the two cases should be determined, without a review of the several instructions given and refused. In the preamble to the act of 13th of February, 1833, it is recited, that there are certain lots of ground within the limits of the town of Carondelet, in the county of St. Louis, which belong to the inhabitants of that town in common, and that it is represented, that the sale of the said lots would greatly conduce to the present and future welfare of the said town. The act then proceeds to authorize the board of trustees of the town to sell and convey the vacant and unoccupied lots to which the inhabitants had a legal or equitable title, included within the surveys of said town, made by Lawrence M. Eiler, in November, 1832. The lots thus authorized to be sold were to be conveyed by the chairman of the board of trustees, and in their behalf. The deed was required to be countersigned by the recorder, and to have the corporate seal annexed thereto. The fourth section of the act authorizes the inhabitants to compromise and settle with any adverse claimant to any lot within the survey of the town, and a deed was required as in case of a sale of a lot. On the 2d of August, 1832, the town of Caron-delet was incorporated by the county court of St. Louis county, by the name of the inhabitants of the town of Carondelet, in pursuance to the provisions of the act for the incorporation of towns, approved 26th January, 1825. In pursuance to the fourth section of the act of 13th February, 1833, the board of trustees of the town directed their chairman to convey to all ¡persons being inhabitants thereof, who were in possession of a
1. In the investigation of this subject, the question first to be disposed of is, whether the inhabitants of the town were in a condition that would authorise an individual claiming "a lot, to insist on the length of possession, as conferring a title. Could a person, by adverse possession, acquire a lot against the inhabitants of the town ? The ground on which a right to prescribe against them rests, is not seen. They were not incorporated until the 2d of August,'1832, as has been shown. Until that time they had no capacity to sue or to be sued. Nor were they clothed with any powers, or charged with any duties by law which would constitute them even a quasi corporation for any purpose. When the act of congress of the 13th of June, 1812, was passed, tbe United States enjoyed the entire sovereignty in this (then) territory, and by their grant could confer on the inhabitants a capacity to hold the land. But there the act stopped; it gave no power, nor imposed upon the inhabitants any duty, which would warrant a court in holding that they constituted a quasi corporation. The inhabitants would not forfeit their rights by reason of not having been incorporated. The majority of them may have been opposed to it, and the rights of the minority are not to be sacrificed by the acts or omissions of the majority. The universal rule, in the construction of the statute of limitations, seems to be, that where there is no person to sue, no laches ban be imputed. It was not the intention of the legislature to embrace such cases with
2. As to the deed executed by the chairman of the board of trustees, we do not regard it as a corporate act; that is, merely as a deed of the corporation in the same sense that a deed is the act of an individual. The deed was executed by no corporate authority, as such, hut under an ordinance which merely repeated the requirements of the act of the legislature. It was the act of an agent of the law, appointed to perform it, with the concurrence of the inhabitants of the town. The power to execute it was conferred on the chairman by statute, and it is not to be likened to a deed made by a corporation of its mere volition, just as.a natural person conveys. The principles governing the execution of deeds made by corporations as such, are not applicable to that involved in the present controversy. The deed here is binding on the inhabitants, not as a corporate act, but because it is executed with their consent,
8. If a deed is absolutely void, and not merely voidable, when it is used for the purpose of affecting the interests of another, he may show that it is void. One in possession without color of right, may defend against such a deed. If the chairman of the board of trustees had wantonly, without any foundation of authority, made a deed to one who had never been an inhabitant of the town, and who never possessed or claimed a lot, these facts appearing, his deed could not be sustained. The deeds executed by the chairman of the board of trustees, under the act of 1833 and ordinance of 1834, are not to be construed as instruments made by an officer of the law conveying the right of another in invitum. The action of the chairman is supposed to be in accordance with the will of the trustees. The conveyances were voluntarily made with a view to pass the right of the inhabitants. They are not the acts of an officer deputed by law to convey against the will of
With the concurrence of the other judges, the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.