Opinion
This declaratory judgment action arises out of a dispute between the plaintiff, the region 14 board of education (board),
The reсord reveals the following relevant facts and procedural history. The association and the board are parties to a collective bargaining agreement that prescribes the procedures for resolving grievances between the parties. The agreement defines the term “grievance” as, inter alia, “a complaint by a member or members of the bargaining unit regarding an alleged violation of a specific provision or provisions of this [agreement which relates to or involves the grieving teacher or teachers.” On March 6, 2002, the assoсiation filed a grievance in which it claimed that the board had violated article V of the agreement
After the board denied the grievance, the association initiated arbitration proceedings with the American Arbitration Association, pursuant to the arbitration provision of the agreement. The board then filed this action seeking, inter alia, a judgment declaring that the dispute is not arbitrable because the board had not violated any specific provision of the agreement. The trial court concluded that the dispute was not arbitrable, reasoning that “[t]he receipt of stock by the board in the demutualization process is a one-time, unexpected distribution of stock which neither party could have anticipated when the contract was executed. Because the receipt of the stock was unanticipated, the parties could not have agreed to arbitrate about it.” The association then appealed from thе trial court’s ruling.
On appeal, the association claims that the trial court improperly determined that the dispute is not arbitrable because: (1) the board failed to meet its burden of estаblishing that the grievance met the “positive assurance” test; see White v. Kampner,
After this appeal was filed, but before oral argument, this court issued its decision in Board of Education v. Wallingford Education Assn.,
We are not persuaded by the board’s arguments. Thе essence of our holding in Wallingford Education Assn. was that the insurance provision of the collective bargaining agreement at issue in that case, which is substantially similar to the insurance provision of the agreеment in the present case, was “susceptible of an interpretation that encompasses the issue raised by the association’s grievance.” Board of Education v. Wallingford Education Assn., supra,
The judgment is rеversed and the case is remanded with direction to render judgment declaring that the parties’ dispute regarding the distribution of proceeds realized from the demutualization of Anthem is arbitrable.
Notes
The plaintiff is a regional school district organized under General Statutes § 10-39 et seq.
The association appealed to the Appellate Court and we transferred the appeаl to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-1.
Article V (A) (1) of the agreement provides in relevant part: “The [board] shall pay 95 [percent] of the cost of the following health insurance for all eligible teachers and dependent family members including the unmarried children up to age 25 and participating teachers shall pay 5 [percent] of such cost. Beginning [July 1, 2001] the Board’s contribution shall be 92.5 [percent] and the teacher’s shall be 7.5 [percent]; beginning [July 1, 2002] the Board’s contribution shall be 90 [percent] and the teacher’s shall be 10 [percent].”
In WaUingford Education Assn., the collective bargaining agreement between the parties defined grievance as: “a claimed misapplication or misinterpretation of a specific provision^) of th[e] [agreement.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Board of Education v. Wallingford Education Assn., supra,
We also are not persuaded by the board’s argument that, under the doctrine of administrative estoppel, the decision of the commissionеr of the Indiana department of insurance that the board was a “statutory member” of the mutual insurance company and, therefore, entitled to receive shares of Anthem stock as a result of the demutualization bars the association’s claim that individual teachers are entitled to a share of the value of the stock. The Indiana commissioner simply did not address the issue raised by the association in the present case. Accordingly, the doctrine of administrative estoppel does not apply. See Corey v. Avco-Lycoming Division,
