This is аn appeal from an order denying appellant’s request for his child-support obligation to be suspended during his incarceration in prison. Appellant argues оn appeal that the chancellor abused his discretion by refusing to abate the payment of support because his imprisonment rendered him incapable of producing income with which to meet his obligation. We find no abuse of discretion and affirm.
When the parties divorced in July of 1995, custody of their two children, ages sixteen and four, was placed with appellee, Theresia Neely Reid. Appellant, Danny Harold Reid, was ordered to make biweekly payments of $200 in child support. On December 4, 1995, appellant was convicted of raping the parties’ sixteen-year-old daughter, and he was sentenced to a term of twenty years in prison. On February 5, 1996, аppellant filed a motion seeking abatement of his child-support obligation, urging his conviction and resulting imprisonment as the sole change in circumstances.
Appellee was the only witness at the hearing. She testified that appellant was a few hours shy of obtaining a bachelor’s degree in engineering and that he was earning $42,000 a year at the time of the divorce. She agreed to a reduction in child support to the minimum family chart amount of $30 a week, but she stated her belief that appеllant should not benefit by being relieved of his duty of paying support as a reward for raping their daughter.
After a brief recess, the chancellor issued his ruling denying appellant’s motion to suspend the payment of child support. The chancellor found that the children’s needs had not diminished and that the position in which appellant found himself was one of his own creation. He thus found no change in circumstances warranting abatement of the obligation. The chancellor further concluded that apрellant should not be allowed to profit from a wrongful act committed against a child for whom he was obliged to pay support. The chancellor also reаsoned that the continuation of the support obligation would not place an undue burden on appellant, given his level of education and earning potеntial. An order was entered incorporating the chancellor’s findings and reducing appellant’s child-support payments to $30 a week. This appeal followеd.
Ordinarily, the amount of child support lies within the sound discretion of the chancellor. Irvin v. Irvin,
Appellant argues on appeal that the chancellor abused his discretion by refusing to abatе his child-support obligation during the period of his incarceration. We are not convinced that the record in this case demonstrates such an abuse. The principle at the core of the chancellor’s ruling was that appellant was not entitled to relief because he had come into court with unclean hands. It has long been recognized that the clean-hands maxim bars relief to those guilty of improper conduct in the matter as to which they seek relief. Equity will not intervene on behalf of a party whose conduct in connection with the same matter has been unconsci-entious or unjust. Wilson v. Brown,
Although there is another school of thought, see e.g. Edmоnds v. Edmonds,
Incarceration is certainly a foreseeable result of criminal activity; wе find no sound reason to relieve one of a child support obligation by virtue of the fact that he or she engaged in criminal conduct. There is no reason thosе who have had to step in and assume the applicant’s obligation should not be reimbursed by the applicant should his future position enable him to do so.
Further, we do not see how the best interests of the children for whom the support was ordered would be served by temporarily terminating the appellant’s child support obligation.
Id. at 618. The court also predicated its holding in part on a decision where it was recognized that, although unemployment or diminution of earnings is a common ground for modification, a petition for modification will be denied if the change in financial condition is due to the fault, voluntary wastage, or dissipation of one’s talents or assеts. The court then reasoned that a child-support obligation should not be modified where the means with which to pay were reduced or eliminated by criminal activity.
In this respect, the opinion in Ohler is consistent with Arkansas law. In Grady v. Grady,
We uphold the decision of the chancellor in this case on the ground of unclean hands. The misconduct which resulted in appellant’s imprisonment was perpetrated agаinst a child for whom appellant owed a duty of support and thus bears a direct connection to the proceeding at hand. We agree that equity will not cоme to the aid of one who of his or her own volition engages in criminal behavior and suffers the consequences which affect the ability to pay child support. Moreover, the needs of the children have remained unchanged, and, as between appellant and his children, the interest of the children must prevail. We can think of no reason how their best interests are served by depriving them of support or why appellee should be left to shoulder the burden alone when there remains the рossibility that the appellant can make recompense in the future.
We also cannot disagree with the chancellor’s conclusion that appellаnt failed to meet his burden of showing a change in circumstances to justify abatement of the obligation. A chancellor’s finding as to whether there are sufficient changed circumstances to warrant a change in child support is a finding of fact, and this finding will not be reversed unless it is clearly erroneous. Schwarz v. Moody,
Finding no error in the chancellor’s decision, we affirm.
Affirmed.