*1
Donald M. Barone the cause Jersey (Gelfand, Company Atlantic Insurance Barone & New Bava, attorneys).
Thomas submitted a brief on behalf of amicus G. Smith letter Casualty Property curiae Insurance Association of America. opinion Justice HOE NS delivered the of the Court. matter, whether, In this we consider and under what circum- stances, single-vehicle may in a driver who is involved purposes assessing be considered to be “at-fault” insurance that, eligibility rating points. Because we conсlude under the Banking presented, circumstances and Insur- regulations applied ance has its in a manner that exceeds the statutory authority, scope of its we reverse.
I. disputed. Reilly returning The facts are not Plaintiff Glen was Pennsylvania January trip home from a ski 2003. He was driving Jersey on Route 15 in northwestern New in weather that rainy. warnings was cold and There had been no snow or ice rain, the weather forecast. Because of the all of the cars on the road, including plaintiffs, traveling approximately m.p.h. were zone, m.p.h. speed leaving in a 55 limit each car driver several lengths Shortly p.m., plaintiff between vehicles. before 7:30 sud- denly warning upon patch and without came of black ice and lost spun degrees control of his car. The vehicle and slid from the right guardrail left lane until it collided with the on the side of the investigating police road. No other vehicles were involved and the *5 officer did not issue a or plaintiff ticket traffic citation to as a result of the accident. any
Plaintiff testified that he had not night seen accidents that own, prior many to his trip but witnessed on the of his remainder Newspaper day home. accounts the next described the conditions throughout Jersey Nightmare” northern New as a “Black Ice driving created “treacherous” George conditions. Berken Mueller, 3, Mark Nightmare, Ledger, Black Ice The Star Jan. 2003, at 1. “spark[ed] The weather hundreds of accidents” and “[bjesieged police departments” keep pace unable to with the “mayhem.” resulting Ibid. accident,
At plaintiff the time of the had automobile insurance (Stаte through Farm), Company State Farm Insurance which reimbursed him in excess of damage one thousand dollars for time, the vehicle sustained in the At incident. the same State Farm, 2, alerting plaintiff, January without determined that the assigned 2003 accident was an “at-fault” accident five insur- eligibility points underwriting ance to him for purposes. future record, specified plaintiff For reasons not in later decided to change companies applied coverage insurance for automobile from defendant AAA Mid-Atlantic Company Insurance of New (AAA). Jersey Although policy defendant issued an insurance plaintiff, company 2, January also concluded that assigned accident was an “at-fault” plaintiff accident and also five eligibility points, along with two based on an unrelated moving 28, result, Seрtember violation on 2001. As a defendant assigned plaintiff eligibility points. a total of seven insurance applicable regulations at plaintiff’s effect the time of permitted voluntarily an insurer to coverage decline eligibility points, driver who had nine see N.J.A.C. 11:3— 34.4(a)(8) (2002) 3260(a) (Jul. 2003). amended 35 N.J.R. 2003, however, December was amended so as to points, lower the threshold from nine to seven see 35 N.J.R. 3260(a) (Jul. 2003). plaintiff’s points, Based on seven could he *6 of which defendant declined requirement,
not this as result meet plaintiffs policy April 2004. to renew point and the five assess- challenged his non-renewal Plaintiff Banking and appeal Department through an ment (“the Department issued a Department”). After the Insurance points assessment of was preliminary finding that defendant’s correct, transferred plaintiff again appealed, and the matter wаs hearing. Law for a to the Office of Administrative 4, 2005, hearing an Administrative Law During April before (ALJ), Sease, an underwriter for Judge plaintiff both and Danielle AAA, road condi- Plaintiff testified about the defendant testified. support night and evidence to tions on the of the accident offered unexpected and that the black ice condition was his assertion extraordinarily emergency. hazardous created an facts, contrary but testified that Sease offered no version nevertheless, was, properly classified as “at-fault.” the accident by was reviewed twice AAA explained that the 2003 accident She First, plaintiff applied for underwriting purposes. for its when plaintiffs coverage, underwriter determined that another “at-fault,” points assigned were at that time. accident was five additiоn, independently testified that she had reviewed Sease correctly that it was deemed to be the 2003 accident concluded Sease, According a driver is an “at-fault” accident. because times, at all expected to maintain control of his or her vehicle driver is deemed “at-fault” for an accident unless there another party to whom fault can be attributed. Reilly’s testimony found “to be credible and consistent
The ALJ throughout,” was not. He found that defendant had while Sease’s determining single-car fault in accidents and guidelines no result, that, those were left to each individual as decisions had judgment. He further found that Sease not underwriter’s surrounding the acci- independently reviewed the circumstances merely accepted had the conclusion about fault had dent but another, Comparing the been made unidentified underwriter. relating emergency, accident to an the ALJ reasoned facts to the unforeseeable, unavoidable, that because the accident was roadway, caused black ice on the it should not be considered a chargeable Rather, “at-fault” specifically accident. the ALJ found place through the accident “took plaintiff. no fault” of The ALJ therefore ordered that the five be rescinded. Commissioner of the issued his final decision May 2005. accepted The Commissioner all of the ALJ’s findings, rejected legal Instead, factual but his conclusion. Commissioner single-car reasoned that a accident can be deemed “at-fault” for rating purposes, regardless insurance of the driver’s culpability, long аs the applicable criteria set forth in the see N.J.A.C. regulation, 11:3-34.3, are met. The Commissioner explained: to N.JAC.
Pursuant an accident is an 11:3-34.3, “at-fault accident” for which *7 eligibility should accrue it: involved a driver points insured under the policy; resulted in of a claim of or payment more for accidents that occurred before $500 2003, June or 9, $1,000 more, or for accidents that occurred on or after June 2003 9, ... which was not from payment another is not recouped tortfeasor; specifically as set forth in the and the driver is not excepted rule; excused of the by application proportionate standard. responsibility The Commissioner therefore concluded that defendant had properly deemed the accident to be an “at-fault” accident and uрheld plaintiffs defendant’s decision to decline to policy. renew and, appealed decision,
Plaintiff
Reilly v. AAA
published
in a
Co.,
Mid-Atlantic Ins.
N.J.Super.
(App.
390
ment’s history enabling stat legislative Finding that the firmed. 17:33B-14, prevent “good” ute, an intention to evidenced N.J.S.A. rates for “bad” the insurance having to subsidize drivers from interpret drivers, Department could that the the court concluded underwriting, rather than fault- it to utilize permit that statute assigning points for insurance concepts for negligence, or based 511-12, supra, N.J.Super. at Reilly, rating purposes. analysis with the court’s usual deference Coupling that A.2d 1105. appellate panel regulations, the agency’s interpretation of its to an to assess permit decision to defendant Department’s affirmed of his one-car against plaintiff based on its classification 510-12, A.2d 1105. at as an “at-fault” event. Id. II. reject Department’s defini- urges us to appeal, plaintiff On “secret, it authorizes rule because of “at-fault” as a unwritten” tion statutorily risk standard rather than the use of an actuarial and, therefore, for fault comparative negligence standard adopted rating points. He contends that of insurance for the assessment being regulation as based interpret the statute and the we should authorizing negligence concepts rather than application of on the Moreover, concepts. he underwriting or the use of actuarial legislative in the record or argues that there is no evidence relating adoption of the statute or the history to the is blameless in a supports the conclusion that a driver who *8 higher risk. actually presents a insurance single-car accidеnt finding light in the unrebutted Finally, plaintiff that contends suggestion Appellate in the negligent, not the the ALJ that he was be contrary is baseless and should Division’s decision to the rejected by this Court. applied Division the Department argues Appellate that the
The interpretation it in its appropriate standards to the matters before statute, Department’s including court’s deference to the the expertise administrative and its evaluation insurance risks. Department regulation also compels contends that the the conclusion plaintiff that was fact “at-fault” because he bears proportionate responsibility regulation event defines Further, Department it. asserts interpretation that the statutory language permit to consideration actuarial risk is both entirely reasonable and purpose consistent with the of the statute. Finally, Department reject urges plaintiffs argument us to regulation’s language that the general negli- itself establishes a gence imputing negligence concept, standard. Rather than a regulation’s proportionate responsibility merely standard excuses one driver accident multi-vehicle because of another driver’s such, negligence. argues Department regulation As that the single-car has no to relevance accidents. Property Casualty
Amicus curiae Insurance Association of (PCIAA) position America Depart- concurs with the taken Pointing ment. out that “at-fault” includes six specific exemptions, applies plaintiffs none of to single-car, which crash, argues weather-related PCIAA that the inten- tionally being excluded such from incidents classified as not “at- Moreover, fault.” argues PCIAA that the statute itself does not imply equated that negligence “at-fault” should be with and that plaintiff negligent, even was not sufficiently his behavior was risky permitted insurer rely upon should be to it to decline to to coverage. Interpreting continue afford him the rule assign automatic fault to driver a single-car of the vehicle in accident, PCIAA, according to is both rational and reasonable. Finally, sounding generalized, policy-based warning permit- ting plaintiff prevail might rates, result in increased insurance urges Department’s PCIAA us to defer to the expertise, and to judgment. the Appellate affirm Division’s
III. requires This plaintiffs single- matter us to consider whether car, appropriately weather-related considered to be an
484 statute, meaning of the N.J.S.A within the
“at-fault” event 17:33B-14, Department, regulation promulgated or the question of inquiry Central this is N.JAC. 11:3-34.3. in negligence is in terms or fault in this context defined whether underwriting concepts. with actuarial or accordance
A. however, questions, we com address those are Before we whether, briefly argued, as defendant has to consider strained recognized, plaintiffs appeal Appellate As the Division is moot. plaintiff expired and can have no assigned to have now points Reilly, in See eligibility his for insurance the future. effect on time, 502, N.J.Super. at 915 1105. At the same he supra, 390 A.2d coverage any for the of is entitled to affirmative relief denial not only regulation permit that would prevails, if he because the even 3, 2006, July until see recovery promulgated was not such 11:3-33.6(d), by already had which time these N.J.A.C. 17:33B—13(f).Finally, Department as expired, see N.J.S.A. challenged process amending regula it of serts that is in the clarity, provide suggesting that we need not address tion to plaintiffs appeal. plaintiff is entitled to affirmative light
In
of the fact
not
declined,
relief,
technically
have often
appeal
his
moot. We
mootness,
however,
grounds
a matter on
the issue
dismiss
appeal
public
See
important
is an
matter
interest.
Inc.,
59, 64,
Roofing
N.J.
527
Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Nat’l
108
(1987);
Application
Regency Corp.
re
A.2d 864
Boardwalk
License,
361, 367-68,
(techni
90
B.
long recognized
empow
Legislature
We have
that the
is
delegate
to
an
agency
authority
ered
to
administrative
to
promulgate
regulations
rules
interpreting
implementing
a
statute. See N.J. Chamber
Commerce v. N.J. Election Law
of
Comm.,
57, 82,
(1980).
82 N.J.
We have cautioned that “if an
is
contrary
statutory language,
agency’s interpreta
to the
or if the
intent,
Legislature’s
tion undermines the
no
is re
deference
Ibid,
State,
Dir.,
quired.”
(citing GE Solid
Inc. v.
Div.
Taxa
of
tion,
298, 306-07,
(1993);
132 N.J.
Adoption
As we
legislative
enactment or frustrate
terms
regulations, “alter the
491,
T.H., supra,
N.J. at
statute.”
189
policy
in the
embodied
Commerce, supra, 82 N.J.
(quoting
A.2d
N.J. Chamber
916
1025
168).
with the
82,
“plainly
at odds
411 A.2d
If
at
statute,
Prot.
In re Freshwater Wetlands
we must set it aside.”
(2004).
Rules,
489,
478,
“As we have
A .2d 1088
N.J.
852
Act
agency’s
stated,
judicial role is to ensure that
repeatedly
legislative
express
implied
intent.”
not violate
action does
491,
T.H.,
(citing
In re Freshwa
supra,
the "Administrative Procedure driving for violations of violations and shall include assessmеnts related experience [C]ommissioner, as by limits within such increments determined the lawful speed moving section, For the of this an violations, and at-fault accidents. purposes other occurring 89, before the effective date of c. means accident,” P.L.2003, “at-fault the of a claim in insurer at least payment by at-fault accident which results $500 occurring 89, c. means P.L.2003, on or after the effective date and for accidents in insurer least a 1,000 results the of at an at-fault accident which payment $ occurring mean an accident as ...; that an at-fault accident shall not claim except emergency in to a medical if the result of motor vehicle response a operation any responding the at to medical the time the accident was physician operator emergency. (citations omitted).] [Ibid, part in of the Fair Automobile was enacted 1990 as statute (FAIR 8, Act), 1990, L. c. at Act now codified Insurance Reform time, At of an “at- to -64. the definition N.J.S.A. 17:33B-1 only payment expressed was terms the fault” accident $500 1997, to Legislature In amended the statute by an insurer. by specifically exclud of an “at-fault” accident refine definition resulting responding to a physician from a ing accidents L. emergency. medical c. 381. The statute was amended again in $1,000. 2003 to increase the dollar threshold from $500 L. 2003, 89, § c. 64.
Although the statute does not define what Legislature “at-fault,” intended its use of the term very selection of the word statutory “fault” in the language arguably implies that the Legislature embody intended to concept negligent or blame- worthy Certainly, choosing “fault,” conduct. the term rather than a more neutral term relating to happening accident, of an Nonetheless, suggest. would so the term in the statute is itself ambiguous, with the result-that we must look further in our effort to discern the intent of Legislature, by extension, limits, any, Department’s ability regulations enact pursuant thereto. Legislature when our adopted Act, the FAIR it did so part
as comprehensive of its effort to continuing address the automobile Legislature insurance crisis. The specifically ex- plained, part legislative findings declarations, that it intended: g. To provide healthy automobile competitive insurance system this State, automobile insurers are through entitled to earn an rate of return adequate ratemaking process. Legislature h. To that end, the declares that it is in the to: interest public
(5) crеate a new residual market mechanism in which insurers will share directly insuring in the risk of the “bad driver;” (6) guarantee “good coverage drivers” secure motor vehicle insurance in the market and control the voluntary of drivers in the residual apportionment market; *12 (codified 17:33B-2).] [L. c. 8 at N.J.S.A. explained by As Assembly the Appropriations Committee state- accompanied bill, ment that aspect this of the FAIR Act was based on a similar Michigan statute in “require[d] that automobile provide to voluntary insurers insurance ‘good market to ” attempted drivers’ and “provide express to defining criteria eligible person L. coverage voluntary for in the market.” c. (Assembly Appropriations Statement, 8 Committee Statement to 1). Assembly Bill No. statement, bill, rather than according to the committee drivers,” “good explicitly to instead listed those
attempting define group, who from this and therefore those who were excluded voluntary part coverage market. Ibid. not be would among categories individuals excluded from the Included preceding voluntary market were those “who within the three- year eligi- period experience-related accumulated insurance ha[ve] bility by points promulgated under a schedule determined Department. bill Ibid. The section [C]ommissioner” authority promulgate the granted that the Commissioner the to schedule, 17:33B-14, point subsequently at there- codified N.J.S.A. identify distinguish fore on notion one could and rested “good” “bad” and them different between and drivers accord rights concerning availability. insurance statutory specifically provision that the
That directed schеdule points, eligibility purposes, point for “shall assess a valuation violations,” including driving experience related violations for Further, speeding moving violations. N.J.S.A. 17:33B-14. that the “shall include statute directed schedule assessments only explanation for ... at-fault accidents.” Ibid. The additional Legislature meant “at-fault” what the is derived from requirement only to the such an would be reference accident payment as an “at-fault accident” if it also included resulted specified of a the insurer minimum claim. Ibid. directive, compliance
In with the statute’s the Commissioner regulations promulgated explain points the schedule of and to identify how be for eligibility would assessed insurance purposes. regulations, substantially Those are which to date unchanged, a definition “at-fault” created based both inclu- pertinent part, sive exclusive criteria. definition language: following includes involving accident” is accident a driver under the “At-fault insured policy: 1. based Where a driver is on the number of vehicles proportionately responsible if involved. A driver is for an proportionately responsible percent responsible % involving involving two an accident drivers; percent responsible drivers, etc.; three *13 2. Which results in a total the insurer of at least payment by $500.00 occurring occurring before June or at 9, 2003; $1,000 least for an accident on or after June 9, 2003. [N.J.A.C. 11:3-34.3.] time,
At regulation the same separate includes six circum- stances in which the insured’s involvement in an accident specifically excluded from the particu- definition of “at-fault.” In regulation lar provides: following:
An at-fault аccident shall not include the 1. Involvement in an accident in which the motor vehicle owned or operated by the insured or other driver insured under the was policy lawfully parked; 2. Involvement in an accident in which the motor vehicle was struck a hit and run if such driver, accident was to the reported authorities within 24 proper hours; 3. in Involvement an accident in connection with which neither the named insured nor other moving driver insured under the any was convicted of policy traffic violation and the owner or of another vehicle operator involved such accident was so convicted; damage 4. For losses other than physical collision; 5. For an accident in which the motor vehicle was struck in the rear another moving vehicle and a driver insured under the has not been convicted of a policy violation connection with the or accident; occurring 6. For an accident as a result of motor vehicle in operation any emergency to an response at the time of the accident was operator responding to the call to as a or volunteer duty paid member of or fire any police agency. first aid or law department, enforcement squad [Ibid.]
Although none of these applies plaintiff, situations the list analysis by illustrating assists our Department’s understand- ing of the FAIR meaning Act’s and intent. initially adopted
This Department’s was under emergency rulemaking authority, period with a limited of effec- simultaneously tiveness. It was re-proposed as a new rule to be adopted in regular extent, rulemaking. course of To some comments Department’s received and the responses thereto dur- ing period the notice and preceding comment the concurrent emergency adoption re-proposal are of to us in assistance our inquiry. particular, several of responses the comments and definition, focus on the “at-fault” as follows: *14 objected to the definition of an “at-fault commenters COMMENT: Several insurers to or assess in 11:3-34.3 because it allows determine accident” N.J.S.A fault. evaluating Insurers have made an assessment always RESPONSE: offault for settling underwriting rating The and thus and claims liability purposes. for objective for the of an criteria for this process. new rules use provide proposed objected commenter to the use of proportionate COMMENT: One responsibility would tо to The commenter believes that this be cumbersome determine fault. assigned fill risk drivers, to certain and would monitor, quickly up unfair argued result market. that the definition could in several drivers The commenter being charged at-fault accident when are not the cause of the for an they primary suggested charge be accident. commenter that the definition amended to The greatest for to determined to hold the an at-fault accident the driver only points percentage of fault. suggested modifying A the definition of an second commenter at-fault from “... for the driver is at least ... to ... for responsible which proportionately than in addition to which driver is more ...” proportionately responsible providing The re- of revised definition definition proportionately responsible. assigned ambiguity moves also makes clear that no would for it be an accident fault was found. where equal The believes that the definition RESPONSE: Department proposed adequately an accident. The has determined two defines at-fault that Department people then accident, are to be both warrant found, responsible they equally for his accrual Each is to be held or her behavior. points. person responsible for It is to be a two-car for two each 50 possible people percent responsible accident. commenter the rule COMMENT: One that requested clarify types (that negligence) not is, accidents where “at-fault” does The commenter apply. following advised current are not at-fault that under considered practice, 2) 1) involving damage with fowl; accidents: accidents contact animals or by damage involving flying gravel accidents limited to and caused or by physical falling objects. if there is The commenter further a standard that questioned insurers use to fault. The commenter also if this rule questioned determine that standard. provides agrees that the rule should include a list of the RESPONSE: Department the driver is not this accidents where and has revised types clearly responsible accordingly. The section rule does not include standard that insurers proposed negligence to use to determine fault. Insurers standard determine apply fault (Dec. added).] 17,1990) (emphasis [22 N.J.R. 3847 directly on the that concepts Each these comments focused in the “at-fault.” would be embodied definition of Each responses, significantly, Department includes references to culpability negligence solely fault the sense of or rather than ratemaking underwriting. terms of or Similarly, proposed regula- Department when the to amend the payment tion in from increase the “at-fault” threshold $500 $1,000, identifying it continued to stress that its focus was drawing “good” a distinction between and “bad” drivers. addressing impact proposed the social amendments to the regulation, commented: good The enactment of these amendments will ensure that drivers do not help pay good ensuring for bad drivers drivers rates reflective of the actual cost pay insuring the vehicles and that those drive, drivers, is, bad with more they eligibility insuring rates reflective of the actual cost of the vehicles points, pay they drive. *15 good to drivers, The amendments аre decrease proposed premiums expected increasing driving while for those insureds whose records indicate that premiums higher eligibility are risks of based the number automobile accumu- they points preceding lated within the three years. (Jul. 21, 2003).] [35 N.J.R. 3260 repeated “good” strongly to and “bad” references drivers suggest Department Legislature’s that the understood the intent is, do, import negligence as we that as a conscious decision to culpability concepts into “at-fault” the definition rather than strictly rely upon underwriting concepts as basis for its the analysis.
IV. directly question need not address the of whether We the by regulation scope authority granted exceeded the of the the face, regulation only statute. On its the sets forth a method for eligibility determining assignment points whether the of will be exceed, permitted. directly It not with nor it does conflict does written, grant authority. largely It in the statute’s of is written negligence concepts expressed words that embrace the both during Legislature the notice and period preceded adoption. “propor comment its The words tionately responsible” suggest in and of themselves vehicles, counting of but
analysis simply is not of the number one is, fault, assigning responsibility, that to each of the rather one of regulation apparent This is because the refers drivers involved. comparison requires a of the to the number of vehicles and “responsibility” driver’s for the event with the number of insured case, being must be some vehicles involved. That there defining responsibility, apart evaluative mechanism for from the vehiclеs, light comparison. of so as to undertake that number comparative analysis, responsibili- about of that determination ty negligence, insured must derive from or fault in driver culpability, concepts. the sense Similarly, regulation’s specific list of will be accidents that category suggests regulation excluded from the “at-fault” that the concepts negligence. includes of fault the sense of For exam- ple, parked, the exclusion of an accident in which the vehicle was run, or was the victim of a hit and or in which the driver violation, moving other vehicle was convicted of a or in which the hit in driver’s vehicle was the rear under circumstances that did violation, moving not lead to the driver’s conviction of a all include concepts ordinary negligence analysis. Al- fault derived from though еxemptions may supported by these same also be underwriting analysis, nothing language or its statute legislative history nothing language in the or history adoption suggests inquiry that surrounded its that the assignment be undertaken in that flows from under- writing principles. *16 sure, relationship negligence
To be is a there between principles underwriting responses by considerations. The the Department during period suggest notice and the comment that “objective regulation designed the was to create criteria” to be “underwriting rating purposes.” used for 22 N.J.R. 3847 (Dec. 1990). is, however, nothing There in the record that supports the conclusion that the evaluation of an accident for the purpose assigning eligibility points solely is based underwrit ing concepts. underwriting To princi- the extent that the use of points, supplant it cannot the assignment in the pies plays а role say, That is to concept embodied in the statute. negligence-based distinguish “good drivers” and to designed statute is to reward the avail- purposes making insurance from “bad drivers” for them able. enacting statute was Legislature the
The intent of identify “good” and “bad” based on an underwriter’s not risk, concepts as ordinary negligence but to embrace evaluation regulation, originally that evaluation. The as the basis for objective criteria on re-adopted, sought to create adopted and as “good” “bad” and to between which to draw the distinction underwriting equation. part into a of an translate those criteria so, by embracing concepts of regulation does indeed The “proportionately responsi “responsibility” an accident into the for anаlysis in underwriting follow from the matrix. The criteria ble” analysis, to do do not inform the for regulation; those criteria enabling scope of the statute. so would be to exceed responsibili- directly proportional not regulation does define sure, To single-car to a accident. be ty concept as that relates that would address promulgate regulation Department could could, Indeed, consistent with circumstance. that intent, single-car “at-fault” for a Legislature’s define “proportionately using negligence-based standard other than the The De- applied to multi-vehicle accidents. responsible” criteria so, however, adopted “proportionate- but partment, did not do face applied to all accidents. On its ly responsible” standard to bе responsibili- says “proportional the driver’s percentage attributed to the ty” mathematical is less than the vehicles, “at- the driver is not on the number of then driver based worded, currently plain import regulation, fault.” The percent single-ear accident is not one hundred if a driver in a accident, “propor- he is not “responsible” happening as the term is tionately responsible” and therefore not “at-fault” regulation. defined in the
494
Although
Department urges
us to embrace its conclusion
single-car
necessarily
plaintiffs
that
accident
constituted an “at-
by
consistently
regulation,
fault” accident as defined
it has not
Indeed,
decisions,
analysis.
previous published
followed that
in
recognized
negligence
the Commissioner has
the fact that
con
cepts play
eligibility
points,
a role
the assessment of
see Amica
Kern,
N.J.A.R.2d(INS) 55,
Mut
Ins. Co. v.
93
1993
548379
WL
(1993) (“proportionate responsibility ... standard was
to be
added
comparative negligence
applied
consistent with the
standard
responsibility,
penalizing
tort
and to avoid
drivers with additional
premium charges when their contribution to the cause of an
drivers”).
negligible compared
Although
accident
is
to other
previously concluding
single-car
may
that a
accident
be deemed to
eligibility purposes,
be “at-fault” for
see
v.Woo
State Farm Ins.
Co., N.J.A.R.2d(INS) 99,
(1996),
agency
96
1996
930938
WL
did so in circumstances in which the driver’s fault also rested on
finding
traveling
speed.
that she had been
at an unsafe
At the
time,
damage
single-car
same
when
was caused in a
stone,
falling
analysis
avoided the “at-fault”
concluding that
the event was not
a collision.
v.
even
Geist
Co., N.J.A.R.2d(INS)
(1996).
Selective Ins.
V. record, challenge no In this there has been the Nor, matter, a hint findings. for that is there even ALJ’s factual of suggest plaintiff was the sole cause the of evidence driver, only the Notwithstanding the fact that he was accident. regulation’s plain wording compels the conclusion that he was the reaching opposite accident. the conclu not “at-fault” for the sion, testimony AAA relied on the of the Appellate the Division by made but previous underwriter and decisions Neither, however, subjected scrutiny. withstands not to our underwriter is entitled to no analysis. opinion The of the insurer’s meaning the statute or the weight in our consideratiоn of the of point, scope regulation. of More to the permissible Department, although entitled to our previous decisions of the agency’s expertise, support cannot an because of the deference regulation. interpretation proper scope exceeds the of the which accident, fact, not single-car as a matter of was Plaintiffs not, fact, single-car accident as a matter one his fault. His was by the proportionately responsible. was The decision for which he underwriting concepts assignment to the apply insurer to by regulation. Department’s The determi permitted not was by only governed includes but is nation that the not con analysis underwriting negligence-based than fault rather wording regulation and plain of the cepts was inconsistent with authority granted regulation beyond expands scope by the statute.
VI.
Appellate Division is reversed.
judgment
RIVERA-SOTO, dissenting.
Justice
majority,
simple
this case involves a
issue:
As defined
circumstances,
“whether, and
what
a driver who is involved
under
single-vehicle
may
in a
be considered to be ‘at-fault’ for
purposes
assessing
eligibility rating points.”
at
insurance
Ante
Because,
briefing
argument,
Certification should be in limited instances. Rule lays clearly high petition 2:12-4 out hurdle for certification *19 justify Supreme must vault in order to Court review: granted generаl Certification will be if the a only appeal presents question which has not been but should be settled Court public importance Supreme a or is similar to on another to the Court; question presented appeal Supreme the decision under review is in conflict with other decision of same or a any higher court or calls for an exercise of the Court’s and in Supreme supervision justice other matters if the interest of be will not allowed on requires. Certification judgments final Division reasons. Appellate except special (Emphasis supplied).] [ appeal presents unique idiosyncratic arising This events out of weather-related, single-automobile a accident. Full consideration discloses, however, appeal present of this it does not “a quеstion general public importance[;]” present it does not court[;]” higher “conflict with other decision the same or a present it does not an instance that “calls for an exercise of the Supreme supervision[;]” present Court’s it does not case justice requires[;]” should be reviewed because “the interest of present any it “special light does not reasons.” foregoing, appeal improvi- certification of this should be vacated as dently granted. certification, appeal if this
Even satisfied the standards for I disagree majority nonetheless with the substantive merits and, thus, appeal judgment Appel- of this would affirm the substantially ably Judge late Division for the reasons Reisner so N.J., Ins. Reilly v. AAA Mid-Atlantic Co. set forth. N.J.Super. (App.Div.2007). A.2d 1105 respectfully dissent. I therefore LONG,
For reversal—Chief Justice RABNER and Justices ALBIN, WALLACE, and HOENS—5.
For dismissal—Justice RIVERA-SOTO—1.