188 Pa. Super. 130 | Pa. Super. Ct. | 1958
Opinion by
A petition was filed in the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County by G. Ralph Reichard and Mildred G. Reichard, his wife, for an award of a portion of the proceeds from the sale of certain abandoned school property under the provisions of section 3 of the Act of July 2, 1937, P. L. 2793, 53 PS §1173. On the pleadings and after argument the court below concluded that the petitioners had failed to disclose any interest in the school property and dismissed the petition. The petitioners have appealed.
On September 23, 1893, Adam and Mary Ryder, husband and wife, conveyed to the School Directors of Quincy Township, Franklin County, a parcel of one hundred thirty perches out of a tract of one hundred twenty-five acres of land, reserving to themselves, their heirs and assigns, a reversionary interest in the event that the ground be abandoned for school purposes. Since 1893 the land had passed through successive public school administrations into the ownership of the Board of School Directors of the Quincy Merged School District. On February 1, 1951, the board, acting under section 2 of the Act of 1937, 53 PS §1172, acquired a fee simple title in the real estate. In August of 1955
The petitioners apparently claim to own approximately ninety-nine acres and sixty perches of the original Ryder tract of one hundred twenty-five acres, which they acquired from successors in title of Adam and Mary Ryder. The balance of the original tract is owned in various parcels by numerous other individuals. The land of the petitioners does not abut on, and is not contiguous to, the school property.
A reversionary interest such as the Ryders retained is not subject to the rule against perpetuities and may be inherited, conveyed, or released. London v. Kingsley, 368 Pa. 109, 116, 81 A. 2d 870; Graybill v. Manheim Central School District, 175 Pa. Superior Ct. 415, 419, 106 A. 2d 629.
The petitioners claim as assignees of the successors in title of Adam and Mary Ryder. It appears that Mary Ryder, who acquired the one hundred twenty-five acre tract in March of 1893, died, intestate, seized of the one hundred twenty-five acre tract less the school lot and several other small parcels totaling approximately twenty-one acres. On March 18, 1902, the heirs of Mary Ryder conveyed eighty-nine acres and one hundred fifteen perches, more or less, to Susan Prey. On April 13, 1913, Susan Prey conveyed that property together with other lands to Harry P. Spangler. On January 17, 1925, Harry P. Spangler made a conveyance to himself and his wife through a straw transaction. Harry P. Spangler died on December 25, 194.4, and on March 31, 1952, his widow, Jennie Spang
Neither the deed conveying the premises to petitioners nor the deeds of any of their predecessors in title specifically mention any reversionary interest in the school lot. However, petitioners contend that the reversionary interest passed to them through the chain of title. They argue that when Mary Ryder died her interest in the reversion passed to her heirs; that the heirs conveyed a portion of the reversionary interest by the appurtenance clause of the deed conveying the tract of eighty-nine acres and one hundred fifteen perches, more or less, to Susan Frey; and that Susan Frey, Harry P. Spangler, and Jennie Spangler each, in turn, conveyed the reversionary interest by their respective deeds by reason of section 2 of the Act of April 1, 1909, P. L. 91, as amended by the Act of April 30, 1925, P. L. 404, 21 PS §3.
It would appear that when Mary Ryder died intestate the reversionary interest which she had in the school lot passed to her heirs. We are unable to agree with petitioners, however, that the deed from the heirs of Mary Ryder to Susan Frey and the subsequent deeds transferred that reversionary interest through the title to petitioners. The deed from the heirs of Mary Ryder to Susan Frey conveyed eighty-nine acres and one hundred fifteen perches of the original one hundred and twenty-five acre tract. The appurtenance clause in the deed provided: “Together with all and singular the tenements, hereditaments and appurtenances to the same belonging, or in anywise appertaining, and the reversion and reversions, remainder and remainders, rents, issues and profits thereof, and also all the estate, right, title, interest, property, claim and demand whatsoever, both in law and equity, of the said parties of the first part, of, in, to or out of the said
The deed from Susan Frey to Harry P. Spangler, the deed from Harry P. Spangler through the straw party to himself and his Avife as tenants by the entire-ties, and the deed from the widoAV, Jennie Spangler, to petitioners were statutory form deeds in accordance Avith the Act of 1909, 21 PS §1. Petitioners contend that section 2 of the Act of 1909, as amended, 21 PS
We think it follows that the reversionary interest in the school lot was not a part of the property conveyed by the deed from the heirs of Mary Ryder to Susan Frey and the deeds subsequent thereto.
Two cases strongly relied upon by petitioners are not applicable. In London v. Kingsley, supra, 368 Pa. 109, 113-116, 81 A. 2d 870, a clause similar to that appearing in the deed from the heirs of Mary Ryder to Susan Frey was held to convey a reversionary interest which the grantor had retained in the same property which he conveyed to the grantees; the reversion
We recognize that the primary object in the interpretation of any written instrument is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the parties. Hess v. Jones, 335 Pa. 569, 572, 7 A. 2d 299. It is also true that in construing a deed it is the plain meaning of the words that controls, and not what the parties may have intended by the language used. Hardes v. Penn Charcoal and Chemical Company, supra, 175 Pa. Superior Ct. 431, 436, 107 A. 2d 176. The language in the deed from the heirs of Mary Ryder to Susan Prey could only mean that the tract of eighty-nine acres and one hundred fifteen perches and all of the grantors’ interest in that land were conveyed.
The order of the court below is affirmed.