Linda REHM and Russell Rehm, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Eldon LENZ and West River Mental Health Center, a/k/a Behavior Management Systems, Defendants and Appellees.
Nos. 19201, 19272
Supreme Court of South Dakota.
Decided May 8, 1996.
548 N.W.2d 560 | 1996 SD 51
Considered on Briefs Jan. 11, 1996.
- Failure to obey orders, rules or instructions, or failure to discharge the duties for which an individual was employed; or
- Substantial disregard of the employer‘s interests or of the employee‘s duties and obligations to his employer; or
- Conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer‘s interests as is found in deliberate violations or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of his employee; or
- Carelessness or negligence of such degree or recurrence as to manifest equal culpability or wrongful intent.
However, mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure to perform as the result of inability or incapacity, a good faith error in judgment or discretion, or conduct mandated by a religious belief which belief cannot be reasonably accommodated by the employer is not misconduct.
[¶ 14] Unemployment benefits are designed to relieve economic insecurity resulting from the loss of one‘s job, consequently unemployment statutes are liberally construed in favor of the claimant. In re Kotrba, 418 N.W.2d 313, 315 (S.D. 1988); Red Bird v. Meierhenry, 314 N.W.2d 95, 96 (S.D. 1982). In this appeal, the propriety of Gateway‘s decision to discharge its employees is not an issue; we only consider whether the employees’ actions form misconduct under the statute. In re White, 339 N.W.2d 306, 307 (S.D. 1983).
[¶ 15] Gateway argues its financial interests were “completely disregarded” because telephone lines otherwise available for customer calls were appropriated to listen to music and it cost nine cents a minute for use of the 800 number. Abild‘s actions cost Gateway $8.55 ($.09/minute x 95 minutes) and $8.44 ($.09/minute x 93.8 minutes) for Connelly. “[M]ere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, ... good faith error in judgment or discretion ... is not misconduct.”
[¶ 16] Finally, Gateway argues it had no duty to forewarn its employees that conduct inimical to the employer‘s benefit will result in discharge; therefore, the Department‘s finding that Abild and Connelly did not make the 800 number calls to enhance their phone statistics is immaterial to a legal determination of misconduct. Gateway cites Kienast, 371 N.W.2d at 341, for this principle. Kienast is distinguishable because there the employee was specifically told to perform a task and she failed to do it. Id. at 340-41. We rejected the employee‘s argument that she should have been forewarned her failure to perform the task would result in discharge. Id. at 341. Here the employees never argued an absence of forewarning, only that the employer failed to adequately inform them of its telephone policy. Unknowingly violating policy classifies more as a “good faith error in judgment” than “misconduct” under
[¶ 17] Affirmed.
[¶ 18] MILLER, C.J., and SABERS, AMUNDSON and GILBERTSON, JJ., concur.
Robert L. Lewis of Costello, Porter, Hill, Heisterkamp & Bushnell, Rapid City, for defendant and appellee Eldon Lenz.
J. Crisman Palmer and Talbot J. Wieczorek of Gunderson, Palmer, Goodsell & Nelson, Rapid City, for defendant and appellee West River Mental Health Center.
[¶ 1] MILLER, Chief Justice, delivers the majority opinion of the Court on that part of Issue I which applies a six-year statute of limitations to the claims against Lenz and reverses and remands for trial the summary judgment in favor of Lenz, and on Issue II.
[¶ 2] SABERS, Justice, delivers the majority opinion of the Court on that part of Issue I holding that the two-year medical malpractice statute of limitations applies to a psychologist treating depression.
[¶ 4] Linda Rehm and Russell Rehm appeal from an order granting summary judgment to psychologist Eldon Lenz and granting partial summary judgment to his former employer West River Mental Health Center (West River). We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
FACTS
[¶ 5] The facts of this case are nearly identical to those which gave rise to Richards v. Lenz, 539 N.W.2d 80 (S.D. 1995). Both cases involve the claims of a husband and wife who received therapy from Lenz while he worked for West River. The various claims are based on Lenz’ alleged improper handling of the transference phenomenon1 in therapy sessions and the development of a romantic relationship between Lenz and the client wife. The facts of this case are so strikingly similar to those in Richards that only a summary is necessary here.
[¶ 6] After being hospitalized for depression, Linda was referred to West River for treatment of her depression. In December, 1986, she began individual counseling at West River and was counseled by Lenz. At this same time, Russell was also counseled individually by Lenz for depression and feelings of guilt. During her therapy, Linda experienced the transference phenomenon, viewing Lenz as her father. Lenz allegedly responded by introducing a sexual overtone to Linda‘s therapy and developing a romantic (and at times physical) relationship with her. As in the Richards case, Lenz conducted these therapy sessions both at his home and at West River‘s office.
[¶ 7] After Lenz left West River in September, 1988, he worked privately as a psychologist. He continued to counsel Linda at his private office and at his home. In 1990, Lenz moved to Indiana. Linda continued to seek out Lenz’ professional help and romantic indulgences. She also returned to West River for counseling. In March, 1991, Lenz sent a letter to Linda stating that “there never has been and never will be a romantic relationship between them.” On December 31, 1991, Linda and Lenz met for a “closure” session arranged by Linda‘s then-current therapist at West River, Ms. Karin Wood. Although Russell ended his therapy sessions at West River in 1989, Linda continued to seek counseling at West River until 1993.
[¶ 8] In October and November, 1993, Rehms served Lenz and West River with a complaint containing the following claims:
- negligence against Lenz and West River;
- negligence against West River;
- breach of fiduciary duty against Lenz and West River;
- negligence against West River;
- fraud and deceit against Lenz and West River;
- alienation of affections against Lenz;
- breach of contract against Lenz and West River; and
- willful and wanton conduct (punitive damages) against Lenz and West River.
Although similar, the Richards complaint also included a claim for medical malpractice, which Rehms’ does not. In addition, the Rehms’ complaint added claims based on alienation of affections or willful and wanton conduct (punitive damages), which were not included in the Richards complaint.2 The trial court granted Lenz’ motion for summary judgment, dismissing the entire complaint against him on the basis that it had
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[¶ 9] This case involves a challenge to the summary judgments awarded in favor of Lenz and West River. As such, the standard of review applicable to both issues is the same as enunciated in Richards:
The party moving for summary judgment has the burden to show that [t]here is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The evidence, including all pleadings, affidavits and deposition testimony, must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and reasonable doubts should be resolved against the moving party. All reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts must be accepted in favor of the non-moving party. Summary judgment is a drastic remedy, and should not be granted unless the moving party has established the right to a judgment with such clarity as to leave no room for controversy.
539 N.W.2d at 83 (quotation and citations omitted). It is against this standard that we evaluate the merits of this appeal.
ISSUES
[¶ 10] I. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment dismissing the Rehms’ claims against psychologist Lenz.
[¶ 11] The Rehms argue that the trial court should not have applied the medical malpractice statute of limitation. They also contend there are factual disputes remaining as to when the counselor/patient relationship with Lenz ended and whether his acts were continuing torts which would alter application of the statute of limitation. We conclude that the applicable limitation period is a 6-year period, within which the Rehms did file their claim. Thus, Lenz was not entitled to summary judgment.
[¶ 12] As in Richards, the trial court3 reasoned that the complaint essentially alleges medical malpractice and applied the 2-year statute of limitation for malpractice claims against practitioners of the healing arts to bar suit against Lenz. See
[¶ 13] In Richards, we rejected this result based on our conclusion that a psychologist providing marriage counseling is not a practitioner of the healing arts, as defined by
Under the facts presented in this case, negligent marriage counseling is not medical malpractice within the language of
SDCL 15-2-14.1 . We hold that the trial court erred in holding that the two-year statute of limitations provided inSDCL 15-2-14.1 is an affirmative defense to the Richards’ amended complaints.
539 N.W.2d at 84. Thus, we concluded that the Richards’ claim was not a medical malpractice claim.
[¶ 14] In this case, none of the parties have argued that a separate analysis should apply to a psychologist when he or she is counseling a person for symptoms of depression rather than for distress caused by
[¶ 15] In abiding by our decision in Richards, we must determine what is the applicable limitations period. As in Richards, the Rehms’ allegations are based on negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud and deception, and breach of contract, and they have also added claims for alienation of affections and punitive damages. The limitations periods applicable to these several claims range from a three-year statute of limitations for the negligence claims,
[¶ 16] When assessing a complaint which alleges claims involving various limitation periods, it is necessary to apply the nature of the allegations test to determine which period applies.
[I]n South Dakota, when one of two statutes of limitations may be applicable, such application should always be tested by the nature of the allegations in the complaint, and if there is any doubt as to which statute applies, such doubt should be resolved in favor of the longer limitation period.
Richards, 539 N.W.2d at 85 (quoting Morgan v. Baldwin, 450 N.W.2d 783, 786 (S.D. 1990)). In Richards, we evaluated the plaintiffs’ claims which are virtually identical to those here. Our conclusion in that case is equally applicable here:
It thus appears that the Richards’ claims of negligence, fraud, and breach of contract are all interwoven as allegations of the defendants’ wrongful conduct. The Richards’ separate complaints state a single wrong for which there can be only one recovery, although the allegations in the complaints purport to state several distinct causes of action arising from negligence, fraud or misrepresentation, or breach of contract. The Richards’ claims arise out of their agreement with [West River] to provide marriage counseling and [West River‘s] action in assigning Lenz to provide such counseling service to the Richards. The allegations in the complaints lead to the conclusion that the gravamen of the complaints is as much based in contract as it would be in negligence or fraud.
[¶ 17] Similarly, Rehms’ claims are grounded in tort, fraud, and contract, leaving doubt as to which limitations period applies. Since such doubt exists, it must be resolved in favor of the longer six-year period governing claims of fraud and breach of contract. 539 N.W.2d at 86. Consequently, it was error for the trial court to have ruled that the two-year limitation period applicable to medical malpractice barred the Rehms’ claims
[¶ 18] II. The trial court did not err in granting partial summary judgment in favor of West River on the basis that the three-year statute of limitation for negligence had expired on the Rehms’ claims against West River for negligent hiring and supervision of Lenz.
[¶ 19] As their second issue, Rehms assert the trial court erred as a matter of law when it concluded that the three-year limitations period on two of their negligence claims against West River began in September, 1988, when Lenz left the employment of West River. They argue that West River‘s liability for Lenz’ misconduct continued even after he left their employment. In contrast, West River argues alternatively that these claims are governed by the two-year limitations period for medical malpractice claims, that the time period began when Lenz was no longer employed by West River, and that Rehms were aware of their potential claims and are not entitled to any extension of the limitation period based on fraudulent concealment.
[¶ 20] Count I of the complaint alleges negligence by West River under a respondeat superior theory, and Count II alleges negligent hiring, supervision, and retention of Lenz. In its memorandum decision, the trial court stated the rationale for its decision that these two claims were barred: “The facts are clear that Lenz left the employ of West River in September 1988. Plaintiffs fail to provide any authority or argument that the statute of limitations did not expire in September 1991. The continuing treatment rule has no application here.”
[¶ 21] Initially, it should be acknowledged that employers can be held responsible for the negligent acts of their employees under a respondeat superior theory, and that negligent hiring and supervision of an employee may also give rise to liability. See Nelson v. Nelson Cattle Co., 513 N.W.2d 900 (S.D. 1994) (negligent supervision); Bass v. Happy Rest, Inc., 507 N.W.2d 317 (S.D. 1993) (respondeat superior). Here, Counts I and II sound in negligence based on the employment relationship between West River and Lenz.5 The claims based on respondeat superior and failure to exercise care in hiring, supervising, and retaining Lenz are plainly based on negligence, to which the longer three-year limitation period applies.
[¶ 22] However, the focus of the dispute on this issue is when the three-year limitation period began to run. West River contends, and the trial court agreed, that it started when Lenz left the employment of West River in September, 1988 and expired three years later in September, 1991. On the other hand, Rehms contend that the period did not begin until a) August, 1993 when Linda stopped going to West River, or b) December 31, 1991, when Linda had her closure session with Lenz, or c) September, 1988, in which case the time period was tolled by West River‘s fraudulent concealment of Lenz’ wrongful conduct both at the time it employed Lenz and throughout the duration of counseling provided to Linda through 1993.6
[¶ 23] In calculating the limitation period, we have steadfastly adhered to the occurrence rule, which requires that the statute of limitations begins from the time when the wrongful act occurred, not when it was discovered by the plaintiff. Shippen v. Parrott, 506 N.W.2d 82 (S.D. 1993). The only excep-
[¶ 24] Count I and II involve West River‘s conduct only as it relates to its employment of Lenz, and it is logical that we limit that responsibility to the time during which West River employed Lenz, as did the trial court. The claim made in Count II is that West River was negligent in hiring, supervising, and retaining Lenz. Any claim of negligence in this respect cannot survive beyond the point in time when West River no longer employed Lenz. It is illogical to contend West River negligently supervised or retained Lenz after Lenz left its employment; once Lenz left West River had no right to supervise or direct Lenz. Surely, West River could not be liable for negligent retention of Lenz once it no longer retained him.
[¶ 25] As to the claim in Count I that West River is liable for Lenz’ improper counseling based on respondeat superior, it is likewise logical to limit that liability to the period of time in which West River was, in fact, Lenz’ superior. However, Rehms would have us extend West River‘s liability for Lenz’ wrongful acts beyond the time during which he was employed by West River because it provided him the opportunity for contact with Linda and Russell and because it employed him while he embarked on his course of wrongful conduct. They point to a New Hampshire case which held that a school district could be held liable for sexual improprieties of its teachers with students even after the students had graduated or when the conduct occurred outside of school. Marquay v. Eno, 139 N.H. 708, 662 A.2d 272 (1995). Even were it binding authority, that case does not apply to the facts here, as West River points out. Marquay held the school district employer liable for the sexual misconduct of teachers which it continued to employ; its employees had not left their jobs as did Lenz.
[¶ 26] While we did not have an opportunity to reach this issue in Richards, we will not extend current law to permit the limitation period to continue almost indefinitely in suits against an employer based on the wrongful acts of an employee. Linda‘s contention that the period did not begin until she terminated counseling with West River in 1993 is untenable. Under that logic, if she had never stopped counseling with West River, it could be liable for Lenz’ actions into the next millennium. Calculation of the three-year statute of limitations from the date that Lenz left West River provides certainty to both plaintiffs and defendants. The trial court properly applied the three-year limitations period as starting when the employer-employee relationship was terminated in September, 1988, and expiring in September, 1991.
[¶ 27] Finally, Rehms contend that even if the trial court applied the proper limitations period, a disputed factual issue remains as to when West River‘s breach of its duties to Linda and Russell ended. However, the limitation period for an employer‘s liability for acts of its employee and for negligent hiring, supervision, and retention commences when the employment relationship terminates. Thus, the only material fact is the date the employer-employee relationship ended. Here, it is undisputed that Lenz left West River in September, 1988. Thus, it was proper for the trial court to grant summary judgment based on the expiration of the three-year statute of limitation for negligence because Lenz left West River in September, 1988 and Rehms did not commence this action against them before September, 1991.
[¶ 28] We reverse and remand the summary judgment dismissing the claims against Lenz, and affirm the partial summary judg-
[¶ 29] AMUNDSON, J., concurs.
[¶ 30] DOBBERPUHL, Circuit Judge, concurs in part and concurs in result on Issue I, and concurs on Issue II.
[¶ 31] SABERS, J., dissents on Issue I and concurs in result on Issue II.
[¶ 32] GILBERTSON, J., dissents on Issue I, and concurs on Issue II.
[¶ 33] DOBBERPUHL, Circuit Judge, for KONENKAMP, J., disqualified.
[¶ 34] SABERS, Justice, writing the majority opinion on that part of Issue I holding that the two-year medical malpractice statute of limitations applies to a psychologist treating depression, and concurring in result on Issue II.
[¶ 35] The trial court was correct in holding that the two-year statute of limitations governed the causes of action whether based on contract or tort. The majority reverses on the basis that the Rehms “did not couch their allegations in terms of medical malpractice (although [the majority concedes] they do refer to professional malpractice).” This distinction without a difference misses the point because South Dakota law provides a two-year statute of limitation for “[a]n action against a ... practitioner of the healing arts for malpractice, error, mistake or failure to cure, whether based upon contract or tort.”
[¶ 36] In my dissent in Richards v. Lenz, 539 N.W.2d 80, 86 (S.D. 1995), I stated:
The trial court was correct that Lenz, a psychologist, is a practitioner of the healing arts under the facts of this case because the Richards were seeking treatment for a “human disease, ailment, ... injury, unhealthy or abnormal physical or mental condition.”
SDCL 36-2-1(3) . They had an “unhealthy mental condition” and they were seeking marriage counseling from a practitioner of the healing arts. We do not need to “expand the language of the statute beyond its plain language,” we simply need to read and interpret it plainly.
[¶ 37] The Richards majority answered the narrow question, “whether a psychologist providing marriage counseling is a practitioner of the healing arts.” Richards, 539 N.W.2d at 84.
[A]ny system, treatment, operation, diagnosis, prescription, or practice for the ascertainment, cure, relief, palliation, adjustment, or practice for the ascertainment, cure, relief, palliation, adjustment, or correction of any human disease, ailment, deformity, injury, unhealthy or abnormal physical or mental condition[.]
If we give effect to Richards at all, we should limit it to its facts; a psychologist providing marriage counseling might not be a practitioner of the healing arts. However, Rehms were seeking treatment for an “unhealthy ... mental condition.”
[¶ 38] The Richards majority stated the legislature could have included psychologists in its list of specified medical practitioners if it intended to include them in the medical malpractice statute of limitation,
[¶ 40] In Judge Dobberpuhl‘s special writing, he asks: “Do intentional acts which are not undertaken for the treatment of a mental condition constitute malpractice?” I say the answer is that it does not make any difference because
[¶ 41] As indicated above, one should not be able to defeat the intent of the Legislature simply by language labeling a tort as an intentional act. Nor should we, as an appellate court, be able to convert the plaintiff‘s pleadings from negligence to intentional acts, without their consent. Yet, that is the effect of Judge Dobberpuhl‘s writing and interpretation here. I am sure that insurance companies across the nation, who do not cover intentional acts, will be pleased to be relieved from their obligation to provide coverage.
[¶ 42] On issue 2, I agree that the trial court was correct in granting partial summary judgment in favor of West River. However, the two-year statute (
DOBBERPUHL, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and concurring in result in part on Issue I, and concurring on Issue II.
[¶ 43] This case represents two issues. First, the Court must consider whether a psychologist is a “practitioner of the healing arts.” Second, the Court must determine whether acts undertaken with no professional purpose are within the parameters of malpractice, and are thus subject to the two-year statute of limitations, or whether the alleged acts are outside the parameters of professional relationship.
[¶ 44] ISSUE 1: Is a psychologist a practitioner of the healing arts within the meaning of the statute of limitations covering medical malpractice?
[¶ 45] Our statutes do not define “practitioner of the healing arts.” However, the definitions of “healing art,” “human ill,” “diagnosis,” and “treatment” provide guidance as to the types of maladies which are treated by such practitioners as well as the methods of treatment used by them. Thus, the term “practitioner of the healing arts” can be confined to those persons actively treating such maladies in a manner provided for by the statutes.
[¶ 46]
[A]ny system, treatment, operation, diagnosis, prescription, or practice for the ascertainment, cure, relief, palliation, adjustment, or correction of any human disease, ailment, deformity, injury, unhealthy or abnormal physical or mental condition[.]
(Emphasis added). “Treatment” is defined as “the use of drugs, surgery ... or any other means of any nature whatsoever for the cure, relief, palliation, adjustment or correction of any human ill as defined herein.”
[¶ 47] The chapter governing psychologists provides the Court with a sound statutory basis for determining whether psychologists fall within the parameters of the term “practitioner of the healing arts” as defined above.
[R]endering or offering to render to individuals ... any service involving the application of psychological procedures for the assessment, diagnosis, prevention, treatment or amelioration of psychological problems or emotional or mental and nervous disorders of individuals....7
By definition then, a psychologist acts to diagnose and treat the mental and/or nervous disorders of his or her patients. The fact that he or she does so through the use of psychological procedures does not take that treatment out of the definition of “treatment” discussed above. Therefore, a psychologist falls within the purview of the term “practitioner of the healing arts,” and claims based on malpractice by a psychologist should be subject to the two-year statute of limitations provided at law.
[¶ 48] ISSUE 2: Do intentional acts which are not undertaken for the treatment of a mental condition constitute malpractice?
[¶ 49] Malpractice has as its central core a professional‘s liability for failure to properly render services provided to another in the context of that party‘s practice of his or her profession. On this basis, it has been held that some psychologists who engage in sexual relations with their patients have committed malpractice by improperly diagnosing and handling a patient‘s manifestation of “transference phenomenon“—e.g. the transferring to the therapist of feelings and behaviors that had previously been experienced with important figures such as parents, siblings, or spouses. See, e.g., St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Love, 459 N.W.2d 698, 701 (Minn. 1990).
[¶ 50] It appears that in situations where allegations of misdiagnosis and/or mishandling of treatment of “transference” were present, most jurisdictions considering the issue have found malpractice was an appropriate cause of action. See, e.g., Doe by Roe v. Madison Center Hosp., 652 N.E.2d 101 (Ind.App. 1995); Love, 459 N.W.2d at 701; Corgan v. Muehling, 167 Ill.App.3d 1093, 118 Ill.Dec. 698, 701, 522 N.E.2d 153, 156 (1 Dist. 1988); Simmons v. United States, 805 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1986). This seems logical, as the psychologist would be acting within the bounds of professional treatment of his patient in misdiagnosing or mishandling one aspect of his patient‘s mental or emotional disorder. However, that premise is inapplicable when a psychologist actively promotes and encourages a patient to develop transference for the purpose of sexually exploiting that patient. Such conduct is clearly beyond even the pretext of the rendering of professional services.
[¶ 51] In their complaint, plaintiffs allege defendant Lenz never intended to counsel plaintiffs to improve their marital relationship, and in fact his conduct was intended to seduce Linda and to entice Linda from her husband. These allegations present a question of fact as to whether defendant Lenz acted with the intent to encourage Linda to develop transference and then turned that transference to his own purposes.
CONCLUSION
[¶ 52] The profession of psychology falls within the definition of “practitioners of the healing arts,” and thus I would hold the trial court‘s dismissal of the causes of actions alleging malpractice was proper. However, I believe it is necessary to differentiate between mishandling or misdiagnosing a problem a patient develops while undergoing
GILBERTSON, Justice (dissenting on Issue I and concurring on Issue II).
ISSUE I
[¶ 53] I generally join in the dissent of Justice Sabers. However I do not think it necessary to revisit the propriety of the holding of Richards v. Lenz, 539 N.W.2d 80 (S.D. 1995), as the facts therein are substantially different than the facts now before us. Whether the holding in Richards survives or is reversed should await a day when the issue is again whether marital counseling by a psychologist comes within the statutory definition of a “practitioner of the healing arts.” See
[¶ 54] The issue before us is whether the facts of this case are governed by
[T]he gravamen of the complaint alleges that Defendant Lenz failed to properly discharge his professional duties which resulted in their damage. Thus, these claims essentially allege medical malpractice. The statute of limitations as set forth in
SDCL 15-2-4.1 pertains to a “practitioner of the healing arts” and applies “whether based upon contract or tort.” “Healing art” includes mental condition. SeeSDCL 36-2-1(3) .... Accordingly,SDCL 15-2-14.1 applies and there is a two year statute of limitations in the action against Lenz. (Citations omitted.)
[¶ 55] Here, Linda Rehm was not treated with counseling for marital problems which can have as its source such non-medical origins as financial problems, religious differences, work habits, temperament and the like. Rather, she was treated for depression. Unfortunately she was not just having a bad day. She was hospitalized for depression so severe that it had in the past and would later manifest itself with suicidal threats.9 While in the hospital, Linda Rehm was being treat-
[¶ 56] Dorland‘s Illustrated Medical Dictionary (25th Ed 1974) defines depression as “a psychiatric syndrome consisting of dejected mood, psychomotor retardation, insomnia, and weight loss, sometimes associated with guilt feelings and somatic preoccupations often of delusional proportions.”
[¶ 57] While we have not had previous occasion to directly address the nature of the condition, most recently we dealt with its effects on a person. In State v. Engelmann, 541 N.W.2d 96 (S.D. 1995), Engelmann‘s depression was described by a psychologist as “a serious mental illness; people suffering from it simply cannot make rational decisions.” Id. at 99. In allowing Engelmann to withdraw his guilty plea we concluded:
A diagnosis of ‘Severe Depressive Episode,’ a recognized mental disorder, reduced Engelmann‘s decision-making ability. Even the State‘s psychiatrist, though he disagreed with the depth of Engelmann‘s impairment, was unable to dispute this diagnosis, but confirmed Engelmann‘s blunted thought processes and diminished mental clarity.
Id. at 103. To me this describes an “unhealthy ... mental condition” as set forth in
[¶ 58] Like Justice Sabers, I conclude a fair reading of the complaint sounds in a cause of action for malpractice whether it uses that explicit word or not. Paragraph VII, of Count I of that pleading states:
By Defendant Lenz‘s actions, he was negligent in failing to exercise a degree of reasonable skill and care with the degree of knowledge and expertise ordinarily exercised by other psychologists in this and other like localities. Defendant Lenz neglected to heed Plaintiffs’ mental and emotional conditions, departed from accepted practices and procedures in the services rendered, failed to follow good psychological practices, performed contraindicated procedures on the Plaintiffs, and failed to provide necessary indicated procedures.
The allegations of the Rehms involve treatment for depression with suicidal tendencies. This leads me to the conclusion that the nature of the complaint is an action for malpractice within
[¶ 59] Thus I would affirm the trial court‘s granting of summary judgment on issue one. Under the facts of this case a two-year statute of limitations may seem harsh. However the wisdom of such a statute is the domain of the Legislature and not this Court.
ISSUE II
[¶ 60] As to issue two, I join with the rationale of the majority. Lenz and West River did not file a notice of review concerning the applicability of the two-year malpractice statute of limitations to this action rather than the three-year statute of limitations adopted by the trial court.
Notes
[A]s therapy develops ... the client comes to regard the therapist as a child might regard the parent.... And, so what happens when therapy is working is that this transference relationship grows so that the client comes to experience the therapist as a powerful, benevolent parent figure.
[A]ny system, treatment, operation, diagnosis, prescription, or practice for the ascertainment, cure, relief, palliation, adjustment, or practice for the ascertainment, cure, relief, palliation, adjustment, or correction of any human disease, ailment, deformity, injury, unhealthy or abnormal physical or mental condition[.]
[T]he observation, description, evaluation, interpretation, and modification of human behavior by the application of psychological principles, methods, and procedures for the purpose of preventing or eliminating symptomatice, maladaptive, or undesired behavior and of enhancing interpersonal relationships, work and life adjustment, personal effectiveness, behavioral health, and mental health. The term includes psychological testing and evaluation or assessment of personal characteristics ...; diagnosis and treatment of mental and emotional disorders or disabilities, compulsive disorders, disorders of habit or conduct as well as of the psychological aspects of physical illness, accident, injury or disability....
Because this case was filed before adoption of this definition, the prior definition applies to this case. However, application of this definition would not alter my conclusions.
To now suggest that the issue of the application of
I believe the trial court correctly decided the issue. That aside, we have consistently affirmed a summary judgment even where the trial court reached the right result but for the wrong reason. See Kehn v. Hoeksema, 524 N.W.2d 879, 881 (S.D. 1994) and cases cited therein. What should be directly on point here is that we have also consistently held a summary judgment will be affirmed if there exists ANY basis which would support the trial court‘s ruling. See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. v. Schilling, 520 N.W.2d 884, 886 (S.D. 1994).