REGIONAL TRANSPORTATION DISTRICT, Petitioner, v. Janet F. VOSS, Evelyn Stephenson, Arthur Waldinger, and Arthur Waldinger, P.C., Respondents.
No. 93SC591.
Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc.
Feb. 21, 1995.
890 P.2d 663
Moss, Morris & O‘Dell, P.C., Edward C. Moss, Anne H. Pierson, Englewood, for respondents Janet F. Voss and Evelyn Stephenson.
Hall & Evans, L.L.C., Alan Epstein, Denver, for respondents Arthur Waldinger and Arthur Waldinger, P.C.
Gale A. Norton, Atty. Gen., Raymond T. Slaughter, Chief Deputy Atty. Gen., Timothy M. Tymkovich, Sol. Gen., Simon P. Lipstein, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for amicus curiae State of Colo.
Griffiths & Tanoue, P.C., Tami A. Tanoue, Denver, for amici curiae Colorado Inter-Governmental Risk Sharing Agency and Colorado Counties Casualties and Property Pool.
Geoffrey T. Wilson, David W. Broadwell, Denver, for amicus curiae Colorado Municipal League.
Daniel E. Muse, City Atty., City and County of Denver, John M. Eckhardt, Asst. City Atty., Denver, for amicus curiae City and County of Denver.
Charles H. Richardson, City Atty., Julia A. Bannon, Aurora, for amicus curiae City of Aurora.
Justice KIRSHBAUM delivered the Opinion of the Court.
In Voss v. Regional Transportation District, No. 92CA1206 (Colo.App. July 29, 1993) (not selected for official publication), the court of appeals held that the three-year statute of limitations established by
On July 12, 1987, an RTD bus crossed the center line of a street while making a left turn and struck a car stopped at a red light. The respondents, who were occupants of the car, were injured by the impact.2 They filed a civil action against the RTD and others on February 9, 1990.3
The complaint alleges, inter alia, that the RTD driver was negligent, that such negligence caused the respondents’ injuries, and that the no-fault limitations statute governs this case. The RTD asserted that the suit was barred by the government entity limitations statute.4 The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the issue of the applicable statute of limitations. The trial court held that the no-fault limitations statute applied on the ground that if two statutes of limitations are arguably applicable, the statute providing the longer period of time governs.5
The case was tried to a jury in February 1992. At the conclusion of all the evidence, the trial court directed a verdict against the RTD, concluding that the bus driver was negligent as a matter of law and that the RTD must be assumed negligent pursuant to the master-servant doctrine.6 The jury awarded damages in favor of Voss in the amount of $300,000 and in favor of Stephenson in the amount of $5,000. The trial court reduced Voss‘s award to $150,000, pursuant to provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act (the Immunity Act) limiting judgment awards against government entities.
The RTD appealed the trial court‘s judgment, and Stephenson appealed the trial court‘s denial of her request for attorney fees. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court‘s conclusion that the no-fault limitations statute applied, reversed the trial court‘s denial of Stephenson‘s request for attorney fees, and remanded the case to the trial court for a determination of that issue.7 In reaching its conclusion with respect to the applicable statute of limitations, the court of appeals relied upon Jones v. Cox, 828 P.2d 218 (Colo.1992), and Reider v. Dawson, 856 P.2d 31 (Colo.App.1992), aff‘d, 872 P.2d 212 (Colo.1994).8
The RTD argues that the court of appeals erred in determining that the no-fault limitations statute is applicable to the respondents’ claims. We disagree.
A
As a preliminary issue, amici, the State of Colorado, Colorado Municipal League, Colorado Inter-governmental Risk Sharing Agency, Colorado Counties Casualty and Property Pool, the City and County of Denver, and the City of Aurora, contend that because the No-Fault Act defines “person” as “every natural person, firm, partnership, association, or corporation,”
Prior to 1972, governmental entities enjoyed complete immunity from claims arising from their tortious conduct. See generally Evans v. Board of County Comm‘rs, 174 Colo. 97, 482 P.2d 968 (1971). In 1972, the doctrine of sovereign immunity was judicially abrogated. In response, the General Assembly enacted the Immunity Act which statute establishes sovereign immunity for many governmental activities and waives such immunity for certain torts.
Immunity and partial waiver. (1) A public entity shall be immune from liability in all claims for injury which lie in tort or could lie in tort regardless of whether that may be the type of action or the form of relief chosen by the claimant except as provided otherwise in this section. Sovereign immunity is waived by a public entity in an action for injuries resulting from:
(a) The operation of a motor vehicle, owned or leased by such public entity....
Personal injury claims arising from automobile accidents between private parties are subject to the provisions of the No-Fault Act. Jones, 828 P.2d 218. Because the Immunity Act directs that “liability of a public entity shall be determined in the same manner as if the public entity were a private person[,]”
[W]here a motor vehicle accident involves a private passenger motor vehicle or a nonprivate passenger motor vehicle and a motor vehicle owned or operated by the regional transportation district... the insurer of the private passenger vehicle... shall not have any cause of action or right of reimbursement for any benefits actually paid by such insurer... against the regional transportation district or against the user or operator of the regional transportation district motor vehicle.
B
The RTD argues that the court of appeals failed to consider applicable legislative history or apply established rules of statutory construction in concluding that the no-fault limitations statute governs this case. The RTD further argues that the court of ap-
The primary task of a court in construing a statute is to give effect to the intent of the General Assembly. Dawson v. Reider, 872 P.2d 212, 214 (Colo.1994); Jones v. Cox, 828 P.2d 218, 221 (Colo.1992); Woodsmall v. Regional Transp. Dist., 800 P.2d 63, 67 (Colo.1990). Courts must look primarily to the language of the statute and determine the legislative intent by giving effect to the commonly accepted meaning of the words appearing therein. Jones, 828 P.2d at 221; Woodsmall, 800 P.2d at 67. Only if the “statutory text lends itself to alternative constructions” should a court employ alternate means to determine legislative intent. Woodsmall, 800 P.2d at 67; see Griffin v. S.W. Devanney & Co., Inc., 775 P.2d 555, 559 (Colo.1989).
The no-fault limitations statute provides in pertinent part as follows:
General limitation of actions—three years. (1) The following civil actions, regardless of the theory upon which suit is brought, or against whom suit is brought, shall be commenced within three years after the cause of action accrues, and not thereafter:
....
(j) All actions under the “Colorado Auto Accident Reparations Act“, part 7 of article 4 of title 10, C.R.S.;
The government entity limitations statute provides in pertinent part as follows:
General limitation of actions—two years. (1) The following civil actions, regardless of the theory upon which suit is brought, or against whom suit is brought, shall be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues, and not thereafter:
....
(h) All actions against any public or governmental entity or any employee of a public or governmental entity, except as otherwise provided in this section or section 13-80-103.5;
The words contained in the no-fault limitations statute and in the government entity limitations statute are not ambiguous. However, both statutes arguably are applicable to the circumstances of this case. In fact, the RTD conceded in arguments to this court that an ambiguity exists with respect to the application of the two statutes.10
In Jones, we held that the no-fault limitations statute rather than the statute of limitations applicable to tort actions in general established by
In Dawson, we considered the application of the no-fault limitations statute to a claim arguably governed by the one-year statute of
Our decision in Dawson was guided by the following rules of statutory construction we relied upon in Jones: (1) a later enacted statute should be applied over an earlier enacted statute; (2) the more specific of two applicable statutes should be applied; and (3) the longer of two applicable statutes should be applied. Dawson, 872 P.2d at 214. We also relied upon the legislative history of both statutes of limitations, and the purpose and policy of the No-Fault Act. Id. We find our analysis in Dawson applicable to the issue here posed.
The principle that a later enacted statute controls over an earlier enacted statute is not helpful here. Both the no-fault limitations statute and the government entity limitations statute were enacted in 1986, as part of Senate Bill 69.
The rule of specificity is also not dispositive. The RTD asserts that the government entity limitations statute is more specific than the no-fault limitations statute because a statute of limitations based on the status or class of defendant is “per se” more specific than a statute of limitations based on conduct. This assertion is not persuasive. The cases relied upon by the RTD in support of this argument recognize that ordinarily a more specific statute should be applied rather than a more general statute if both statutes deal with the same or similar subject matter. See Persichini v. Brad Ragan, Inc., 735 P.2d 168, 172-73 (Colo.1987); Koch v. Sadler, 759 P.2d 792, 793 (Colo.App.1988); Mohawk Green Apartments v. Kramer, 709 P.2d 955, 957 (Colo.App.1985). However, in Dawson, we recognized that in “determining which [of two statutes] is controlling by comparing the two statutes is not possible because one is defined in terms of the type of civil action while the other is defined in terms of the class of defendants.” Dawson, 872 P.2d at 214. Similarly, in this case the no-fault limitations statute refers to the type of civil action (claims brought under the No-Fault Act), while the government entity limitations statute refers to a class of defendants (governmental entities). In addition, each section is entitled “General limitation of actions,” and each section contains the following identical introductory language: “[t]he following civil actions, regardless of the theory upon which suit is brought, or against whom suit is brought, shall be commenced within [two] [three] years after the cause of action accrues, and not thereafter.” Compare
We have recognized that because statutes of limitations are in derogation of a presumptively valid claim, a longer period of limitations should prevail where two statutes are arguably applicable. Dawson, 872 P.2d at 214 (citing Payne v. Ostrus, 50 F.2d 1039, 1042 (8th Cir.1931) (“Of course if substantial doubt exists, the longer rather than the shorter period of limitation is to be preferred.“); O‘Malley v. Sims, 51 Ariz. 155, 75 P.2d 50, 54-55 (1938) (“We have repeatedly held that while the defense of the statute of limitation is a legitimate one, it is not favored by the courts, and, where two constructions are possible, the one which gives the longer period of limitation is the one to be preferred.“); Jefferson v. Nero, 225 Ark. 302, 280 S.W.2d 884, 886 (1955) (“If there is doubt as to which of two or more statutes of limitation applies to a particular action or proceeding, and it is necessary to resolve the doubt, it will generally be resolved in favor of the application of the statute containing the longest limitation.“); Thiel v. Taurus Drilling Ltd., 218 Mont. 201, 710 P.2d 33, 40 (1985) (“Where there is a substantial question as to
C
The RTD contends that the court of appeals failed to harmonize the language of the no-fault limitations statute and the government entity limitations statute and that application of the former statute to this case would render the latter a complete nullity. The RTD further contends that the court of appeals’ construction creates an implied exception to the government entity limitations statute, violating the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius. See Black‘s Law Dictionary 521 (5th ed. 1979) (“Under this maxim, if [a] statute specifies one exception to a general rule... other exceptions or effects are excluded.“). We reject these contentions.
In Dawson this court found that the legislative history of sections
The rationale of Dawson controls here. The No-Fault Act contains no provision exempting civil actions filed thereunder against governmental entities from the no-fault limitations statute. To imply such an exception from legislative silence would be inappropriate in view of our decision in Dawson. Contrary to the RTD‘s arguments, such construction does not eviscerate the provisions of the government entity limitations statute or create an implied exception thereto; the latter statute governs actions not arising under the No-Fault Act. A contrary construction, however, would do violence to the broad purposes of the No-Fault Act to “avoid inadequate compensation to victims of automobile accidents” and to “require registrants of motor vehicles in this state to procure insurance covering legal liability arising out of ownership or use of such vehicles and also providing benefits to persons injured in accidents involving such vehicles.”
D
Our conclusion that the no-fault limitations statute governs this case is buttressed by what we identified in Jones as “notions of fairness.” Jones, 828 P.2d at 223; see
III
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
ROVIRA, C.J., dissents, and VOLLACK, J., joins in the dissent.
Chief Justice ROVIRA, dissenting:
We have been asked to decide which statute of limitations applies to a tort action brought against the Regional Transportation District (RTD). The majority holds that the three year limitation period for actions arising under the Colorado Automobile Accident Reparations Act (No Fault Act limitation) applies rather than the two year limitation for actions against governmental entities (Governmental Entity limitation). Maj. op. at 666; Compare
I.
The majority relies on two principal cases to support its holding, Jones v. Cox, 828 P.2d 218 (Colo.1992) and Dawson v. Reider, 872 P.2d 212 (Colo.1994). Indeed, the majority explains that the “analysis in Dawson [is] applicable to the issue here posed.” Maj. op. at 668. The majority‘s rationale here contains many of the same errors I first identified in my dissent in Dawson.
As I stated in Dawson, the Jones holding was not premised on the principle of statutory construction that the longer statute of limitations should prevail when two statutes conflict. Dawson, 872 P.2d at 218 (Rovira, C.J., dissenting). Rather, in Jones, the court held that actions arising under the No Fault Act comprise a more specific class of actions than do tort claims generally.1 In Jones, once the court had answered the preliminary question of whether the No Fault Act covered an action between two motorists, it could readily identify the more general and specific statute. See Jones, 828 P.2d at 223.
In Dawson the court attempted to build on Jones, but was without identifiable general and specific statutes. Absent this guideline, it resorted to the conclusion that the length of the statutory period is dispositive. Here, the majority once again concedes that two of the three principles of statutory construction relied on in Jones are not present.2 Maj. op. at 668. Thus, while the court purports to rely on Jones, in reality that case provides little support for the majority‘s decision.
II.
A.
The majority‘s reliance on the proposition that the longer statute must prevail because statutes of limitation preclude presumptively valid claims is defective in three respects. First, the majority ignores the rule that statutes of limitations governing actions against governmental entities must be strictly construed. In so doing it ignores the policies clearly set forth in the Governmental Immunity Act (GIA). Second, it ignores the modern trend to view statutes of limitation favorably. Finally, the majority‘s interpretation
I agree that the provisions of the No Fault Act apply to RTD as a public entity. Maj. op. at 666. That the substantive provisions of the No Fault Act apply is not, however, determinative of the procedural aspect of the applicable statute of limitations. Any limitation period providing for claims against the government must be strictly construed. See Dawson, 872 P.2d at 219 (Rovira, C.J., dissenting). This rule finds strong support in the policies underlying exceptions to governmental immunity. When it enacted the GIA, the General Assembly recognized that “taxpayers would ultimately bear the fiscal burdens of unlimited liability and that limitations on the liability of public entities and public employees are necessary in order to protect the taxpayers against excessive fiscal burdens.”
B.
Further, as pointed out in my dissent in Dawson, limitation periods are viewed favorably in Colorado. Dawson, 872 P.2d at 218-19 (Rovira, C.J., dissenting) (citing Oberst v. Mays, 148 Colo. 285, 365 P.2d 902 (1961); Chuchuru v. Chutchurru, 185 F.2d 62, 64 (10th Cir.1950)). The cases relied upon by the majority to support the contention that the longer period applies all originate outside of Colorado, and reflect an archaic view toward limitations periods. The majority bases its conclusion on the fact that statutes of limitation bar presumptively valid claims. However, the GIA provides that there are no presumptively valid claims against any Colorado governmental entity, except those allowed by statute. See
C.
Finally, the majority holds that application of the longer period of limitations would not eviscerate the two year limitation period for actions against governmental entities. I disagree. Statutes are to be read in harmony to avoid a construction that would render meaningless one or more such parts. People v. Terry, 791 P.2d 374, 376 (Colo.1990). The majority points out the limitations statutes contain identical introductory language.4 Maj. op. at 668. Indeed, the one, two and three year limitations periods all contain identical introductory language. Because limitations periods are defined for every category of claim that can be brought against a
The majority states that its interpretation is supported by the fact that the No Fault Act limitation contains no exception for the Governmental Entity limitation. Maj. op. at 669. Once again, I fail to understand the majority‘s exclusionary argument. See Dawson, 872 P.2d at 221 (Rovira, C.J., dissenting). The majority‘s analysis is equally persuasive to draw the opposite conclusion because the Governmental Entity limitation contains enumerated exceptions, none of which relate to the No Fault Act. See
III.
Finally, the “notions of fairness” contained in Jones does not suggest the longer statutory period should apply. While in Dawson the majority was influenced by the General Assembly‘s rejection of a one year limitations period as too short to bring a claim, here, the two year period provides ample time for such a claim. See Dawson, 872 P.2d at 215 (explaining the only unanimous conclusion of the Special Task Force on Tort Liability and Insurance was “that a one-year interval is too short and a four year interval too long,....“). Indeed, we recently upheld the constitutionality of a two year limitations period based on our view that the statute properly “promote[d] justice, discourage[d] unnecessary delay, and forestall[ed] the prosecution of stale claims.” See Dove v. Delgado, 808 P.2d 1270, 1274 (Colo.1991).
Here, the respondents properly notified the RTD of their potential claims as required under the GIA. While such notice provided the RTD with ample time to prepare for the action, the intervening two year period also provided the respondents a “fundamentally fair” period in which to file their claim.
Because the majority continues to adhere to an outdated view of limitations periods without giving consideration to competing policies underlying the GIA or basic principles of statutory construction, I dissent.
I am authorized to say that Justice VOLLACK joins in this dissent.
Notes
The following civil actions, regardless of the theory upon which suit is brought, or against whom the suit is brought, shall be commenced within [three or two] years after the cause of action accrues, and not thereafter.