151 Iowa 491 | Iowa | 1911
On September 10, 1907, the defendant, J. W. Turley, and the plaintiff, F. J. Reiger, entered into a written contract, by which defendant sold to said plaintiff a farm of one hundred and twenty acres at the agreed price of $9,700, to be paid $1,500 on the execution of the writing, $500 on March 1, 1908, and the remainder, or $7,700, on March 1, 1913; the deferred payments to be evidenced by promissory notes bearing interest at five percent, payable annually. Possession was to be given and the abstract
It is expressly agreed that the party of the second part shall make all repairs to the fences and other improvements that may' be put upon said premises at his own expense. It is further agreed by and between the parties hereto that the party of the second part shall have the privilege at the end of the one-year term provided for in this lease and agreement of purchasing the above described premises for the agreed purchase price of eight thousand two hundred dollars, five hundred of the same to be paid in cash, and a first mortgage executed by second party for seven thousand seven hundred dollars, providing the rent herein agreed to be paid shall then be fully paid and the party of the first part hereby agrees to execute a warranty deed at the expiration of the said one-year term conveying said premises to the said party of the second part, or to such person as shall be named in writing by the party, of the second part, upon the payment to first party of the said agreed, purchase price of eight thousand two hundred dollars, together with all rents .provided for in this lease. It is further agreed that in case the second party fails to pay the rent as herein provided within ten days after the*494 same becomes due, or fails to pay all taxes assessed against said premises before the same becomes delinquent, or fails to comply with any of the conditions of the lease and agreement on his part to be kept and performed, then and in any of such events this lease and agreement may at the option of the first' party be terminated by giving thirty days’ notice in writing to quit possession of said premises, •and the first party shall upon the termination of such thirty days’ notice be entitled to take immediate possession of said premises without process of law, using such force as may be necessary to put said parties in full possession and enjoyment of said premises, or at the option of said party of the first part it is expressly agreed that he may bring action of forcible entry and detainer for the possession of said premises, it being expressly understood and agreed that any failure in the respects mentioned on the part of the second party shall cause all his rights of every kind and nature in and to said premises to at once terminate. It is expressly agreed and understood that all prior agreements and understanding by and between the second party hereto and the first party hereto or their grantor shall be and are hereby expressly rescinded and canceled.
On March 1, 1909, the parties entered into another or third written agreement, in the form of a contract of lease of the same premises for the further period of one jyear, on substantially the same terms as were contained in the contract for the preceding year, except the omission of all reference to a contract or option for the purchase of the land. The stipulated rent and taxes were paid in full each year.. On March 12, 1910, plaintiff instituted this action, setting up the original contract of purchase, and alleging that in February, 1908, and before any default in the performance of the contract on his part, he entered into an oral agreement with plaintiff for one year’s extension of the time ■ for payment of the installment of $500; that defendant, under false'and fraudulent pretense-that to give effect to such agreement for extension of time ; it was necessary to execute another writing, prepared and' requested the plaintiff to sign the second instrument above
After issue was thus joined, the wife of the plaintiff came into the case by petition of intervention, setting up homestead rights in the premises; but, as the disposition of this appeal in no manner depends upon the claim thus asserted, we shall give this feature of this case no further attention. After the close of the testimony, plaintiff was permitted, over defendant’s objection, to amend his petition asking, in case he be denied a reformation' of the written contracts, and the court in its discretion refuses to decree specific performance of the contract of purchase, that he then have judgment against the defendant for the return to him of the advance payment of $1,500 with interest. After hearing the evidence offered and the argument of counsel, the trial court entered its decree finding that plaintiff had not made a case for reformation of the written agreements, but held that the contract of purchase having been rescinded by the parties, defendant was not entitled to retain the advance payment of $1,500, and gave the plaintiff the option to take a money judgment for said sum with interest from the date of such rescission!. Plaintiff having signified his election to take such judgment, the court further decreed that his prayer for specific performance be denied, and that he have no further right, title, or interest in the premises, and that defendant be
If a party desires to take advantage of any error in the form of action adopted, he must do so by motion to transfer, and failure to do so is a waiver of the objection. Lewis v. Soule, 52 Iowa, 11.
Hence has arisen the very general rule that when equity has once obtained jurisdiction of a controversy, it will determine all questions material or necessary to the accomplishment of full and complete justice between the parties, even though in doing so it may .be required to pass upon some matters ordinarily cognizable at law. Johnson v. Carter, 143 Iowa, 100; Clinton v. Shugart, 126 Iowa, 188.
Under the rules above adverted to, we have no doubt of the authority of the trial court to require the restoration of the advance payment made to the defendant,. and this too without reference to the regularity of the amendment ■to the petition at the close of the trial.
It was doubtless within the discretion of the court to have refused leave to -amend the petition, or to have refused to pass upon plaintiff’s right to a return of the advance payment, and leave that claim to be fought out in another action. Under the prayer for general relief, it was equally within its discretion to retain jurisdiction of the proceedings for the complete adjudication of every right' which was fairly involved in or dependent upon the issues tendered by the pleadings, even though such relief be inconsistent with the specific relief prayed for. Bailey v. Burton, 8 Wend. (N. Y.) 339; Raper v. Sanders, 21 Grat. (Va.) 60; Franklin v. Greene, 2 Allen (Mass.) 519; Pearsall v. Kingsland, 3 Edw. Ch. (N. Y.) 195;
In the last cited case the court said: “Having once obtained jurisdiction upon issue properly presented, the jurisdiction would be retained and the rights of the parties determined even though the relief ultimately granted should be a mere money judgment.”
At no stage of the proceedings was there any motion to transfer the issues, or any o'f them, to the law docket, or to have them, or any of them, set down for trial to a jury or as an issue of law separable from the issues of an equitable nature. The court did not therefore exceed its authority in assuming jurisdiction to make complete and final adjudication of the rights of the parties, both legal and equitable, so far as they were involved in the contracts in' suit.
Now rescission has a well-defined meaning in law, and includes the idea of restoration of both -parties to their status quo and the return by each to the other of the consideration given and received. It follows of necessity that if the contract of February 25, 1908, is to be given the strict construction' claimed for it by defendant, he became at once indebted to plaintiff for a return of the $1,500 which he had received upon the purchase so rescinded. The contract of March 1, 1909, construed with the same strict adherence to its literal terms, affords us no help whatever in this respect. It makes no reference of any kind to the contract of purchase or to the terms of the “lease,” so called, of February 25, 1908, nor in any manner refers to prior relations or dealings between the parties.
For tbe reasons stated in tbe foregoing opinion, tbe decree of tbe district court is affirmed.