Reginald Williams v. Columbus Regional Healthcare Systems, Inc.
499 F. App'x 928
11th Cir.
2012
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Docket

Reginald WILLIAMS, M.D., Nicole Williams, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. COLUMBUS REGIONAL HEALTHCARE SYSTEMS, INC., Doctors Hospital, Medical Center, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 12-11122

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

Dec. 3, 2012.

928-930

Non-Argument Calendar.

Works and Sewer Bd. of City of Birmingham, 239 F.3d 1199, 1208 (11th Cir.2001). Her right to reinstatement was not absolute, however. . Rather, “[i]f an employer can show that it refused to reinstate the employee for a reason wholly unrelated to the FMLA leave, the employer is not liable.” .

Here, the record demonstrates that Rodriguez experienced performance problems before taking FMLA leave. She admits that those problems started in June or July 2009, several months before she requested FMLA leave. Rodriguez acknowledges that during the meeting with Human resources and Allen, Allen laid out specific pre-leave reasons for her disappointment, including Rodriguez’ lack of initiative, failure to schedule meetings and the need to correct meeting minutes prepared by Rodriguez. According to Rodriguez, Douglas acknowledged the problems between Rodriguez and Allen and suggested a transfer if another position was available but if not, Rodriguez would return to her former position with a job performance plan.

It logically follows, therefore, in temporarily assigning Rodriguez to a lesser position, the University was motivated not by her taking FMLA leave but because of the problems between Rodriguez and Allen relating to Rodriguez’ job performance. Similar to the employee in , Rodriguez was therefore not entitled to reinstatement to her original position because she had performed poorly in her job before she took FMLA leave. Had she not taken leave, the University would have been justified in demoting and reassigning her, which is essentially what occurred. Or, she could have been placed on a performance plan, as Douglas had suggested, if no other positions were available. Accordingly, even accepting Rodriguez’ version of what occurred and why, the undisputed facts demonstrate that the University‘s failure to reinstate her was wholly unrelated to her taking FLMA leave, as the district court correctly found.

fendants-Appellees, Allmed Healthcare Management and Skip Freeman, M.D.

Nicholas Kadar, Cranbury, NJ, Thomas F. Martin, Martin & Martin, LLP, Tucker, GA, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Linda Haddad, Lauren Maria Massucci, Daniel Mulholland, Horty Springer & Mattern, PC, Pittsburgh, PA, Lucius Martelle Layfield, III, Columbus, GA, for Defendants-Appellees, Columbus Regional Healthcare Systems, Inc., Doctors Hospital and Medical Center.

Robert L. Shannon, Jr., Hall Booth Smith & Slover, PC, Atlanta, GA, for De-

Before CARNES, WILSON and BLACK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Reginald Williams, an African-American male, appeals the district court‘s dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1981 complaint for failure to state a claim. In his complaint, Williams alleged that Columbus Regional Healthcare Systems, Inc., Howard Weldon, Andrew Morley, Scott Hannay, and John Does A-J (collectively, Appellees) intentionally interfered with his right to the full and equal benefit of the laws and his right to contract with third parties on the basis of his race. After review,1 we affirm the district court.

“To state a claim for non-employment discrimination under § 1981, a plaintiff must allege (1) he is a member of a racial minority, (2) the defendant intended to racially discriminate against him, and (3) the discrimination concerned one or more of the activities enumerated in the statute.” . The rights enumerated in the statute include the right to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and the right to make and enforce contracts. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a).

Williams contends the Appellees interfered with his equal enjoyment of the laws and proceedings afforded by the hospitals’ bylaws in depriving him of his medi-cal staff privileges. However, we have previously held the suspension of medical staff privileges cannot be challenged in a § 1981 claim because under Georgia law, medical staff bylaws do not create a contractual right to the continuation of those privileges, and physicians do not have a broad property interest in continuing to practice medicine. . Thus, Williams’ argument is foreclosed by our holding in , and he cannot allege a § 1981 violation because he has not identified a protected liberty or property interest with which the Appellees interfered.

Additionally, we have previously held that alleging suspension of medical staff privileges does not implicate any contractual relationship, and cannot be the basis of a § 1981 discrimination claim. . Thus, Williams’ claims of interference with his right to contract all fail because they are predicated on the suspension or revocation of his medical staff privileges. Because he has no protected contractual interest in the continuation of his hospital staff privileges, he has no cognizable claim that Weldon interfered with his contract with the hospitals at which he worked. Similarly, he cannot raise a claim that the Appellees interfered with his patient contracts because the Appellees’ only action affecting those contracts was the limitation of his medical staff privileges. Finally, he cannot raise a claim of interference with future employment contracts because such contracts are too speculative.

AFFIRMED.

Notes

1
We review de novo a district court‘s grant of a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. . We accept the allegations in the complaint as true, and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
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