Reid v. Reid

incorrectly believing protective or- State, any the failed to make

der bound Marriage REID, re the of Daniela concerning explicit any kind the order Petitioner/Appellee, possession deposition. State’s of the REID, Respondent/Appellant. Finally, Randall when it received the entry reciting February 13 minute the No. 1 CA-CV 07-0800. belief that counsel had court’s mistaken its nothing Arizona, assured the that it would Appeals Court of pending upcoming deposition with the the Department C. Division hearing, put State was on notice the the 28, 2009. July Nevertheless, although the confusion. State request February 13 withdrew its for a copy deposition, unfortunately of the sealed

failed the Lennar or Sonoran to alert (we assume) of the failed mistake must to direct the Sheriffs Office to secure the

deposition the pending resolution of misun would

derstanding. better course have been for State to call issue to the legal

attention of the court so that issues arising acquisition State’s

deposition have could been resolved before transcript newspaper. was released to the said, however, being All this our conclusion by remains that the State was not bound protective order.

CONCLUSION not bound Because State was protective acquired deposi- order and tion other through means than the under- lying litigation, protective did order deposition. from disclosing bar the State Therefore, the reasons set forth

above, superior we vacate the court’s order

and direct the court to dismiss Sonoran’s attorney’s

application for fees. CONCURRING: ANN A. SCOTT TIMMER, Judge, Chief and PATRICIA A.

OROZCO, Judge. P.C; Friedeman, Friedeman, By

John John Phoenix, Attorney Petitioner/Appellee. for Angle Warner Hallam Jackson & Forma- By Phoenix, nek Bergstrom, P.L.C. Erik C. Attorneys Respondent/Appellant.

OPINION

WINTHROP, Presiding Judge. (“Father”) 1 Randall appeals Reid denying post-decree court’s order petition modify custody parties’ of the two minor challenges children. He the court’s ruling allowing expert the admission of testi- mony, adequately the court’s failure to set conclusions, forth its and the sufficiency supporting of the evidence court’s decision. evidentiary We affirm the but, ruling, because the court failed to make statutorily findings pursuant mandated (“A.R.S.”) Arizona Revised Statutes section 25-403(B) (2007), custody we vacate the or- der and remand for further record. AND

FACTUAL PROCEDURAL

BACKGROUND ¶2 (“Mother”), Father and Daniela Reid physicians, both were divorced in 2003. Mother lived in Illinois at that time and was legal awarded sole primary physical cus- tody of parties’ children. Father was living in New par- Mexico and was awarded enting time with the children. Mother and the children later moved to Arizona. February 3 In peti- Father filed a tion, seeking in part modify the decree to legal obtain sole of the children. He allegations made regarding numerous Mother, including that she repeatedly had time, interfered parenting with his failed to needs, address the counseling children’s ne- glected care, inap- children’s dental propriately prescribed medication to the old- est child.

¶4 court ordered a evaluation, and, evaluation, part as calling testify Dr. about Stahl was conducted would be neuropsychiatric examination subsequently filed child, diag- evaluation. In the been who has since of the oldest hearing, at the joint pretrial statement and Syndrome. After the Asperger’s nosed with evaluation, late disclosure objected to Dr. Stahl’s received the the substance of calling and the failure to disclose would be Mother that she disclose^ had not Ph.D., testimony. Mother conceded she Stahl, critique the evaluation. his Philip to Dr. until after she received untimely and disclosed Stahl objected to the incom- Father Stahl, she had not custody evaluation and that but the court the plete disclosure of Dr. opinions, but the substance objection and allowed Dr. Stahl disclosed overruled the attorney had notified Father’s evidentiary argued the she testify telephone via at to deposition on available for that Dr. Stahl was hearing. hearing. The dates before the two different ¶ one-day evidentiary hearing, After a 5 testify, allowed Dr. Stahl to con- trial court would retain sole the court ruled that Mother evidence would allow cluding the additional primary physical legal and court to make a more informed decision. other The court did enter various children. concerns, “ includ- to address Father’s orders ¶ ‘The trial court has broad discre 8 ordering parenting Father’s time be ing that ruling discovery and disclosure tion in increased, immediately the old- enter Mother matters,’ ruling we will not disturb its and therapy, and Mother not medicate er child in Link v. absent an abuse of discretion.” ap- doctor’s the older child without another ¶ 336, 338, 3, County, Ariz. 972 Pima 193 proval. timely appealed, and we have 669, (App.1998) (quoting Rosner v. P.2d 671 jurisdiction appeal pursuant to over his Diamonds, Inc., 431, 434, Ariz. Denim & 188 12-2101(0) (2003). § A.R.S. (App.1996)). 937 356 ¶ Gama, argues Hays that 205 9 Mother ANALYSIS (2003), supports Ariz. 67 P.3d 695 argues that 6 Father decision, agree. Hays family court’s and we allowing in Dr. Stahl to abused its discretion custody dispute in a mother was a which adequately testify, set the court failed directing ther- disobeyed a court order which pursuant findings and conclusions forth its daughter apist her would see. Id. at 25-403(B),1 § and the evidence does ¶¶ sanction, 5-6, 67 P.3d at 696. As a support the decision. We review court’s family court excluded the child’s unautho- custody decision for an the court’s child therapist testifying and ordered rized Marriage abuse of discretion. See In re therapist’s not be clinical records Diezsi, 524, 526, 3, used or relied on form the basis (App.2002). 1191 ¶¶ 9-10, expert’s opinion. other Id. P.3d at 697. Our court held that Testimony I. Dr. Stahl’s by imposing con- court had erred family tempt direct and in- 7 Father asserts that sanctions excluded allowing Dr. evidence derived from the child’s ther- court abused its discretion direct 104, 23, testify apist. did not time Id. at 67 P.3d at 700. Such Stahl to because Mother sanction, reasoned, August the court is inconsistent ly disclose this witness. On duty compe- days parties received the cus with the trial court’s to hear all eight after the evaluation, days determining a child’s tody eight before the tent evidence offered and making custody deci- evidentiary hearing, disclosed she best interests when Mother may argues explain court failed ther does not how A.R.S. 25-408 1. Father also appears regard- applied and he be to this himself to set forth its conclusions 25-408(1) question viewed as a in A.R.S. whether this case be the factors enumerated (I) (2007). language, relevant factors that "relocation" case. Given the statute's Subsection lists 25-408(1) determining to a a child's we conclude that does not the court must consider is, would “re- case—that in a case such as this—when children best interests a relocation change custody. simply parents locate" virtue of a in which both reside Arizona case Consequently, Fa- parent we do not further consider to relocate out of the custodial wishes 25-408(1). argument regarding § retaining custody of the child. Fa- ther's state while ¶¶ to make the remanding for the court 67 P.3d at 699 Id. at sion. 25-403). Johnson, required under A.R.S. (citing Johnson (1946); P.M.B., re eases, As in the aforementioned 1999)). (Tex.App. S.W.3d inadequate. findings in this case testimony Dr. in this case 10 The Stahl that it was the chil- family court stated compelling much less than the evidence was that Mother retain sole dren’s best interests Nonetheless, Dr. Stahl’s Hays. excluded legal custody residential custo- testimony cannot However, had some relevance. We acknowledges, dy. even Mother as weight placed on Dr. why ascertain the explanation no provided testimony to the court’s limited Stahl’s due arrangement in the children’s best inter- Therefore, findings. gauge we cannot the Additionally, although the court’s or- ests. any, degree, if to which Father was disadvan- der that the court considered all states note, however, testimony. taged by this We 25-403(A), § the factors listed in relevant that Father chose not to seek continuance may language order’s indicates that the court Moreover, depose timing the of Dr. Stahl. evidence as well be- have considered other entirely included, disclosure not Mother’s the findings the court’s but were cause fault, due, part, on but was to the late date to,” Fur- “not limited those listed factors. custody parties which the received the evalu- ther, that the court “did not Mother concedes circumstances, ation. Under these we can- which factors had influenced deci- [its] state say the abused its discretion not court sion,” from the and we cannot ascertain allowing testify. Dr. Stahl to ruling court’s orders and how statutory weighed the factors to arrive at its Adequacy Findings II. Fact of conclusion that Mother should retain sole physical custody. The legal primary ¶ and argues 11 Father next the court’s custody had ulti- court-ordered evaluation findings inadequate satisfy the re- mately that Father become 25-403(B). recommended quirements § In mak- A.R.S. primary parent, and residential substan- determination, the court must presented hearing at the tial evidence was consider the factors enumerated A.R.S. regarding Mother’s and Father’s mental 25-403(A) regarding § in- the children’s best health, and the mental health of the oldest 25-403(B) Further, § terests. A.R.S. re- Nonetheless, cursory child. the court’s find- that, quires a contested “[i]n weighed and ings do not indicate how specific findings the court shall make other relevant evidence to reach the conclu- factors and the record about all relevant custody. should retain sion that Mother reasons for which the decision is the best ¶¶ 420-21, 8-12, Owen, Compare 206 Ariz. at (Emphasis add- child[ren].” interests of the (noting that the trial court 79 P.3d at 669-70 ed.) required the factors set forth is to consider ¶ Diezsi, 12 In this court held that it was determining wheth- in A.R.S. 25-408 when an for the lower court to abuse discretion interests). er relocation is in the child’s best requisite findings pursuant fail to make the explanation further from the trial “Without ¶ Ariz. at P.3d at 25-403. 201 regarding appli- its consideration of the Blackhawk, 1191. See also Owen v. 206 Ariz. factors, say cannot that the trial cable 418, 421-22, 12, (App. 79 P.3d 670-71 focus too much attention on court did not 2003) (holding that the court abused to the exclusion of other relevant [one factor] changing resi its discretion at considerations.” Id. at 79 P.3d parent altering parenting dential 670. making time schedule without Smith, Citing on the record in contested 200 Ariz. Banales (review statute, (App.2001) brought under the relocation 26 P.3d 1190 denied case 8, 2002), 25-408); Scheffler, 206 Jan. Mother contends Downs 496, 501, 19, appeal by failing (App. waived this issue on to raise Ariz. 2003) proceedings. In Ba- (holding superior it in the that the lower court’s nales, legal the lower court awarded sole were insufficient as a matter of law and that, physical custody general proposition to the mother after consid- when a ering making numerous detailed fails to raise an issue before the trial 25-403(A) but one of the see, all various appeal, e.g., the issue is waived on Tran ¶¶ 419-20, 3-5, 26 P.3d at factors. Id. tor, 300-01, 658-59, 179 Ariz. at 878 P.2d at appeal, argued 1190-91. On the father prog we observe that neither Trantor nor its this omission constituted an abuse of the eny has created an unalterable rule of waiv ¶¶ court’s discretion. Id. at 3^1 er. (qualifying See id. at 878 P.2d at 658 that, circumstances, extraordinary “absent 15 This court noted that the father had errors not raised in the trial court cannot be failed to raise this in motion for omission added)); appeal” (emphasis raised on objection new trial or in In re other or motion court, and, 2006-000023, relying 246, 249, 11, filed before trial on MH Fredrikson, 300-01, Trantor v. (App.2007) (concluding (1994), 658-59 we held that that, stake, given liberty interests at an appeal.2 father had waived the issue on Ba- involuntary presents treatment case one of ¶¶ nales, 26 P.3d at extraordinary circumstances which an 1191. further reasoned that the record We presented error to the trial court be indicated the had raised omitted presented appel in the first instance to the court, factor before the trial which demon- court). City late Tempe See also v. Flem relevant, strated that it knew the factor was 454, 456, ing, 1, 168 Ariz. (App. 815 P.2d 3 and the court’s numerous other detailed find- 1991) (recognizing that the waiver rule “is ings entry in its minute showed “the court procedural, jurisdictional, not and we every attempt comply § made to with 25-403 (citations suspend it in our discretion” omit in considering the best [the interests of ted)). ¶ 7. opined child].” Id. at therefore that We 564, 565, Richey, 17 In State v. 160 Ariz. express the trial court’s failure to make an 1354, (1989), 774 P.2d supreme 1355 our finding regarding single that factor could that, court held although not statu- simple have been a oversight that could easi- torily, specific findings of fact and ly have conclu- been corrected if the father had sions of law must be made a raised the issue below. Id. at trial court 8. We also awarding attorneys’ possibility §§ observed that “[t]he that the court fees under A.R.S. 12- 341.01(C) 12-349, did not consider provide this factor or that an ex- and which for an press finding attorneys’ on the factor would award have fees as sanctions. In changed the Trantor, result here seems remote.” Id. supreme our addressed ¶at 7. party’s whether a object failure to in the trial court to the findings required absence of the ¶ 16 We find the facts this case distin- by Richey prevented party raising a from guishable from those in Banales. In this 299, appeal. issue on 179 Ariz. at 878 P.2d at court’s failure to make de- supreme 657. The court determined that the findings tailed as to the reasons for its deci- findings of fact and conclusions of law made sion was more oversight than the mere of a obligatory Richey under were not so funda- single substantially factor. Had the court mentally required preclude waiver, 25-403(A) as to and complied § with AR.S. consid- ultimately ering making “conclude[d] failure of a and on all but one of party object factors, to to Banales, the lack of requisite of fact as it did in and conclusions of position making would be in a much law awards of better to deter- 12-341.01(0) properly mine whether fees under weighed or precludes necessary considered the 12-349 raising factors de- termining the best interests of the children. the absence of findings appeal.” as error on Further, although 301, quarrel we have no with Id. at 878 P.2d at 659. The court rea- of Pownall, Marriage 2. This court object also cited In re osition that a failure to to a trial court's 577, 583, ¶ 27, (App. 197 Ariz. 5 P.3d 917 argu- lack of constitutes a waiver of that 2000) Trantor), (citing and Callanan v. Sun Lakes Banales, appeal. ment on See 200 Ariz. at 1, Inc., Homeowners’ Ass’n No. 134 Ariz. 6,¶ 26 P.3d at 1191. (App.1982), prop- 626 for the

209 opposing soned that coun- the trial court and about all relevant factors and the court’s opportunity only sel should be afforded the reasoning appellant exists not to aid an they correct asserted defects before are reviewing and the but also for a more rejected raised on the rationale of compelling aiding reason —that of all promoting appellate review as basis for determining and the the best 300-01, declining find a waiver. Id. 878 interests of the child or children both cur- rationale, rejecting P.2d at In 658-59. rently generally and in the future. See that, “[although our court noted Downs, 499, 7, 206 Ariz. at P.3d at 778 80 findings of fact and conclusions of law are (“Arizona’s public policy in- makes the best review, certainly helpful they appellate terests of the child the consideration go to the foundation of the case or de- awarding custody.” (citing Hays, child 205 prive party hearing.” aof fair Id. 698)). 102, 18, Ariz. at 67 P.3d at See also 257, 262, Woodford, 320 Banales, applied Clifford 18 this court (1957) P.2d (stating that the child’s analysis presumptive without rule of “primary best interest is the consideration” espoused in Trantor 25-403. waiver court); “pole and the star” for the In re Banales, 420, 6, See 26 P.3d at Gove, Marriage (“Although none of these cases [includ (“In (App.1977) case findings required ] Trantor involves the primary duty safeguard of the court is to by § reasoning we believe their the best holdings interests and welfare of the chil- equally applicable con text.”). Clifford)); Banales, (citing dren.” recognized As this court Hoffman Hoff- man, Ariz.App. explicitly requires 25-403 that a trial court specific findings. (citing (refusing See id. the court rule treat- 25-403(B) (stating that “the court shall ing as a confession of error a mother’s failure specific findings make on the record about all answering to file an in brief a child relevant factors and the reasons for which appeal, doing because so would not serve the in decision is the best interests of the justice of ends and would have an adverse child”)). requirement for rationale this children, effect unrepresent- who were simply appellate is not to aid review —a ratio persons ed but were the in most interested rejected by nale as insufficient our proceedings). provide Trantor —but also ¶ Although agree we that Father should family necessary court with a “baseline” have raised this issue before the lower against any peti which to measure future doing provided so would have that court by party “changed tions either based on cir simpler, expedient with a opportunity more Canty Canty, cumstances.” See remedy perhaps its lack of (“To (App.1994) 874 P.2d decision, reconsider its we also conclude that order, change a previous custody mechanically applying principles waiver must determine whether there been a has setting this and in similarly postured cases change affecting material in circumstances involving mandatory statutory findings of (citing Pridgeon the welfare of the child.” inappropriately 25-403 would de- Court, Superior 655 P.2d prive family parties court and all of the (1982))); Anderson, see also Anderson v. baseline required peti- information for future 14 Ariz.App. involving tions or child’s children’s best (“It is axiomatic Arizona law that the interests. trial continuing divorce eases retains

jurisdiction modify or amend the ¶ provisions important 20. Because the relating most is to minor children. Also custody disputes sue in proposition well established is the best is the that a interests children, prerequisite of the child or showing to modification is a of and neither Trantor changed progeny nor affecting the its has created an circumstances welfare unalterable children.”). words, instances, mandating In other rule waiver in 25- all we 403(B)’s statutory requirement that the fami decline to the waiver rule enunciated in ly specific findings court make adopted on record Trantor and in- Banales portions cites of the record for each fact by manner advocated Mother. The ther

flexible Further, error as a he discusses later his brief. in this case was lack Diezsi, law, brief contains Mother concedes Father’s matter of see in the deprived this relevant facts with record citations which argument meaningful opportunity to section of his brief. court of a assess finding, interests court’s best assuming 24 Even that Father’s limited Father did not waive this issue this precisely opening brief does not adhere by failing it below. circumstance to raise We 13(a)(4), the tenets of Rule the order which vacate the court’s order and therefore appear the factual citations in his brief remand the matter for that court’s reconsid- not have resulted in should additional eration and for the court to make attorney. by Consequently, effort Mother’s supporting its decision as AR.S. deny request Mother’s for sanctions on 25-403(B).3 remanding we are Because basis. for reconsideration and to allow the court to appropriate findings, not and we need Attorneys’Fees Appeal IV. on not reach the whether the issue decision supported parties request the evidence.4 25 Both an award of attorneys’ fees on based on A.R.S. Request III. Mother’s Sanctions (Supp.2008). parties § 25-324 Neither of the position ap has taken an unreasonable brief, answering argues 21 In her Mother peal, appear equally and both to have opening that Father’s brief fails to include a adequate pay financial resources to their re 13(a)(4) pursuant statement of to Rule facts spective attorneys’ Accordingly, each fees. Appellate of the Arizona Rules of Civil Pro- shall bear or her own cedure, and she asks this court to sanction appeal. fees on by awarding part her all or attorney in preparing fees her incurred

statement facts. CONCLUSION 13(a)(4) appel- 22 Rule states affirm the We court’s decision lant’s brief shall set forth statement of “[a] testify to allow Dr. Stahl to at the presented facts relevant to the issues for However, hearing. vacate we the court’s review, appropriate with references to the custody order and remand the of child issue provides record.” rule further custody to the court for reconsideration with may statement of facts be “[t]he combined specific findings instructions to make with the statement of the case.” ARCAP 25-403(B). pursuant record to A.R.S. 13(a)(4). Additionally, we note that Rule remanding express opinion this we no 13(a)(6) provides argument for an section in deny as to the merits. We also Mother’s opening “parts brief that contains request party pay Each sanctions. shall “may record relied on” and include a sum- his or her own fees. mary.” ease, provided 23 In this a state- IRVINE, CONCURRING: PATRICK containing ment of the case citations to the Judge.

record, and the statement of facts section of HALL, Judge, dissenting. opening clearly brief states that the rele- applicable are majority’s vant facts set forth 27 The determination that the Indeed, discussing the explicated sections issues. Fa- waiver rule as not Trantor does notes, 3. As the dissent these both 4. The dissent contends that our will decision well-funded, they encourage litigant likely and the record is clear that a who loses or is to lose Thus, shy away litigation. intentionally request- not from we find it the lower court to avoid unlikely any ing pro- findings decision of this court will an order to secure "inevitable litigation appeal. argument vide an ultimate resolution to their reversal" on This overlooks finality ability request result that both the dissent and the the fact that both sides have the to majority agree necessary findings is desirable. from that court. Rather, custody hearings appeal. impor- to modification has on I believe that the delaying certainty the unfortunate effect of tance of such is all the more reason stability it where is most needed and why litigant required a should be to first prolonging litigation where is least desir provide the family opportunity court an agree family able. I court did not significant easily correct what is a but cor- adequately comply statutory with re procedural asserting rectable omission before quirement specific that it “make on on that the omission constitutes re- the record about all relevant factors.”5 versible error. 25-403(B). But as the majority’s 29 The determination that Trantor, explained a trial court such errors need not be raised in the opportunity should be afforded an to correct that, typically, they court means will not be. may such an error before it be raised on (at Every litigant represented by if least an appeal: attorney in the as were these Although findings of fact and conclusions parties) who with is dissatisfied the outcome certainly helpful appellate of law are of a child battle knows that there is review, they go do not to the foundation of very little likelihood that a court will deprive party the case or aof fair hear- change its decision when reminded of its ing. If the court has failed to make find- obligation specific findings, to make and few ings them, party and a wants all one has to pursue will if that route to do so do is to make that known in issue the trial Instead, seeking appellate before review. court. The trial court will either make opinion permits litigant this who loses in does, or it will not. If it party simply appeal try the trial court to gets so, what it wants. If it fails to do secure a more favorable outcome before a preserved issue is for review. But fail- judge different when the child deter- all, litigant to act at is not inevitably mination is vacated and the case position complain helpful about how remanded. At a time when the Arizona Su- findings would appeal. have been on preme recently Court has limited the use of 878 P.2d at 658-59. cases, type litigation tactic in criminal majority 28 The reasons that Trantor is Henderson, see State v. distinguishable because the failure of a fami- ¶ 19, (holding that a ly court to specific findings of fact in a object defendant who fails to to trial error type child ease is the of “extraordi- right appellate forfeits his review unless nary circumstance” that excuses a error), he can establish fundamental providing opportunity the court an to correct expand should not its use civil cases. the defect before error be raised on ¶ Moreover, my to the extent that appeal. Although agree I col- majority’s with the leagues imply applicable that Trantor observation that is less “compelling” there are rea- specifically to statutes require findings, sons for a specific court to make the 25-403(B), First, I findings required disagree. by one of the including fees overriding concern with the statutes at issue in Trantor best inter- was A.R.S. 12- child, (2003), disagree ests of the I 349 impor- under which a court adequate findings tance of unjustified child award fees for actions without cases is a reason “set[tingj specific for us to deviate from the forth the reasons for the award,” (2003). jurisprudential sound principle Second, errors 12-350 not raised in the trial court cannot be raised approvingly Bayless Trantor cited Invest- ("The (A)(5) 5. To be fair to the community") it did list the school and mental 25-403(A) involved”). physical factors under A.R.S. that it consid- and Furthermore, health of all individuals ered and did specific so a manner that showed it the court also made some light evaluated findings, including at least some of those always faclors of that Mother has been children, example, the evidence. For caretaker of the that Fa- specifically support mentioned that it considered the ther failed to maintain current child parties' medical payments, condition of one of the children and that Father's claim that the chil- evaluating statutory imperiled by factors listed in sub- dren’s dental health was Mother's (A)(4) ("the home, adjustment neglect sections by child's was not substantiated the evidence. 212 Parra, Guadalupe single a wom Moving Trading v. & Sandra

ment & Co. Bekins Mejia Avila, single 265, Co., and Eulalia a Ariz.App. 547 an Storage 26 woman; Parra, (1976), that a Maria Elisa Pozo as which held P.2d 1070-71 friend for Maria raising for the first mother and next best precluded is Parran, minor, Guadalupe Plain appeal the trial court’s failure Pozo a time on specifically required tiffs/Appellants, findings when Procedure by Arizona Rule of Civil do so 52(a). Ariz. at 878 P.2d at 657. 179 AMER waiver CONTINENTAL TIRE NORTH

Accordingly, perceive I that Trantor’s ICA, INC., corporation; an Ohio Bill vigor much to statutes or applies rule with as Center, Inc., an Alexander Automotive specifically require as rules that corporation, Defendants/Appel imposed by Arizona requirement is does when the Galloway Vanderpool, 205 lees. case law. Cf. P.3d

Ariz. No. 1 08-0556. CA-CV (“Once published, interpretation [of our statute.”); part of the Local statute] becomes Arizona, Appeals of of Court Workers, A.F. L. v. Int’l Bhd. Elec. Department D. Division Project Agric. Improvement and River Salt July 2009. Dist., Ariz. Power (1954) (recognizing that “unreversed statutory part is to be held construction written”). originally

the statute as if so point. my One further Because col- leagues not to Trantor’s waiver choose

rule, they underlying do not reach sub-

stantive issue raised Father: Whether petition family court’s denial of Father’s supported by change in the evi- consequence, dence. As a this issue will pending probable fur- remain unresolved litigants. I ther these well-funded reach this issue and find that the trial would sufficiently sup- court’s order was evidence, ported by bringing this thus parties’ particular chapter litigation in the history to a conclusion. foregoing, respectfully I 32 Based

dissent.

213 P.3d 361 PARRA, surviving Elisa Pozo Maria mother of Maria Fernanda Chavez Pozo surviving daughter of Maria Eli-

and the Morales, sa Parra on her own behalf Reyes, and on behalf of Luis Chavez Pozo; father of Maria Fernanda Chavez

Case Details

Case Name: Reid v. Reid

Court Name: Court of Appeals of Arizona

Date Published: Jul 28, 2009

Citation: 213 P.3d 353

Docket Number: 1 CA-CV 07-0800

Court Abbreviation: Ariz. Ct. App.